Abstract:

The question ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ is an intellectually and practically vital one, and yet it has largely been eclipsed by other debates within the scholarly literature on terrorism. This article considers some of the recent contributions to an emergent discussion of the question; it then outlines some of the problems inherent within the academic debate which has occurred thus far on the subject; and it adumbrates a framework for making future scholarship in this area more inclusive, systematic and
Dialogue is inherently dialogically fruitful than it has been to date.

Despite the valuably unending debates about precise definitions of ‘terrorism’ (Schmid, 2011; Richards, 2014; Ramsay 2015), many observers will agree that the term refers to a violent attempt to produce political or other forms of change. That being so, the extent to which terrorism does actually bring about such change should be a central question for scholars, states and citizens alike. Yet there has so far been much more attention paid by the scholarly community to questions of definition, causation, case study analysis and appropriate state response than there has been to this issue of terrorism’s efficacy or inefficacy (Crenshaw, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman, 2015; English, 2009; English, 2012; Singh,
To illustrate the point, we might consider one recent (and very good) survey of contemporary scholarly debates on terrorism, whose editors skilfully and primarily aimed ‘to provide an overview of the key questions and debates of the terrorism field’; the resulting book is impressive, focusing on what the editors consider the twelve ‘key questions which in many ways define the core debates and controversies within the terrorism studies field today’ (Jackson and Sinclair, 2012: vii-x, 2). The question, ‘Does Terrorism Work?’, is not among them.

Yet it is also true and encouraging that there has recently been something of a scholarly turn towards beginning to address, more directly and sustainedly than before, the issue of whether or not terrorism works as a method of political struggle. This current article will introduce some of the major, pioneering contributions that have been made to that emerging debate; it
will then identify various problems with the discussion as it has so far developed, before setting out an agenda on the basis of which we might try to ensure that future discussion of this vital subject is creatively fruitful, multidisciplinarily harmonious and internationally systematic.

**Contributions to an Emerging Debate**

In typically coruscating manner, Professor Alan Dershowitz set out over a decade ago a very forceful account of why, in his view, terrorism actually works. The central problem, he argued, was that the international community had attended far too much to addressing the causes behind terroristic (and especially Palestinian) violence, that they had therefore rewarded it greatly, and that the lesson had consequently been absorbed that, yes, terrorism does in fact work: ‘the
international community responded to terrorism between 1968 and 2001 by consistently rewarding and legitimizing it, rather than punishing and condemning it’, Dershowitz claimed (Dershowitz, 2002: 85).

But, while the late-twentieth century had witnessed this indulgent encouragement of terrorism, what was now needed – so Professor Dershowitz asserted - was the adoption of a new and different stance: ‘We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation’ (Dershowitz, 2002: 24-5).

Indeed, Dershowitz highlighted an important connection between (on the one hand) the degree to which terrorism might be judged effective and (on the other) our understanding
of the causal processes that tend to be involved within it. ‘The real root cause of terrorism,’ he claimed in his undeniably provocative book, ‘is that it is successful – terrorists have consistently benefited from their terrorist acts. Terrorism will persist as long as it continues to work for those who use it, as long as the international community rewards it, as it has been doing for the past thirty-five years.’ According to such a reading, ‘Terrorism will persist because it often works, and success breeds repetition,’ and there is a need to alter our response as a result: ‘the “root cause” of terrorism that must be eliminated is its success ... Before September 11, terrorism worked – not in every case and not for every group, but often enough to be seen as a successful tactic for bringing about considerable change. ... Any rational terrorist group that operates according to cost-benefit calculation will, at least in theory, be inclined to opt for the tactic or tactics that hold the best prospect for furthering their goals. At the moment, that
tactic is terrorism’ (Dershowitz, 2002: 2, 6, 26, 31, 167).

Professor Dershowitz has not been alone in stressing the efficacy of terrorist violence. Other talented scholars have also suggested that terrorism has in practice proved to be successful. ‘Terrorism often works. Extremist organizations such as al-Qaida, Hamas and the Tamil Tigers engage in terrorism because it frequently delivers the desired response’ (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 49). Or again, from another leading and influential scholar: ‘The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works’ (Pape, 2003: 350). And other learned analysts too have pointed to terrorism possessing considerable efficacy (Merari and Elad, 1986: 90).

Professor Dershowitz’s book focused heavily on Israel-Palestine. So too, another important contribution to the
debate, Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor’s 2010 article ‘Does Terrorism Work?’, also examines the Israeli and Palestinian case. It does so from a different methodological perspective from that of Professor Dershowitz (Gould and Klor’s approach being that of statistically based Economics rather than politically oriented Law); but it certainly marks a major intervention in the discussion, and it again finds that terrorism does succeed in producing some desirable effects for its practitioners.

Gould and Klor examine Israeli responses to Palestinian terrorism between 1988 and 2006, exploring local-level data, and concluding that ‘local terror attacks cause Israelis to be more willing to grant territorial concessions to Palestinians’. They also find, however, that there is a threshold effect: beyond a certain level, terrorism has the result of hardening attitudes about (and against) concessions. And, while
terrorism appears (in Gould and Klor’s argument) to move Israeli Jewish voters towards supporting right-wing parties in larger numbers, their work also suggest that terrorism tends to shift right-wing parties in a broadly leftward direction.

Gould and Klor’s article is methodologically very rigorous, so their suggestions ‘that terrorism can be an effective strategy’, and especially that ‘the data display a tendency for Israelis to become more accommodating in their views over time – more willing to grant concessions’ as a result of terrorism, deserve wide attention, especially as they are reinforced by some earlier scholarly work carried out by one of the authors together with another colleague (Gould and Klor, 2010: 1459-60, 1468; Berrebi and Klor, 2008).

But, in stark contrast to the kind of argument proffered by
those who stress the efficacy of terrorism, there have also been scholars who have argued strenuously that the opposite is in fact the case. In the words of Dr Max Abrahms, such commentators have tried to explain ‘Why Terrorism Does Not Work’. In Abrahms’ own forceful argument, ‘terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives’, and ‘terrorist success rates are actually extremely low’ (Abrahms, 2006a: 43-4). The focus of this important 2006 article by Dr Abrahms is on terrorists’ capacity to secure their strategic goals. Elsewhere, he concedes that terrorism is effective in producing fear and harm; he maintains that terrorism is ineffective politically, and that such strategic inefficacy is inherent in the tactic itself; but he acknowledges that strategic incentives alone do not necessarily explain terrorists’ actions (Abrahms, 2013). Significantly, his main interest lies in assessing the degree to which terrorist violence secures for its practitioners the strategic objectives that they centrally pursue.
In another strong piece, focusing this time specifically on al-Qaida, Abrahms argues again that terrorism has demonstrated a strategic inefficacy. Here he persuasively suggests that al-Qaida’s motivation crucially lay in its desire to change United States foreign policy, and he argues that in reality the trend of political developments has worked against, rather than for, that terrorist group’s aims:

There is a major disconnect between al-Qaida’s foreign policy objectives and the direction of post-11 September US policies in the Muslim world. ... In response to the 11 September attack, the United States has (1) increased its occupation of the Persian Gulf, (2) strengthened relations with pro-American Muslim rulers, (3) supported military interventions that have killed thousands of Muslims, and
(4) become an even more partial mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Abrahms, 2006b: 517, 523).

Other terrorism scholars have likewise reached the view that it is the inefficacy of this method of pursuing political change that is most striking when we closely consider it. Veteran terrorism expert Professor David Rapoport has, for example, claimed that, ‘By their own standards, terrorists rarely succeed’ (Rapoport, 2001: 54). Again, in the words of Peter Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, ‘campaigns of terrorism – shocking and brutal as they may seem – rarely succeed in achieving their stated objectives’ (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 100).

Reinforcing such judgments is the important work of Dr Audrey Kurth Cronin, whose wide-angled analysis of 450 terrorist groups’ campaigns resulted in her judging that 87.1% had achieved none of their strategic aims, that 6.4% had
achieved a limited result, that 2.0% had achieved a substantial component of their aims, and that only 4.4% had succeeded in the ‘full achievement of [the] group’s primary stated aims’ (Cronin, 2009: 215-16). Elsewhere, Dr Cronin has similarly observed that, ‘Terrorist campaigns rarely achieve their initial goals’; ‘Instances of success are rare, especially when judged against a group’s stated strategic aims’; and ‘Very few terror groups achieve their stated strategic aims.’ In asking how far terrorist groups have succeeded in securing their central goals, therefore, Dr Cronin suggests that, ‘the overwhelming majority have failed, with only about 6% of groups that rely on terrorism showing full or substantial achievement of their aims’; ‘terrorist successes, by which is meant campaigns that achieve long-term objectives and are then ended, are the rare exceptions’ (Cronin, 2008: 26, 35, 37).
Further bolstering such scepticism about terrorism’s effectiveness, other scholars have argued powerfully and originally that non-violent methods have proved to be far more successful in the pursuit of political goals. According to this view, civil resistance allows much better than do violent methods for attracting diverse, large-scale groups of activists, participants and supporters to mass-based struggle, and offers better chances of success as a result (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Roberts and Garton Ash, 2009). To some degree, this latter body of work resonates also with a wider turn in the scholarly literature, towards an explication of what might be termed an eirenic shift away from violence; pioneering and prominent here is the work of Harvard Psychologist Steven Pinker (Pinker, 2011).

So there is a broad, emergent school of work now pointing in the direction of terrorism being effective (Dershowitz, Pape,
Walter, Kydd, Gould, Berrebi, Klor, Merari, Elad); and there is an alternative perspective (exemplified by Abrahms, Rapoport, Neumann, Smith, Chenoweth, Stephan, Cronin), which points in the opposite direction, towards the judgment that terrorism does not work. A third broad stance is also evident in the literature to date, evincing the view that there is a somewhat ambiguous picture. Important scholars here include the late Professor Paul Wilkinson, who argued that terrorism ‘has proven a low-cost, low-risk, potentially high-yield method of struggle’, yet also that it has been one which ‘very rarely succeeds in delivering strategic goals’ (Wilkinson, 2000: 66). The same author expanded his view elsewhere in his work:

the history of modern terrorism campaigns shows that terrorism as a major weapon has only very rarely succeeded in achieving a terrorist group’s strategic goals ... However, there is a key difference between terrorists
gaining all their strategic goals and terrorists having a strategic impact on macro-political and strategic events and developments. With careful timing and skilful planning terrorists can certainly have a strategic impact on international relations and politics from time to time ... 

Although it is clear that terrorism rarely, if ever, wins strategic political goals, it has an impressive record in gaining such things as massive world-wide publicity, extortion of large ransom payments, and the release of considerable numbers of imprisoned terrorists (Wilkinson, 2006: 6, 22, 26, 195).

Professor Louise Richardson (another distinguished and influential terrorism scholar who, like Paul Wilkinson, worked at the University of St Andrews), has similarly suggested that, ‘Terrorist groups have been singularly unsuccessful in
delivering the political change they seek, but they have enjoyed considerable success in achieving their near-term aims’ (Richardson, 2006: 105-6). And, further echoing this view, experienced terrorism scholar Professor Dipak Gupta has strongly argued that, ‘while terrorist organizations are most often able to achieve their short-term strategic objectives, very few can reach their long-term goals’ (Gupta, 2008: 191).

**Problems with the Current State of Play**

What we have therefore is a newly emerging debate of real scholarly value, contributing to one of the major areas of analysis regarding terrorism. For, if the five main issues to discuss on the subject of terrorism are those of definition, causation, consequences, appropriate response, and the dynamics of endings, then it is clear that ‘Does Terrorism
Work?’ speaks directly to the third of these, that it relates significantly to each of the other four, and that we are only now beginning a seriously sustained scholarly debate on an issue which should probably have been focused on in this way years ago.

As suggested, the existing academic literature might be grouped into the three broad stances summarized above: those who argue that terrorism works; those who claim that it does not do so; and those who consider the picture to be more ambiguous. Scholars from each group have contributed much insight and wisdom to the debate so far. But it might be thought that some significant problems exist with the stage of the discussion at which we currently find ourselves. The remainder of this article will briefly identify some of these problems, before adumbrating an agenda for moving our discussions and debates more fruitfully forward in the future.
The first difficulty at present is that different scholars answer the question ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ according to diverging senses of what ‘working’ actually means. For example, the Alan Dershowitz book referred to earlier in this article considers the gaining of widespread publicity, or the securing of interim concessions, to embody terroristic success, while Max Abrahms’ work has tended instead to consider terrorism to work only when it secures its practitioners’ central, strategic goals (Dershowitz, 2002; Abrahms, 2006a). The problem here is that scholars risk talking past one another, and that the chances of cumulatively and collectively moving the community’s assessment forward are hindered as a result.

Nor is this merely a scholarly problem. In the wake of terroristic attacks such as the 26 June 2015 Tunisian beach
shootings or the 17 August 2015 Bangkok shrine bombing, interpretations of the effects of the assaults will depend (and policy and public and even future terroristic reactions will all partly be determined) by what we judge to have been intended and achieved. If the aim behind the Tunisian killings was the generation of publicity, or the vengeful killing of perceived enemies, then it might be judged to have worked brutally well; and if the intention was to damage the Tunisian tourist industry, then governmental and popular responses in its wake indeed helped to make this aspect of the gunman’s work effective also, at least temporarily. If the aim, however, was to advance the popularity and feasibility of the wider jihadist cause, then the widespread revulsion generated by the attack, together with the more determined and extreme anti-terrorist state responses prompted by it, might be thought to have rendered the operation less efficacious. With attacks such as this – and Bangkok provides another horrific and recent
example – serious discussion on practical responses can be marred by a failure to agree on what successful terrorism involves.

To take a particular example: there is great variation across terrorist groups in terms of how long they are able to sustain their efforts and violence. One authoritative recent study has suggested that nearly half of all terrorist organizations have been associated in fact with only one attack; it also suggests that nearly a quarter of all terrorist groups seem to have carried out more than one attack, but to have been active for less than one year. In other words, over seventy per cent of all terrorist groups have carried out operations for less than twelve months (LaFree et al, 2015: 81). If this is correct, then one line of enquiry for us as we ask ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ might be to ask whether merely sustaining a terrorist organization or movement for a reasonable length of time in
itself constitutes a major form of success, or whether such longevity has indeed to be tested against the securing of policy or political goals through violent action. At present, the scholarly debate is insufficiently coordinated for such considerations to be dealt with effectively. But this limits our understanding of what terrorists might reasonably consider to represent success, and how their motivation will be affected as a consequence.

In addition to this, it is also true that there remains another problem in agreeing what ‘terrorism’ itself actually is in the first place, and so the phenomenon at the heart of our debate continues to be a somewhat contested one. Analysis of whether terrorism works can (understandably, I think) often turn fairly promptly to considering episodes such as the October 1983 Hezbollah Beirut truck bombings, since these did seem to yield striking and considerable strategic success. But
almost all of the dead in these 1983 attacks were military personnel. So, while some scholarly definitions would allow them to be included in the debate, those many scholars who define terrorism as necessarily involving the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants might not consider discussion of the Beirut attacks to be appropriate. So, again, there is a risk of scholars talking past one another when we debate this question. As a further example of definitional issues, those who define terrorism as something only practised by non-state actors might differ in their focus of research and discussion from those who consider states and non-state activists alike to be capable of carrying out violence deserving the description of terrorism (Richardson, 2006; English, 2009). Yet again, another serious definitional problem concerns the difficulty of distinguishing between terrorism and larger-scale forms of violence such as insurgency, civil war and guerrilla warfare (with some organizations or movements practicing
different kinds of violence even within the same struggle). In particular, this emerges as an issue regarding anti-imperial or anti-colonial campaigns, such as those against the British in places including Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus (Bennett, 2013; Cormac, 2013). Some scholars would claim that violence such as that which occurred in these twentieth-century contexts should indeed form part of our debate regarding the efficacy of terrorism; some would exclude it since it involves levels of violence greater than they judge terrorism to involve; and again therefore there can be a danger of scholarly debate being less integrated than would be ideal.

Another dialogic difficulty in the current literature derives from the broadly helpful fact that the debate on terrorism’s efficacy has (quite rightly) been multi-disciplinary. Political Scientists, Economists, Lawyers, Historians, International Relations scholars, Psychologists and others have all been
involved. This brings with it the prospect of disciplinary multilingualism, and it is to be celebrated. But it has at times also involved less mutual listening than would have been ideal, since the methodological approaches deployed (and the literatures evident in people’s respective bibliographies) have not always been respectfully inclusive. Part of this has involved a tension between those who adopt a case study emphasis (intensively discussing Israel, or Spain, or particular groups such as al-Qaida, the IRA, or Hamas or ETA) and those whose approach involves a more wide-angled and nomothetic engagement, more comprehensive in its scope but thinner at each case study point in its reflection (Singh, 2011; English, 2012 cf. Cronin, 2009; LaFree et al, 2015). The strengths of both the particularizing and the generalizing scholar are clearly very significant; but drawing their respective insights together has not always been easy (or even attempted as frequently as one might prefer).
A Framework for Future Scholarship

So: how might we collectively decide to address these problems? There is unlikely ever to emerge scholarly consensus on a definition of terrorism (any more than there will emerge full agreement about defining other major terms such as nationalism, the state, Marxism, empire, colonialism, feminism and so forth). The best that we can probably hope for here is that each scholar makes clear and adheres to their own rigorous definition of terrorism in their work, and that we all try to offset the blind spots that are sometimes created by the way in which we each variously define the term. It would be possible, for example, for scholars who exclude certain kinds of act from their own definition of terrorism, none the less to respect and address the arguments and cases of those
whose definitional approach (and therefore range of cases) differs. Pragmatic flexibility can reduce mutual deafness here, I think.

And the issue of defining what ‘working’ means is one which can, I believe, be addressed much more fully and satisfactorily than has hitherto been the case. My own approach here (in a book due to be published in 2016 by Oxford University Press (English, 2016)) is to set out a layered, detailed, systematic framework for understanding what we might consider it to mean to say that terrorism works. Such a framework allows us to include the insights and arguments of those (such as Max Abrahms and Alan Dershowitz) who at present seem to disagree with each other in ways that avoid collective consensus; and it allows also for the inclusion of many terrorist cases which, at present, tend to be considered in isolation.
Clearly, deploying this framework involves the analysis of much complexity of detail as it is worked out in contextual practice; but, in stark terms, I would argue that when we ask ‘Does Terrorism Work?’, there could be:

1) strategic victory, with the achievement of a central, primary goal or goals

2) partial strategic victory, in which:
   a) one partially achieved one’s central, primary goal(s)
   b) one achieved or partially achieved one’s secondary (rather than central, primary) strategic goal(s)
   c) one determined the agenda, thereby preventing one’s opponent from securing victory

3) tactical success, in terms of:
a) operational successes

b) the securing of interim concessions

c) the acquisition of publicity

d) the undermining of opponents

e) the gaining or maintaining of control over a population

f) organizational strengthening

4) the inherent rewards of struggle as such, independent of central goals.

Such an approach, if used by scholars of various kinds and approaches, would have the benefit of allowing all of our insights simultaneously to be included in collaborative assessment as we seek to move the debate forward. Those who suggest that terrorism works in terms of tactical success (such as Alan Dershowitz) could therefore coexist plausibly and harmoniously within our assessment with those (such as
Max Abrahms) who maintain that terrorism tends not to work in terms of the securing of central, strategic objectives. What initially appears to be disagreement between such scholars would therefore somewhat evaporate. And, in relation to methodological combat, those whose nomothetic work generates valuably wide-angled assessments about efficacy or inefficacy across many cases (Audrey Kurth Cronin, for example) could be complemented by the particularizing work of those who look in closer detail at one specific case (whether Bruce Hoffman on Jewish terrorism, Eric Gould and Esteban Klor on Palestinian terrorists’ effect on Jewish Israeli politics, Max Abrahms on al-Qaida, myself on the IRA, Rashmi Singh on Hamas, and so on). We would, within such a shared framework, possess a map onto which many scholars’ work could be written and noted simultaneously. The possibility of reaching something nearer to a collective scholarly judgment would be greatly enhanced, I think.
For the question ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ is far too important for it to be approached by only one discipline, or for it to be read through only one methodological lens. My own training and approach are those of the political Historian. But we also need the conceptual precision of the Philosopher, the contextual knowledge of the long-time case study expert (whether Anthropological, Historical, or other), the forensic acumen of the legally focused, the cross-case insights of the comparative Political Scientist, the theological and ideological understanding of the Theologian, and so forth. Without a framework such as the one that has been adumbrated above, such insights will risk being lost within intra-disciplinary mini-debates, and their effect will be diminished by the solipsism of individual disciplines. *Within* such a framework as the one set out above, however, all of the insights of scholars whose work has already been mentioned in this article, could be drawn
together to produce a more comprehensive and collective portrait.

This would also allow for us to offset another existing problem in the ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ debate (and in wider post-9/11 academic analysis of terrorism more generally): namely, the division between the now enormous US-generated literature on the subject, and the often different bibliographies engaged with elsewhere (including western Europe). A global conversation on this vital topic, on the basis of a shared framework for layered analysis, would allow for us all to learn far more and (perhaps) even to agree. Debates on the efficacy of related phenomena such as peacekeeping are now usefully emerging (Fortna, 2008). And there is the basis now for a more sustained, inclusive, and dialogically fruitful scholarly discussion of the question, ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ It is such an important issue that we must not waste the opportunity. It
is probably not true that international terrorism is growing in frequency (LaFree et al, 2015: 146-71). But there is no doubt either that many countries across the world continue to experience the threat of terrorist attacks, that there exist at least some family resemblances between these expressions of violence, and that our analytical and practical understanding of the dynamics of terrorism are narrowed down if we fail to listen sufficiently to scholars working in other geographical settings. An internationally shared framework for analysis therefore makes very good sense.

And this could have important policy implications. The literature on terrorism tends to demonstrate that terrorists act with the same kind of levels of rationality and sanity as do other people (Horgan, 2005: 50, 53, 62-5). This being so, and as is evident from so many case studies on the subject, one of the central mechanisms involved in terrorist decision-making
is that terrorists opt to use violence because they consider it to be the most (or even the only) effective means of pursuing necessary change. Such violent decisions will continue to be made, of course, whatever academics might conclude. But if the scholarly community were able both to demonstrate that different levels of terroristic goal have different levels of likely success deeply inherent within them (that, say, tactical success is far more probable that strategic victory), then there would be grounds for individuals and groups and societies to assess future terroristic violence (perhaps) as unlikely to yield the kind of strategic result that would justify its bloody deployment.

Moreover, states which want to limit non-state terrorism (and that includes most of them most of the time) would be able to understand more fully the reasons for terrorism actually being sustained (that it continually yields some inherent rewards;
that it offers significant tactical returns; that it can and does determine political agendas), while being calmer about the central or even existential strategic issues over which the violence tends to be ostensibly practised. A more finely-tuned and proportionate state response might then be forthcoming, perhaps, than the ones which have seen both this century and the previous one scarred by wars which were contingently pursued after the trigger of non-state terrorist atrocity (whether in June 1914 in Sarajevo, or September 2001 in the eastern United States).

It might also avoid some of the arguably self-damaging aspects of less dramatic state response too. One of the elements identified in our framework above involves the terroristic capacity to undermine opponents; and one frequent illustration of this lies in the ways in which liberal democracies have often reacted to terrorism by undermining their own
precious laws and their protections of citizens’ rights (Gearty, 2013; Donohoe, 2008). This has often embodied one of the clearest ways in which terrorist violence has worked (English, 2009; English, 2012). If we all shared a fuller view of the complex ways in which terrorism actually works, then there would be a diminished likelihood of states making non-state terrorists’ work easier for them. We should not exaggerate the degree to which academic insights or agreement will determine policy or political developments. But nor should we allow a fissiparous scholarly approach to limit our understanding of a question as important as ‘Does Terrorism Work?’ A shared framework for interrogation of the problem would enable scholars to contribute more coordinated analysis; in turn, this would possess benefits as we all reflect on how to respond to one of the most significant challenges facing us as individuals, societies and states in the twenty-first century.
Underlying this reality is the vital fact that, when we study non-state terrorism, we need to do so with a close eye to state actions and to the relationship between states and their non-state adversaries. For there is a paradoxical intimacy between these enemies in very many cases. The prior villainy of each supposedly precedes and justifies the (often violent) actions of the other, and there is a mutually shaping relationship between counter-terrorist efforts by states and the trajectories of non-state terrorist individuals and groups (English, 2015). Whether discussing the definition of terrorism, its causes, its effects, its endings or the best responses to it, the relationship between state action and non-state terrorism is therefore vital, and this is undoubtedly the case in relation to the question ‘Does Terrorism Work?’
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