

The Europeanisation of Regionalisation: European Integration and Public Support for Self-Government in Scotland 1979/1997

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The paper addresses the question of whether and how European integration affects demands for regional self-government in states which are member of the European Union. It does so analysing the dynamics of the demand for self-government in Scotland on the basis of a comparison between 1979 and 1997. What impact did membership of the EU have on support for self-government at the two points in time? Did the process of European integration between 1979 and 1997 increase support for self-government in Scotland? Through the analysis of public opinion data drawn from a series of election and referendum studies, the paper argues that the demand for self-government in Scotland was strongly affected by the EU dimension from the mid-1980s onwards. The different result of the 1997 referendum relative to the 1979 referendum can be explained as the result of a process of Europeanisation between the two points in time. By improving the cost/benefit balance of self-government relative to the status quo, European integration indirectly raised the demand for the former. Two broader conclusions follow: that European integration impacted on the demand for self-government at mass public level through the intervening variable of political actors' strategies and that it was the single market rather than regional policy that had the strongest impact.

Introduction

The academic research on Europeanisation has covered a large number of issues and of theoretical approaches. In particular, two perspectives can be distinguished. On the one hand, the concept of Europeanisation has been used to describe the development of a supranational political system at the European level. On the other hand, it has been used to describe the impact that this development has had on the structure and on the political process in the member states of the European Union². One of the central questions in the literature which adopts the latter perspective is whether and how the process of European integration affects the demand for self-government at the regional level within the states that are member of the European Union. In other words, whether and how demands for regional self-government

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have been *Europeanised* by the process of integration. The question of whether integration at the supra-state level would cause 'disintegration' at the sub-state level by raising demand for regional self-government has been present in the literature on Europeanisation for a long time, both with reference to Europe as a whole³ and to individual states such as the UK⁴. Despite having been present in the academic debate for such long time, this question has never been thoroughly investigated either at the theoretical or at the empirical level. On the one hand, it is frequently asserted that the process of European integration is likely to have increased – and to further increase – the demand for self-government at the regional level but that assertion is not substantiated by empirical evidence of the causal mechanisms through which the impact of one phenomenon on the other is supposed to take place⁵. On the other hand, one finds empirical references to the impact of European integration on the politics of self-government of several EU states, but these references are not grounded in an explicit theoretical framework⁶.

This paper intends to contribute to the literature on Europeanisation by providing a theoretically based analysis of the impact of European integration on a major case of demand for regional self-government: Scotland between 1973 and 1997. Scotland and the

UK provide an ideal test case for the general hypothesis that European integration raises demand for self-government at sub-state level for three main reasons. First, the establishment of a Scottish parliament is the most recent and arguably the highest profile case of demand for self-government at regional level in Europe⁷. Second, there is a long history of demand for self-government in Scotland which thus allows for testing the impact of European integration as an additional variable⁸. Third, the existence of two very distinctive periods -

² See discussion in Bomberg and Peterson (2000), in this series. For the sake of simplicity and consistency I use the terms European Union and EU to refer to what in the 1970s was called the European Communities, the EEC or the Common Market.

³ See, among others, Feld (1975), Kellas (1991), Saint Ouen (1993), Sharpe (1993), Borrás-Alomar et al. (1994), Loughlin (1996).

⁴ On the impact of European integration on the vertical distribution of power in the UK see in particular Rhodes (1973-4), Kolinsky (1978), John (1996), Leicester (1998).

⁵ For examples of such assertions, see Kolinsky (1981: 86), Urwin (1982: 67), Kellas (1991: 226-31).

⁶ See, for example, Keating and Jones (1991), De Bandt (1992), Brown et al. (1996).

⁷ There is considerable disagreement in both the academic and the journalistic usage on whether Scotland should be referred to as a nation or as a region. I use the second definition in the sense of unit within a state. Since nation is often used, albeit incorrectly, as a synonym for state I believe the word region involved less ambiguity. I thus contrast region with state rather than with nation.

⁸ By self-government, I refer to both devolution or home rule – i.e. self-government within the UK – and independence – i.e. self-government outside the UK. For an overview of the politics of self-government in Scotland, see Bogdanor (1999); on the 1979 referendum, see Watt (1979), Perman

culminating in the referendums of 1979, which failed to show sufficient support for devolution, and in 1997, when the result was decisively in favour - allows for a comparison across time in presence of change in both the independent and the dependent variable.

This paper focuses on the demand for self-government at mass public level and investigates to what extent it was affected by European factors. Since it was mass public demand, as expressed in referendum votes, which ultimately decided the fate of self-government in Scotland, the paper attempts to ascertain whether European factors can account for the endorsement of devolution in 1997 vis-à-vis rejection of devolution in 1979. In other words, whether the higher level of demand in 1997 was the product – at least partially – of a process of *Europeanisation* of the demand for self-government in Scotland.

The analysis is based on a rationalist framework which models support for self-government at mass public level as a function of a rational calculation of costs and benefits – broadly understood - of self-government versus costs and benefits of the status quo. This analysis is carried out through a comparison of public opinion data on the demand for self-government in 1979 and 1997, when the two referendums to establish an elected Scottish assembly/parliament were held⁹. The data are obtained from public opinion surveys conducted after the general elections of 1979 and 1997 and after the 1997 referendum as part of the British Election Studies series¹⁰.

The paper identifies three key aspects of the demand for devolved self-government at mass public level. First, the existence of a significant gap between the level of demand at the attitudinal level and the one represented by the vote in the referendums. Second, a close link between attitudes to devolution – i.e devolved self-government – and to secession – i.e. independent self-government. The analysis of this gap reveals that actual demand for devolved self-government – as expressed in the referendum vote – was largely a function of

(1979), Balsom and McAllister (1979), Bochel et al. (1981), Proctor (1982) and Brand (1986); on the 1997 referendum see Jones (1997a, 1997b), Mitchell et al. (1998), Pattie et al. (1998) and Pattie et al. (1999).

⁹ The elected body proposed in 1979 was called Scottish Assembly while the one proposed in 1997 was called Scottish Parliament. The powers assigned to the latter were significantly greater than those assigned to the former.

¹⁰ These datasets are as follows: Scottish Election Study, 1979 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 1981. SN: 1604 | McCrone, D. et al., Scottish Election Survey, 1997 [computer file]. 2nd ed. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 24 June 1999. SN: 3889 |

attitudes to independent self-government. I call this connection the ‘interaction effect’ between devolution and independence. Relative to the status quo, support for independent self-government was negative in 1979 and positive in 1997. Third, that attitudes to independence were deeply influenced by the perception of European integration as mediated by political parties and interest groups. The change in the perception of integration between 1979 and 1997 largely determined the change in the attitudes towards independence. By virtue of the interaction effect mentioned above, higher support for independence determined higher demand for devolution. It thus concludes by claiming that the demand for self-government underwent a process of Europeanisation between 1979 and 1997 primarily through the impact of integration on the attitudes to independence and the close link between the latter and the demand for devolved self-government.

The paper is divided into two parts and six sections. The first section describes the demand for self-government at different levels and in various forms. The second one identifies and analyses the discrepancies between its strength at the attitudinal level and at the behavioural level. The third section identifies and discusses the link between independence and devolution. Sections four to six discuss how the inclusion of an explicit European dimension in the strategies of political actors pursuing self-government Europeanised the demand at mass public level and led, first, to a change in the perception of the EU and, second, to higher support for self-government. The concluding section summarises the argument and discusses its wider implications.

The Nature of the Demand for Self-Government in Scotland at Mass Public Level in 1979 and in 1997

This part analyses the nature of the demand for self-government at mass public level in 1979 and 1997 and introduces the concepts of ‘virtual/actual demand gap’ and ‘devolution/independence interaction effect’ on which the argument of this paper rests.

The demand for self-government

The demand for self-government at mass public level took two forms and was expressed at two different levels. It is important to distinguish between these different elements in order to understand the nature of support for self-government.

The demand for self-government took two forms as there were two main constitutional options involving differing degrees of self-government: devolved self-government – or devolution – and independent self-government – or independence. As discussed below, support varied greatly between these two constitutional options both at each point in time and between the two points in time. Demand for self-government was also expressed at two different levels: through answers to opinion poll surveys and through vote in the two referendums. I refer to the first level as the 'virtual' demand for self-government as this is essentially an attitudinal support whereas I refer to the second level as the 'actual' demand on the basis that the latter is a behavioural support. Here it is important to bear in mind that only the demand for devolution was expressed at both the virtual and the actual level while the demand for independence could only be expressed at the attitudinal level as independence was never an option in the referendum.

Starting with the analysis of the demand for self-government at the virtual level, four main points emerge. First, self-government (i.e. devolution and independence combined) enjoyed large majority support versus the status quo at both points in time. Demand for it was at 61 per cent in 1979 and at 78 per cent in 1997. Second, demand for self-government was concentrated among Labour and Nationalist identifiers, whereas among Conservative identifiers, especially in 1997, self-government only enjoyed minority support. Third the demand for the two self-government options, devolution and independence, changed in opposite directions. Demand for devolution declined from 54 to 43 per cent while demand for independence rose from 7 to 35 per cent. In other words, the increase in the demand for self-government between 1979 and 1997 was entirely attributable to the higher popularity of independence. Fourth, and most significant for the present enquiry, is that in turn the rise in the demand for independence is almost entirely accounted for by the popularity of the 'Independence in Europe' option¹¹ while the 'Independence outside the EU' option only rose by two percentage points. The decline in the demand for devolution and the increase in the

¹¹ Support for the 'Independence in Europe' option was not measured in 1979 as the policy of the SNP was to withdraw from the European Union; hence support for independence in 1979 can be interpreted as support for independence outside the EU.

demand for independence between 1979 and 1997 took place across all party identifications¹² with particular sharp increases in support for independence among Labour and Nationalist identifiers. For the latter group of party identifiers, it is important to point out that in 1979 independence only received minority support while 50 per cent supported either devolution or the status quo [table 1].

Actual support for self-government - measured by vote in the two referendums - was substantially different between the two time-points. The Yes vote increased more than twenty points while the No vote, including those who did not vote in 1979 but favoured the No side, declined by 27 percentage points. The change in the actual support for self-government was thus much stronger than the change which took place at the level of virtual support. Disaggregating the data by party identification, moreover, it emerges that the change was highly concentrated among Labour identifiers while the voting pattern of both Conservative and, especially, Nationalist identifiers remained broadly stable. Among Labour identifiers the vote 'swing' between 1979 and 1997 was more than twenty percentage points [table 2].

These data also show that actual support for devolution was in fact negative in 1979 even though the referendum result showed a narrow positive margin¹³. The difference is accounted for by the effect that the 40 per cent rule¹⁴ had on the decision to abstain from voting in the referendum. As showed by the data reported in the table 2, those who did not vote were twice as likely to favour the No vote than the Yes vote which indicate that many opponents of devolution chose to abstain in the knowledge that, by virtue of the 40 per cent rule, their abstention would have favoured the No side. If the percentage of No votes and that of non-voters favouring No are combined it becomes clear that the overall actual support for a Scottish assembly was negative in 1979. This interpretation is confirmed by additional data on the electorate's own interpretation of the referendum result. As shown in table 3, the prevailing interpretation was that the result showed that the Scottish people did not want an assembly.

¹² Throughout this paper, I use party identification as the main controlling variable; the crucial role of party identification in determining self-government preferences has been demonstrated by Pattie et al. (1998: 12; 1999: especially 149-51)

¹³ On the prevailing interpretation of the referendum result as 'indecisive', see Perman (1979: 63), Balsom and McAllister (1979: 401)

¹⁴ The 40 per cent rule stipulated that at least 40 per cent of the eligible voters had to vote in favour of devolution for the latter to be implemented, see Bogdanor (1980 and 1999: 186-89).

While the *volume* of the demand for self-government rose, it is interesting to note that the *intensity* of such demand declined between 1979 and 1997. A measure of the intensity of the demand for self-government is given by the perceived importance of the latter as a political issue at the time of the general elections. As reported in table 4, this measure shows a decrease in the salience of self-government as a political issue. Such a decrease took place across all party identifications, but it was much stronger for Nationalist and Conservative identifiers than for Labour identifiers. Not surprisingly, however, the perceived importance of self-government was positively correlated with the demand for it, so the importance of the issue was highest among Nationalist identifiers and lowest among Conservative identifiers both in 1979 and in 1997.

The gap between virtual and actual demand

In this section I analyse the gap between demand for self-government at the attitudinal and behavioural levels and I discuss the implications for explaining the different results of the two referendums and the process of Europeanisation of self-government in Scotland. I refer to the difference between the attitudinal support for self-government and the behavioural one as the 'virtual/actual demand gap'¹⁵. As summarised in table 5, this gap was much wider in 1979 than in 1997. In 1979, taking into account those who did not vote but favoured a Yes vote, the Yes vote commanded 39 per cent against a 61 per cent 'virtual' support for self-government. In contrast, in 1997 75 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted Yes which compares with a 78 per cent virtual support for self-government. In other words, many who 'virtually' supported self-government did actually vote against the assembly in the 1979 referendum or abstained in the knowledge that they would favour the No side. In contrast, those who were virtually in favour of self-government in 1997 voted overwhelmingly Yes in the referendum. To further analyse the nature of this gap I disaggregated the data by degrees of virtual support for self-government. Table 6 shows that less than 50 per cent of virtual supporters of self-government voted Yes in the referendum in 1979 against 70 per cent who did so in 1997. While the percentage of non-voters stayed exactly the same, 26 per cent voted No against only 5 per cent in 1997. Moreover, the table shows that the virtual/actual support gap in 1979 is accounted only marginally by the behaviour of those in favour of independence. Despite the distance between the self-

government capabilities of the proposed Scottish assembly and their own preferences, together with the ambiguous attitude of the SNP towards it¹⁶, 68 per cent of them voted Yes. This compares with a 75 per cent positive vote in 1997 and clearly indicates that supporters of independence were almost as ready to support a Scottish assembly in 1979, as they were to support a Scottish parliament in 1997. The group whose behaviour largely created the virtual/actual support gap in 1979 emerges as being those who virtually supported devolution. Only 46 per cent of them voted Yes in the referendum against 28 voting No while those who did not vote were more likely to favour a No vote than a Yes vote. These data compare to a 65 per cent Yes vote and a 7 per cent No vote in 1997. The virtual/actual support gap in 1979 was thus almost entirely attributable to the decisions of those who were in favour of devolution at the attitudinal level.

Moving one step further and disaggregating the data between supporters of the two devolution options - assembly and parliament – shows that the gap was largest among those virtually supporting the assembly as their preferred devolution option. As indicated in table 7, supporters of the parliament option voted decisively Yes in the referendum and those who did not vote were slightly more likely to favour the Yes side. In stark contrast, a plurality of those in favour of the assembly option actually voted No in the referendum and those who did not vote were more than twice as likely to favour a No vote than a Yes vote. Therefore, we are confronted with the paradox that those theoretically in favour of the option closest to the one put to the vote in the referendum were, remarkably, those most responsible for voting against it.

It thus appears that the gap between virtual and actual support for self-government in 1979 and by consequence the rejection of the Scottish assembly in presence of a very consistent long-term virtual support for self-government¹⁷, was caused by a plurality - or a majority if those who did not vote but had a preference are included - of virtual supporters of the assembly option voting No in the referendum. Two questions thus emerge. First, why was the gap much larger in 1979 than in 1997? Second, why did the group who should have found the referendum proposal closest to its own preferences actually reject it? The following section

¹⁵ The idea of virtual/actual support gap can also be found, in more general terms, in Watt (1979: 145), Perman (1979: 53) and Mitchell et al. (1998: 166).

¹⁶ On the attitude of the SNP to devolution in the 1970s see, among others, Levy (1986).

¹⁷ On the long-term consistently high level of virtual support for self-government, see Bennie et al. (1997: 154-6).

proposes an explanation based on the interaction between attitudes to independence and attitudes to devolution.

The interaction effect between devolution and independence

This section advances an explanation for the gap between virtual and actual support for self-government – notably the large one present in 1979 – based on two elements: the hierarchical distribution of preferences between status quo, devolution and independence and the existence of an interaction effect between the latter two.

As regards the first element, the distribution can take one of the following forms:

- 1 $D > I > SQ$ = devolution preferred to independence and independence preferred to status quo
- 2 $D > SQ > I$ = devolution preferred to status quo *but* status quo preferred to independence
- 3 $I > D > SQ$ = independence preferred to devolution and devolution preferred to status quo
- 4 $I > SQ > D$ = independence preferred to status quo *but* status quo preferred to devolution

On the basis of the data discussed below, I would argue that in 1979 the two distributions took the forms 2 and 3 while in 1997 they took the forms 1 and 3. In other words, positive attitudes to devolution co-existed with negative attitudes to independence. In the case of virtual support for self-government as measured by preferences on constitutional statuses, the two forms of support could be kept distinct and resulted in strong support for devolution and limited support for independence.

As regards the second element, my contention is as follows: since the establishment of a Scottish assembly/parliament was widely seen as a likely first step towards eventual independence – see below – , support for it was not only dictated by attitudes to devolution but also, crucially, by attitudes to independence. Since, as shown in the previous paragraph, supporters of devolution preferred the status quo to independence, the strength of their actual support for self-government was the product of an interaction effect between attitudes to the two forms of self-government. In conceptual, rationalist terms – assuming support as a function of perceived utility – the actual demand for self-government can be modelled in the following terms:

$$ADd = [VDd f(Ud - Usq) - p (Ui - Usq)] + \{VDi f [Ui - (Ud + Usq)] p \} \quad \text{with } U^* = (B^* - C^*)$$

Where the actual demand for devolution [ADd], defined as the demand for a Scottish assembly/parliament, is equal to the sum of two elements: the actual demand of those virtually supporting devolution plus the actual demand of those virtually supporting independence. In turn, the first element is composed of the virtual demand for devolution [VDd] – defined as a function of the perceived utility of devolution [Ud] minus the perceived utility of the status quo [Usq] – *minus* the perceived utility of independence [Ui] relative to the utility of the status quo [Usq] *discounted* by the perceived probability [p] that devolution would lead to independence. The second element is given by the virtual demand for independence [VDi] – defined as a function of the perceived utility of independence [Ui] minus the perceived *combined* utilities of devolution [Ud] and the status quo [Usq] – *multiplied* by the perceived probability [p] that devolution would lead to independence; and where all perceived utilities are the result of the difference between the perceived benefits and the perceived costs of each constitutional status.

The key aspect here is the p factor, i.e. the perceived probability that devolution would lead to independence: the higher the perceived value of p , the stronger the effect of the interaction between attitudes to devolution and attitudes to independence. In other words, the higher the perceived value of p the higher the likelihood that the crucial determinant of the referendum vote was the assessment of the utility of the status quo versus the utility of independence instead of that of devolution itself. In short, support for the two self-government options could be kept distinct in the case of answers to opinion polls questions – what I call virtual support – but could not be kept separate in the case of a referendum vote – what I call actual support – and this is why the latter was determined by the interaction of the attitudes towards both devolution and independence, even if independence was not as such an issue in the referendum. This is the mechanism that I refer to as the interaction effect.

A corollary of the existence of this interaction effect, is also that we should expect those favouring the lowest option of self-government - in 1979 the assembly option -, i.e. the one most distant from the independence option, to be those most opposed to independence. If the latter was perceived as a highly probable outcome of a Yes vote in the referendum, then it

follows that we should expect those favouring the assembly option to have been the ones most likely to vote No in the referendum. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence identified in the previous section and thus supports the hypothesis that the existence of an interaction effect between devolution and independence explains the apparent paradox of the gap between constitutional preferences and referendum vote of devolution supporters. Moreover, by virtue of this interaction effect, another feature of the referendum vote was that the true choice was not between devolution and the status quo but between devolution combined with the probability that it would lead to independence and the status quo. There are thus two crucial elements in the interaction effect between independence and devolution: the perception of the probability that the latter would lead to the former and subsequent assessment of the relative benefits/costs balance of independence versus the status quo¹⁸.

As regards the first aspect, the available evidence suggests that at both points in time the probability that devolution would lead to independence was perceived to be very high¹⁹. As the data in table 8 indicate, a break-up of the UK was considered to be the main disadvantage of devolution in 1979. Furthermore, it was particularly so for those opposing self-government *in toto* and for those supporting the weakest self-government option. Notably, there is only the slightest difference between these two groups in the extent to which they perceived devolution as leading to independence. It therefore appears that the fear that devolution would be a stepping stone to independence was a crucial determinant of opposition to self-government. In this light we can appreciate the dilemma of the supporters of the assembly option who were in the uncomfortable position of being in favour of a limited degree of self-government while being acutely aware that that limited degree of self-government was highly likely to turn into a maximum degree of self-government. Evidence that perception of the probability of this linkage was a crucial factor in the referendum vote is provided by table 9 which shows that those virtual supporters of self-government who voted No in the referendum were much more likely to think that the break up of the UK was the most important disadvantage of devolution and that the same pattern was reinforced in the case of virtual supporters of the assembly option. Additional support for the claim that the probability of devolution leading to independence was perceived as being very high and that it played a large role in shaping the referendum vote is provided by the abundant qualitative evidence

¹⁸ Evidence that a rational assessment of devolution took place is given by Balsom and McAllister (1979: 399) who state that the referendum campaign was based on the benefits and costs of the assembly.

that the likelihood of a break-up of the UK was the key argument of the anti-devolution campaign led by the Conservative party and business organisations and that the divisions in the Yes camp were largely dictated by the different interpretation of the purpose of devolution between Labour and the SNP²⁰.

As regards the 1997 referendum, the available data refer to the preferences on the most important thing the future Scottish parliament should not do²¹. In a similar pattern to the data for 1979, secession of Scotland is considered to be by far the most important decision the parliament should avoid. Again, likewise 1979, the data disaggregated by referendum vote reveal a very significant gap between the attitudes of actual supporters and opponents of self-government on this issue: the latter are almost twice as likely as the former to think so [table 10]. In sum, there is substantial evidence that the break up of the UK was perceived as the main cost of devolution in both 1979 and 1997. Therefore it follows that the probability that devolution would lead to independence was perceived to be very high at both points. This evidence supports the existence of the first aspect of the interaction effect: the perception that devolution was highly likely to lead to independence and indicates that such perceived probability remained broadly constant between the two time-points.

I now turn to the second aspect of the interaction effect: the hypothesis that as devolution was perceived to lead to independence, the crucial determinant of the referendum vote was the assessment of the utility of the status quo versus the utility of independence. Moreover, that such an assessment on the part of the virtual supporters of the assembly option in 1979 provide a robust explanation of why a large percentage of them voted No in the referendum. Data in table 11 show that independence was perceived in more negative terms - i.e. as involving lower utility - than the status quo by virtual supporters of devolution. In particular, a very limited change to the status quo such as having the Scottish MPs meeting in Scotland rather than in London was strongly preferred to independence and even no change at all in the way Scotland was governed was still preferred to independence. As seen for previous

¹⁹ In formal terms, the value of p was perceived as being higher than 0.5

²⁰ Virtually all accounts of the rise in the political saliency of the demand for Scottish self-government and of the reactions of British governments emphasise the triggering role of the rising electoral support for the SNP whose fundamental policy goal was (and is) the secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom. For two examples, see Balsom and McAllister (1979: 395-6) and Mitchell et al. (1998: 166-8); on the connections between support for the SNP and demand for self-government in the 1970s, see Miller et al. (1977); on the 1979 referendum campaign in particular, see Perman (1979: 56-59), Balsom and McAllister (1979: 397-9) and Macartney (1981).

²¹ Despite the slightly different format of the two variables, I believe they should both provide reliable estimations of the perceived underlying connection between independence and devolution.

variables, the same pattern is reinforced among virtual supporters of the assembly option. In this case, not only was no change at all largely preferred to independence but the option of having Scottish MPs meeting in Scotland was actually judged in slightly positive terms. It thus emerges that supporters of devolution if faced with the ultimate choice between status quo and independence preferred the status quo; Assembly supporters very strongly so. These results provide support to the hypothesis that a large number of virtual supporters of devolution voted No in the 1979 referendum because they thought devolution was highly likely to lead to independence and they had a much more negative opinion of the latter than of the status quo. In turn, those negative attitudes to independence can be conceptualised, in rationalist terms, as having been determined by the perception that secession was an extremely costly option in political, economic and symbolic terms. As mentioned above, the anti-devolution campaign was centred on the disastrous costs for Scotland had devolution led to secession from the UK.

Additional, indirect, evidence in support for this explanation is given by the responses to the question of the role of the SNP in the politics of self-government. As shown in table 12, a plurality of respondents perceived the SNP as having had a negative effect on the achievement of devolved self-government by linking devolution to secession from the UK. In particular, both Conservative and Labour identifiers were twice as likely to think that the SNP delayed devolution by frightening off those who feared separation than to think that it speeded up devolution and a substantial 35 per cent of Nationalist identifiers thought likewise. As mentioned in the previous section, a similar plurality interpreted the referendum result as showing that Scottish citizens did not really want an assembly in 1979. In other words, there is strong evidence that the linkage between independence and devolution – what I have defined here as the interaction effect – turned opposition to independence into opposition to devolution at the time of the first referendum.

The situation was radically different in 1997. For that time point, actual data on the second preference of supporters of devolution are available. As table 13 indicate, in 1997 supporters of devolution were almost twice as likely to prefer independence to the status quo. Crucially, Labour identifiers in particular were twice as likely to prefer independence to the status quo and only the very small group of Conservative identifiers expressed a reverse preference. Thus, the interaction effect was still present in 1997 but its effect had largely been neutralised by the shifting of the attitudes towards independence relative to the status quo.

From the comparison between the data for 1979 and 1997 a key difference between the two referendums thus emerges: at the first point in time, virtual supporters of devolution preferred the status quo to independence whereas at the second point in time the reverse was true. A central contention of this paper is that, by virtue of the interaction effect, this difference is the key to the explanation of the gap between virtual and actual support for self-government in 1979 and hence to the explanation of the failure of devolution in 1979 and its success in 1997 in presence of a fairly steady, long-term majority support for self-government in Scotland. From the analysis presented above, it follows that the attitude to independence was the key determinant of the demand for self-government at public opinion level. In the second part of this paper I discuss how the Europeanisation of the politics of self-government in Scotland between 1979 and 1997 fundamentally altered mass public attitudes to independence relative to the status quo and determined the different results of the two devolution referendums.

The Europeanisation of the Demand for Self-Government between 1979 and 1997

This part proposes an explanation for the different results of the two referendums based on the concepts of actual/virtual demand gap identified above and built around the concept of *Europeanisation* of the demand for self-government at mass public level. The central claim is that the dynamics generated by a process of Europeanisation of the demand for self-government between the two time-points provides a robust explanation of why devolved self-government was rejected in 1979 and endorsed in 1997. This had four different aspects which linked together in a causal mechanism connecting the process of European integration and the strength of actual demand for self-government in Scotland. Each of these aspects features a change between 1979 and 1997. The first aspect was that the political actors mobilising the demand for self-government – the SNP, Labour and the trade unions – were strongly opposed to the EU in 1979 and broadly in favour of it in 1997. By consequence, they did not utilise the European dimension to increase the demand for self-government at mass public level in 1979. In contrast, they did so most effectively in 1997 with the SNP making the European dimension the cornerstone of its secession policy and Labour and the trade unions making it a central feature of their policies of devolution. As a result of this shift of political strategies, second, public support for the EU among those demanding self-government also shifted from negative in 1979 to positive in 1997, particularly on certain political aspects of integration. Third, the fact that Scottish independence in 1997 was explicitly placed within a favourably-perceived European context determined the dramatic rise in public support for it, well beyond

Nationalist identifiers. Finally, the rise in the demand for independence together with the fact that the latter was by then preferred to the status quo neutralised the interaction effect between support for independence and support for devolution and largely closed the gap between virtual and actual demand. Therefore, by eliminating the obstacles to turn virtual support into actual support, the factors mentioned above determined the success of devolution in 1997.

The strategic use of Europe by political actors

The first element in the Europeanisation of the politics of self-government in Scotland concerned the change in the strategies of the political actors who were pursuing self-government for Scotland. This element is composed of two aspects. First, these 'self-government entrepreneurs' changed their perception of the process of European integration and of Scotland's position within it. Second, they started to exploit the EU dimension to strengthen their respective self-government policies and increase support for the latter at mass public level.

Support for EU membership in 1979 was essentially dictated by attitudes to the type of economic integration the EU was based on, namely free trade and market liberalisation. It was thus supported by liberal and conservative parties and opposed by socialist and social-democratic parties and, in turn, supported by middle class voters likely to identify with – and to vote for – the Conservative and Liberal parties and opposed by working class voters likely to identify with the Labour party and the SNP²². On the left of the political spectrum, both in terms of parties and of their electorates, the EU was seen as a free-market, capitalist organisation, fostering a form of economic integration which was in the interest of the 'core areas' of Europe (including south-eastern England) and against those of peripheral areas such as Scotland²³.

In contrast, the EU was perceived in 'pluri-dimensional' terms from the late 1980s onwards with a significant political dimension added to the original economic one. The development of social and regional policies played a crucial part in heightening the awareness of the political aspects of European integration in Scotland as a whole and among the political

²² There is large consensus that the SNP was (and is) a social-democratic party, see for example the relevant chapter in Bennie et al. (1997); for this reason it is here associated with Labour

actors demanding self-government in particular. As a result, attitudes to the EU in the 1990s were constituted by two discrete elements: attitudes to economic integration and attitudes to political integration, especially to the social dimension. Labour and the SNP were in favour of both aspects of European integration while the Conservative party supported the former but was strongly opposed to the latter. The trade unions reluctantly accepted economic integration and were enthusiastically in favour of the 'social dimension'. Therefore, not only did the left-of-centre political actors support the EU social policy - rather predictably - but they also crucially changed their perception of economic integration at both the ideological and empirical levels. Ideologically, the left-of-centre opinion in Scotland, like elsewhere in Europe, largely came to terms with the liberal capitalist system and with the process of economic integration in Europe²⁴.

Empirically, they moved from perceiving it as a threat to Scotland to viewing it as an opportunity for Scotland. Scotland's ability to improve its economic situation in the face of deepening economic integration on a European scale and the development of EU regional and social policies – over the same period in which the latter were being phased out by the UK government – are likely to have been the crucial factors in determining the change in attitudes²⁵.

This change took place from the second half of the 1980s and made possible the second aspect of Europeanisation mentioned above: the inclusion of an explicit European dimension in the policies on self-government of the SNP, the Labour party and the trade unions based on the exploitation of the opportunities that the process of European integration was offering for Scottish self-government. In conceptual terms, such opportunities could be exploited to lower the costs and increase the benefits of self-government and therefore attract higher demand for it. The foremost example of political entrepreneurship in utilising European integration to increase support for self-government is provided by the SNP adoption of the policy of

²³ On the fear that European integration would exacerbate the centre-periphery dichotomy in Europe, see Leonardi (1993)

²⁴ On the left's conversion to European integration, see Hix (1999); on the hegemony of the left in Scotland, see Miller (1983: 108) and Pattie et al. (1999: 138); on the distinctiveness of Scotland's electoral patterns within the UK, see Field (1997: 27-63).

²⁵ On the changed attitude to the European Union on the part of the SNP, see Lynch (1996) and Macartney (1990); as regards the Labour party and the trade unions, see Daniels (1998) and Graham and McGrath (1991), respectively; for the British labour movement as a whole, see Teague (1989a) and Rosamond (1993).

'Independence in Europe'²⁶. The SNP which had been opposed to membership of the European Union throughout the 1970s started to modify its approach in the early 1980s and from 1988 campaigned on a policy of 'Independence in Europe' based on the guarantee that an independent Scotland would enjoy member state status in the European Union. The new policy exploited three main opportunities provided by the EU as strategic devices to increase support for independence. Each of these opportunities can be conceptualised in rationalist terms as reducing the costs of secession. At the most general level, the process of European integration provided an opportunity for independence as it was offering a favourable framework within which some of the negative connotation of secession, such as the ideas of separation and isolation, would lose much of their rhetorical power. The SNP could claim that within an integrating Europe, an independent Scotland would neither be truly separated from the UK nor would it be isolated on the world stage. This opportunity reduced the costs of secession because it made it less traumatic in symbolic terms²⁷. Not surprisingly, European integration offered the strongest opportunity in the economic sphere.

Here the key factor was that the existence of the customs union – deepened by the development of the single market – offered the guarantee that an independent Scotland would have access to the English market as such access would be preserved by the EU framework. The potential loss of the English market for companies operating in an independent Scotland had always been perceived as the main economic cost of independence and a major stumbling block to broadening its appeal beyond the committed hard core. With the EU customs union in place and the development of the single market, the SNP could claim that the economic costs of independence had been eliminated²⁸. Last, but by no means least, the EU was also offering incentives to independence in institutional terms. The institutional structure of the EU is biased in favour of the smaller member states whose interests are over-represented in the key institutions of the Council of Ministers, European Commission and European

²⁶ On the 'Independence in Europe' policy see Macartney (1990) and Lynch (1996)

²⁷ This point was stressed by Jim Sillars, the leading proponent of the Independence in Europe policy in his 1986 book (1986: 182)

²⁸ See, for example, SNP Power for Change, SNP manifesto for the 1994 European election, p. 6-7; at the 1983 conference, the then leader of the party, Gordon Wilson, defined the new policy towards the EU as a "first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation", quoted in Lynch (1996: 38); the same idea was further developed by Sillars (1986: 184-6)

Parliament²⁹. The ever wider and deeper remit of EU powers together with the continuous dominance of the Council of Ministers within its institutional structure increased the benefits of the 'member state' status vis-à-vis the 'region' status. This enabled the SNP to argue that the European union was a more advantageous political framework for Scotland than the British union as the former was a confederal union of independent states, with a structure privileging small states such as an independent Scotland, while the latter was still a unitary, politically centralised state in which Scotland was governed by a party it had repeatedly rejected at election times³⁰. Crucial in this respect was that the party was able to claim that only member-state status would give Scotland adequate representation at the EU level when the latter was becoming increasingly important with the development of the process of integration and while the Conservative party self-inflicted isolation reduced the UK political influence within the Council of Ministers³¹. In this sense, the existence of the EU institutional framework was reducing the political-institutional costs of secession.

The SNP exploited these three opportunities offered by the process of European integration to attract higher support for the option of independent self-government on the grounds that the new, Europeanised version of independence had a much more favourable costs/benefits balance than the old version proposed in the 1970s. By placing independence in the context of the EU, the SNP succeeded in deeply transforming the perception of independence and, by implication, of itself. Both independence and the SNP came to be accepted as mainstream policy and party, respectively. The SNP move also forced the other two main political actors advocating self-government for Scotland – Labour and the trade unions – to include a European dimension in their case for devolved self-government. The combined effect was that the effort to mobilise support for self-government at public opinion level was thus Europeanised in the 1990s.

Changed perceptions of the EU at mass public level

²⁹ Small countries are on an equal footing with larger ones in terms of presidency of the Council and the right of veto and over-represented in the power of appointing Commissioners, in the voting weights in the Council and in the share of seats in the Parliament

³⁰ See SNP Power for Change, p. 4 and 8-9; see also Sillars (1986: 186-8).

³¹ Cfr. "Scotland needs to change...central to that change is the need for a powerful, direct voice in Europe. An independent Scotland sitting at the top table beside the other nations of Europe will totally change our situation", SNP Power for Change, p. 2

The first consequence of the strategic use of the European dimension by ‘self-government’ entrepreneurs was to change the perception of the EU by those supporting self-government at mass public level. This was a necessary step in the strategy to utilise the European dimension to strengthen the demand for self-government as it would have been impossible for these ‘entrepreneurs’ to emphasise the European dimension to Scottish self-government had the EU still been perceived in negative terms by Scots. In the case of the SNP, in particular, it would have been much more difficult to rally support for its policy of ‘Independence in Europe’ if ‘Europe’ had not been perceived as a better alternative to Britain. As mass public awareness of European issues was very limited, the strategies of those ‘self-government entrepreneurs’ acted as the vital link between the development of European integration and the public debate on self-government in Scotland.

The dramatic change towards positive support for the European Union is clearly shown by the data relative to two variables: satisfaction with membership of the EU and support for the Social Charter. The first one measures whether respondents thought UK's membership of the EU was good or bad for Scotland while the second one measures whether respondents were in favour of the UK signing the EU's Social Charter. The two variables measure attitudes to the economic and political aspects of European integration, respectively. Satisfaction with membership of the EU, is largely a measure of support for the economic aspects of integration, i.e. for the establishment of an integrated single market³². Support for the Social Charter, on the other hand, is a key indicator of support for adding an explicit political dimension to the prevailing economic nature of European integration³³.

Satisfaction with EU membership increased very substantially between the two timepoints turning from negative levels in 1979 to positive ones in 1997. The increase was particularly strong among Labour and Nationalist identifiers whose attitudes were deeply negative in 1979. The latter group passed from being the least supportive of EU membership to being the most supportive. Since, as mentioned above, this variable largely measures satisfaction with the economic aspect of the European Union, what emerges from these results is that the perception of the economic benefits for Scotland of belonging to the EU changed dramatically between 1979 and 1997. By the latter date there was a broad consensus that the

³² The role of economic factors in determining satisfaction with membership of the European Union has been comprehensively demonstrated by Gabel (1998a, 1998b).

economic effects of European integration were positive for Scotland [table 14]. Such a consensus did not clearly exist as regards the attitudes towards the Social Charter³⁴. The aggregate positive support for signing up to the Charter concealed a sharp divide between Labour and Nationalist identifiers strongly in favour and Conservative identifiers strongly opposed. Overall, thus, Labour and Nationalist identifiers reversed their previous positions and by 1997 had positive attitudes towards both the economic and political aspects of EU membership [table 14].

As a result of the realignment of attitudes towards the EU among voters identifying with Labour and the SNP, in the 1990s demand for self-government became positively associated with support for the EU, a complete reversal of the 1979 situation when support for self-government was negatively correlated with support for the EU [table 15]. As mentioned above, the left-wing political opinion, among which the demand for self-government was mainly concentrated, had a negative opinion of the EU on the grounds of ideological opposition to free-market, capitalist economic integration and, more particularly, of the expected negative effects of the latter on Scotland's economy and society³⁵. Support for the EU was therefore largely perceived as antithetical to support for Scottish self-government as the latter was intended by many as a way of insulating Scotland from the negative effects of the UK economic environment and the EU was perceived as reinforcing them. In 1997, in contrast, both support for membership of the EU and, especially, for the signing up to the Social Charter were positively correlated with virtual and actual demand for self-government.

The strategic claim by political actors that European integration had made Scottish self-government more necessary also seems to have found a receptive hear among mass public opinion as support for the EU became positively associated with the expectation that a Scottish parliament would make Scotland's voice in the EU stronger. Those who thought membership of the European Union was good for Scotland were almost 10 per cent more

³³ As the social dimension of the EU and the Social Charter in particular, were absent in the 1970s, the data relative to support for the Social Charter are only available for 1997.

³⁴ The Social Charter was an agreement to add a 'social dimension' to the single market programme that the British Conservative government refused to sign in 1989 and was subsequently added as a chapter to the Maastricht treaty in 1992 covering the other 11 member states. The Social Charter was an issue during the election campaign of 1997 with the Labour party committed to signing up. On the social dimension of the single market programme, see Teague (1989b).

³⁵ Scots voted proportionally more against the EU in the referendum of 1975 than the other areas of the UK and Nationalists were those mostly against, see Kirby and Taylor (1976: especially 190); on

likely to expect a stronger voice for Scotland in the EU as a result of devolution than those who had a negative perception of EU membership. Interestingly, those satisfied with membership of the EU were also more likely to expect a stronger voice for Scotland in the EU than within the UK [table 16]. The question of the representation of Scotland's interests at the EU level thus became an important issue in the demand for self-government in the 1990s.

Finally, the realignment of perception towards the EU also had the consequence of changing the way supporters of self-government perceived the EU relative to the UK and, by extension, Scotland's position within both. As table 17 shows, support for membership of the EU in 1979 was in positive correlation with all three measures of support for the UK. In particular, the correlation was strongest with satisfaction with the UK government. These results show that attitudes to the EU were largely consistent with attitudes to the UK, that supporters of self-government had equally negative opinions of both the UK and the EU and, therefore, that the latter was largely perceived as a 'negative extension' of the former, especially in terms of exacerbating even further Scotland's peripherality both in economic and in political terms. This seems to have been the case particularly among Nationalist identifiers.

In 1997, in contrast, positive attitudes to the political aspects of European integration – as symbolised by support for the Social Charter – were negatively correlated with all measures of support for the UK though support for economic integration remained positively associated with them³⁶. Those demanding self-government for Scotland had thus a positive opinion of European political integration and a negative opinion of the UK political system. This seems to indicate that supporters of self-government in 1997 perceived the EU as providing a policy output closer to their preferences than the policy output of the UK government. The development of new policies which had strong support in Scotland had moved the policy output of the EU closer to the preferences of the median Scottish voter over the same period in which their being phased out by the Conservative government moved the policy output of the UK government further away from him or her³⁷. The EU political system was thus

peripherality as a determinant of Scotland's opposition to the EU in the late 1970s, see Keating and Jones (1991: 315).

³⁶ It is interesting to note that support for the EU was not significantly associated with primary identification with the UK which seems to indicate that affective support for the UK political system was unaffected by the European dimension.

³⁷ On the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland and the divergence in political preferences between Scotland and England since the late 1970s, see Kendrick and McCrone (1989), Seawright (1999) and Brown et al. (1996: 62).

perceived as a 'positive alternative' to the UK political system for a self-governing Scotland or, put another way, the European Union came to be perceived as more attractive than the British Union by the majority of supporters of self-government³⁸.

Europeanisation led to higher demand for self-government

The result of the two aspects of Europeanisation discussed above was a much higher demand for self-government in 1997 relative to 1979. At the virtual level this took the form of a dramatic surge in the support for independence and of a preference for the latter vis-à-vis the status quo. At the actual level it manifested itself in the emphatic success of the Yes side in the referendum of September 1997. In between the two levels, the key mechanism was the neutralisation of the independence/devolution interaction effect discussed in section 1.3 above and the almost complete closing of the gap between virtual and actual demand. I discuss each of these points below.

As mentioned in section 1.1 above, the large increase in the support for independence was, quantitatively and qualitatively, the main difference between the demand for self-government in 1997 compared to 1979. At aggregate level, support for independence rose five-fold, from 7 to 35 per cent. In particular, it reached 72 per cent among Nationalist identifiers only 37 per cent of whom were in favour of independence in 1979³⁹ and it attracted support of 36 per cent of Labour identifiers, up from 4 per cent eighteen years earlier. In other words, independence was by then the first constitutional preference among Nationalists and the second one among Labour identifiers.

Furthermore, the data disaggregated into the two options of 'Independence outside the EU' and 'Independence within the EU' clearly indicate that the increase in the demand for independence between the two time points was almost entirely attributable to support for the latter option. Overall, support for independence from the UK *and* the EU increased from 7 to 9 per cent between 1979 and 1997⁴⁰. This evidence supports the central claim of this paper that the increase in support for independence was the direct result of the *Europeanisation* of

³⁸ A similar idea was expressed by Keating and Jones (1991: 322) in the following terms: "both territorial and class-based oppositions are beginning to see Brussels as more accessible and receptive to their demands than Whitehall".

³⁹ On the connections between support for the SNP and demand for self-government in the late 1970s, see Miller et al. (1977).

the latter. In rationalist costs/benefits terms, the process of Europeanisation reduced the costs and increased the benefits of independence thus attracting higher demand for it.

The second crucial consequence of the rise in the demand for secession was that it made the independence option *preferred* to the status quo in 1997, a reversal of the 1979 situation. As discussed in section 1.3 above, in 1979 the status quo was clearly preferred to independence by those who supported devolved self-government – very strongly so by supporters of the assembly option. In 1997, in contrast, supporters of devolution preferred independence to the status quo by a ratio of 2 to 1 with only Conservative devolutionists still choosing the status quo as second best. The distribution of constitutional preferences had thus been dramatically altered by the rise of demand for independence fuelled by the process of Europeanisation.

In turn, these changes in the preference distribution on self-government affected the two causes of the failure of devolution in 1979 identified in the 1st part of this paper: the interaction effect between independence and devolution and the gap between virtual and actual support. The interaction effect was still present in 1997 in the sense that – as in the previous referendum – independence was not object of vote as such but the expectation that devolution might lead to independence was still very strong and widespread. As in 1979, therefore, virtual supporters of independence had to vote for devolution in the hope that their preferred outcome will follow at a later stage while virtual supporters of devolution had to vote bearing in mind that the end result of the process might not be what they voted for. As mentioned, the probability of this combination of events happening was still perceived to be very high. However, the crucial change was that the negative effect of this interaction on the actual demand for devolution was largely *neutralised* by the fact that independence was by then preferred to the status quo anyway. In a sense, most virtual supporters of self-government had nothing to lose by voting Yes in the 1997 referendum. In the best scenario they would get devolved self-government in the worst scenario they would get independent self-government but both scenarios were preferable to the default condition in the first place.

Evidence for this claim is provided by the size of the gap between virtual and actual demand for devolution at the two points in time. In 1979, 28 per cent – 39 per cent including those who did not vote but had a preference – of those in favour of devolution at the attitudinal

⁴⁰ For the interpretation of the 1979 category as 'independence outside the EU', see note 10 above.

level voted against devolution in the referendum. In 1997, only 7 per cent of virtual supporters of devolution voted No in the referendum. In other words, the large gap created by the interaction effect in 1979 was narrowed almost to a close by the neutralisation of such effect discussed in the previous paragraph.

In sum, the analysis of public opinion data provides consistent evidence that the dynamics of mass public demand for self-government in Scotland can be robustly explained as a result of a process of Europeanisation that took place between 1979 and 1997.

Conclusions

This paper addresses the question of whether and how the process of European integration affects demands for regional self-government in the states which are member of the European Union by analysing the case of Scotland. The main finding of the analysis is that the demand for self-government in Scotland was strongly affected by the process of European integration, especially from the mid-1980s. In other words, the demand for Scottish self-government underwent a very significant process of *Europeanisation*. Indeed, such process of Europeanisation provides a robust explanation for the different result of the two referendums on devolution in 1979 and 1997 in the presence of consistent long-term majority support for self-government.

The paper proposes a rationalist model for conceptualising the causal mechanism through which European integration affected the demand for self-government in Scotland based on a costs/benefits calculus and which treats the opportunities offered by the process of integration as the independent variable, support for self-government at mass public level as the dependent variable and the strategies of political actors as intervening variables. At the time of the first referendum, the political actors pursuing self-government were ideologically opposed to European integration so were prevented from utilising the opportunities offered by the latter. The intervening variable was missing. Through a mechanism called the 'interaction effect' opposition to independence ultimately translated into opposition to devolution. From the mid-1980s onwards a number of changes connected European integration and Scottish self-government. First, political actors pursuing self-government abandoned their ideological opposition to the EU and started to perceive it in positive terms. Second, the opportunities offered by European integration became deeper and more visible. Third, political actors included an explicit European dimension into their self-government

strategies and started emphasising it in their campaigning. Fourth, mass public opinion internalised the arguments of those campaigns and increased support for self-government, particularly for independence. Finally, the shift in the distribution of constitutional preferences with independence by then *preferred* to the status quo neutralised the impact of the devolution/independence interaction effect and cleared the way for the endorsement of devolution in the 1997 referendum.

Two broader conclusions emerge from the analysis. The first one is that the strategies of political actors were a crucial intervening variable. To a large extent, European integration was already offering opportunities for Scottish self-government in the late 1970s. In particular the customs union and the institutional features were virtually identical though market integration was of course less deep. They could have been utilised to strengthen the case for self-government, but - primarily for ideological reasons – political parties and interest groups failed to exploit them. The second one is that the opportunities offered by European integration affected *primarily* support for independent self-government as opposed to support for devolved self-government. They ultimately affected the actual demand for devolution – i.e. the vote in the referendum – because of the existence of an interaction effect between devolution and independence. This was possible in Scotland because there were a number of features which determined the existence of a substantial *potential* demand for secession and because there was an established party committed to mobilising such demand.

Evidently, the fact that those features are not present in many other EU states where there is significant demand for regional self-government limits the generalisation of the model presented here to the whole European context. However, this insight challenges the prevailing thesis present in the literature that European integration affects demands for regional self-government primarily through the operation of the structural funds and the incentives to regional government provided by the partnership principle⁴¹. The Scottish case indicates that European integration increases regional demands for self-government primarily through lowering the costs of secession.

⁴¹ See, among others, Marks (1993), Hooghe (1996), Smyrl (1997), Tömmel (1998); with regard to the UK, Rhodes (1978), Martin and Pearce (1993); for a sceptical view see Anderson (1991).

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Tables

Table 1 - Virtual demand for self-government by party identification (column %)

1979: Here are a number of suggestions ⁴² which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?								
1997: Which of these statements ⁴³ come closest to your view...Scotland should...?								
	Conservative		Labour		Nationalist		All	
	1979	1997	1979	1997	1979	1997	1979	1997
Status quo	40	61	20	7	5	2	26	19
Devolution	46	28	62	53	45	25	54	43
<i>Assembly</i>	29	-	31	-	9	-	28	-
<i>Parliament</i>	17	-	31	-	36	-	26	-
Independence	3	9	4	36	37	72	7	35

⁴² No devolution or Scottish assembly of any sort; Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their meetings; An elected Scottish assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster; A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, including many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible only for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy; A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament. I collapsed the first two categories under the category 'status quo' as there is a wide consensus in referring to devolution as to the establishment of an elected body.

⁴³ Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers; Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union; Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union.

<i>Indep. In EU</i>	-	8	-	26	-	54	-	26
<i>Indep. Out EU</i>	(3)	1	(4)	10	(37)	18	(7)	9
Self-government	49	37	66	89	82	89	61	78
Don't know	11	2	14	4	13	9	13	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	197	123	235	336	66	122	729	676

Note: the categories 'Assembly' and 'Parliament' for 1979 refer to options for a devolved body with less or more power; the Assembly category was closest to the option put to the referendum. Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 2 - Actual demand for self-government by party identification (column %)

1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side?								
1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁴⁴ ?								
	Conservative		Labour		Nationalist		All	
	1979	1997	1979	1997	1979	1997	1979	1997
Voted No	62	58	27	7	3	1	33	18
Didn't vote fav. No	13	-	14	-	4	-	12	-
(Total No)	(75)	-	(41)	-	(7)	-	(45)	-
Didn't vote no pref.	5	27	8	27	4	21	16	27
Didn't vote fav. Yes	4	-	8	-	12	-	6	-
Voted Yes	16	15	43	66	77	78	33	55
(Total Yes)	(20)	-	(51)	-	(89)	-	(39)	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	201	123	246	336	68	147	729	882

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 3 - Interpretation of the referendum result by party identification (column %) 1979

In your own opinion, did the referendum result show that the Scottish people wanted an Assembly or not?				
Weight/Category	Conservative	Labour	Nationalist	All
-1 Did not want assembly	66	42	16	47
0 Indecisive result	16	15	21	16
1 Wanted assembly	17	40	62	33
Don't know	1	3	1	4
Total	100	100	100	100
Index*	-49	-2	46	-14

Note: N=658; *equal to the sum of the weights given to each category multiplied by the column percentages. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 4 - Index* of importance of self-government

1979: When you were deciding about voting, how important was the general issue of the form of government for Scotland?			
1997: When you were deciding about voting in the general election, how important was this issue - Scottish Parliament - to you? Was it...			
	1979	1997	79/97 Change
Conservative identifiers	163	138	-25

⁴⁴ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

Labour identifiers	172	164	-8
Nationalist identifiers	249	217	-32
All	178	161	-17
Correlation with demand (gamma)	.40***	.38***	
N	729	882	

Note: *index varies between 100=100% of respondents thought self-government was not very important and 300=100% of respondents thought self-government was extremely important; ***p<.001. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979 and 1997

Table 5 - Virtual/actual support for self-government gap by party identification (%)

	Conservative		Labour		Nationalist		All	
	79	97	79	97	79	97	79	97
Status quo	+22	-3	+7	0	-2	-1	+7	-1
(Status quo)*	(+35)	-	+21	-	(+2)	-	+19	-
Self-government	-33	-22	-23	-23	-5	-11	-28	-23
(Self-government)*	(-29)	-	-15	-	(+7)	-	-22	

Note: *including preferences of those who did not vote, see table 2. Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 6 - Referendum vote of virtual supporters of self-government (column %)

1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side?						
1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁴⁵ ?						
	Independence		Devolution		Self-government	
	1979	1997	1979	1997	1979	1997
Voted Yes	68	75	46	65	49	70
<i>Didn't vote favoured Yes</i>	12	-	8	-	8	-
(Total Yes)	(80)	(75)	(51)	(65)	(57)	(70)
<i>Didn't vote no preference</i>	8	23	7	28	7	25
<i>Didn't vote favoured No</i>	2	-	11	-	10	-
Voted No	10	2	28	7	26	5
(Total No)	(12)	(2)	(39)	(7)	(36)	(5)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	50	232	394	289	444	521

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 7 - Referendum vote of virtual supporters of devolution by option preference (column %) 1979

1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side?			
1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁴⁶ ?			
	Assembly	Parliament	Devolution
Voted Yes	36	57	46
<i>Didn't vote favoured Yes</i>	6	10	8
(Total Yes)	(42)	(67)	(51)
<i>Didn't vote no preference</i>	5	8	7
<i>Didn't vote favoured No</i>	14	9	11
Voted No	39	16	28

⁴⁵ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

⁴⁶ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

(Total No)	(53)	(25)	(39)
Total	100	100	100
N	205	189	394

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 8 - Most important disadvantage of devolution by constitutional preference (column %) 1979

Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution?					
	Status quo	Assembly	Parliament	Independence	All
Break up UK	38	37	23	16	27
Cost of bureaucracy	25	22	25	28	22
Too many levels of govt	16	18	16	16	15
Benefits wrong	5	10	11	8	8
Harm economy	9	6	4	2	5
Loss UK voice	4	6	6	10	5
Others/don't know	3	1	15	20	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Note: N=729. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 9 - Most important disadvantage of devolution by vote in the referendum (column %) 1979

Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution?				
	Yes		No	
	Self-government*	Assembly**	Self-government*	Assembly**
Break up UK	22	26	37	44
Cost of bureaucracy	27	28	26	19
Too many levels of govt	16	18	19	19
Benefits wrong	11	10	8	8
Harm economy	4	8	1	1
Loss UK voice	9	9	4	4
Others/don't know	11	1	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100
N	444	205	444	205

Note: *sub-sample of 'virtual' supporters of the three self-government options: assembly, parliament, independence; **sub-sample of supporters of the assembly option only. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 10 - Parliament's most important thing not to do by vote in the referendum (column %) 1997

This card shows a few things a Scottish parliament might want to bring about...And which, if any, should a Scottish parliament <u>not</u> try to bring about? IF SEVERAL MENTIONED: Which is the most important?			
	Yes	No	All
Leave UK more likely	47	85	56
Stronger voice in UK	3	1	2
Stronger voice in EU	1	1	1
More pride in country	1	2	1
Increase standard of living	1	0	1
None of these	32	5	25
Others/Don't know	15	6	14

Total	100	100	100
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Note: N=676. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 11 – Index of attitudes to the status quo and to independence among supporters of devolution 1979

For each suggestion ⁴⁷ on the card, could you say whether you are very much in favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat against or very much against that suggestion?			
	Status quo 1**	Status quo 2**	Independence
Assembly	-91	17	-163
Parliament	-110	-30	-87
Devolution	-100	-3	-126

Note: N=394; *index varies from -200=100% of respondents were 'very much against' and +200=100% of respondents were 'very much in favour'; **there were two options which largely amounted to maintaining the status quo in the 1979 survey, see note 60. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 12 - Perceived effect of SNP on devolution by party identification (column %) 1979

Whether or not you yourself ever voted for the SNP, what effect do you think the SNP has had on devolution?				
Weight/Category	Conservative	Labour	Nationalist	All
-1 Delayed devolution by frightening off those who feared separation	49	42	35	42
0 Not much effect	26	32	17	27
1 Speeded up moves towards devolution	21	22	44	26
0 Don't know	4	4	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Index*	-28	-20	9	-16

Note: N=729; *equal to the sum of the weights given to each category multiplied by the column percentages. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 13 - Second preference of supporters of devolution by party identification (%) 1997

Which of these statements comes closest to <u>your</u> view...And which would be your second preference?				
	Conservative	Labour	Nationalist	All
Status quo	26	16	3	17
Independence	15	30	37	30
Other devolution option*	47	34	43	34
Don't know	12	20	17	19
Total	100	100	100	100
N	34	178	30	289

Note: *with tax-raising powers or vice-versa. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997.

Table 14 - Indices of support for the EU

	1979	1997
Satisfaction with membership*	-10	32

⁴⁷ See list at note 41

Sat. with mem - Con ID	16	30
Sat. with mem - Lab ID	-23	30
Sat. with mem - Nat ID	-48	35
Support for the Social Charter**	-	19
Supp. Soc. Chap. - Con ID	-	-39
Supp. Soc. Chap. - Lab ID	-	34
Supp. Soc. Chap. - Nat ID	-	30

Note: *index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought membership of the EU was bad for Scotland and +100=100% of respondents thought membership of the EU was good for Scotland, 1997 data are relative to Referendum; **index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought the UK should not sign up to the Social Charter and +100=100% of respondents thought the UK should sign up to the Social Charter, 1997 data relative to General Election. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 15 – Correlations between support for the EU and demand for self-government (gamma values)

	1979	1997: membership	1997: social charter
Virtual (inclusive of out EU option)	-	.05	.37***
Virtual (exclusive of out EU option)	-.21**	.26**	.48***
Actual	-.24***	.33*	.68***

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 16 – Expectations and Priorities of actual supporters of self-government by satisfaction with EU membership 1997

Expectations: Will a Scottish Parliament...? Priorities: Scottish Parliament first thing to do?						
	Expectations*			Priorities**		
	Good	Bad	All	Good	Bad	All
More say in government	88	84	87	34	22	32
Increase standard of living	70	73	70	18	36	22
Improve education	93	89	92	23	18	22
Stronger voice in UK	82	85	83	13	4	11
Stronger voice in EU	85	76	83	4	16	6
More likely leave UK	-1	20	3	3	4	4
More pride in country	82	84	83	4	0	3
Total	-	-	-	99	100	100

Note: N=236, *numbers refer to indices of agreement where -100=100% of respondents saying that the Scottish Parliament will not bring about each of the listed effects and +100=100% of respondents saying that the Scottish Parliament will bring about each of the listed effects; **numbers are column percentages. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 17 – Correlations between support for the EU and support for the UK (gamma values)

1 1979: How many marks out of ten would you give the Westminster parliament? 1997: Which of these statements ⁴⁸ best describes your opinion on the present system of governing Britain?			
2 On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Britain?			
3 Compared with other parts of Britain, would you say that Scotland was better off or not so well off?			
4 Which nation benefits most from the UK?			
5 1979: do you consider yourself to be British or Scottish or something else? 1997: Which, if any, of the following ⁴⁹ best describes how you see yourself?			
	1979	1997: membership	1997: social charter

⁴⁸ Needs a great deal of improvement; Could be improved quite a lot; Could be improved in small ways but mainly works well; Works extremely well and could not be improved.

⁴⁹ Scottish not British; More Scottish than British; Equally British and Scottish; More British than Scottish, British not Scottish. I collapsed the first two categories into a primary identification with Scotland and the latter three into a primary identification with the UK.

1 Satisfaction with UK government	.49***	.36***(R)	-.37***(E)
2 Satisfaction with UK democracy	-	.22**(E)	-.30***(E)
3 Scotland's welfare vs rest of UK	.15	.09 (R)	-
4 UK economic benefits	-	.36***(R)	-.20*(E)
5 Identification with the UK	.22**	.10(R)	-.12(E)

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05; E=general election, R=referendum. Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997