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Harrington

Kevin Harrington

Kevin Harrington
H1575900@qub.ac.uk

Research

This thesis will test the hypothesis that the “The UK applied for EEC membership to align British and American policies on Europe”. This will be done by researching the period 1964 -1970 looking at the twin threads of the ‘Special Relationship’ and the development of British interest in EEC membership. The number of times the two intersect should make clear how much impact the ‘Special Relationship’ had on the Accession bid. In other words, how much of British decision-making and policy formulation was affected by bilateral bargaining? As will be seen later in this introduction there are a number of different ‘paths’ or topic options that can be chosen when analysing the UK Accession Bid and the ‘Special Relationship’. Those include domestic politics, ‘foreign affairs’, economics, culture etc. Thanks to the ‘high politics’ nature of the hypothesis under review, this thesis will focus on the “foreign affairs” path by looking at the strategic bilateral negotiations between the UK and America and the relevant factors that impacted on the formulation of the accession bid.

There are a number of reasons for this focus. Questions around the accession bids stem from an interest in Britain’s ‘awkward’ relationship with Europe. Many attempts to look at the source of this ‘awkwardness’ have followed Britain’s relationship and track record since joining. This thesis differs in reversing this supposition by poising the question; if there has been such a ‘misfit’ between British and European political cultures, which its track record as a member would suggest, what was it about the EEC that made the UK invest so much political capital in trying to join? Considering the almost incestuous nature of the ‘Special relationship’ one must also question the level of influence America had on these deliberations, thereby making it also possible to clarify the validity of de Gaulle’s ‘Trojan Horse’ accusation .

There are two reasons for the interest in the effect of the ‘Special Relationship’ on the accession bids. First and perhaps most important is the fact that it loomed large in the ‘alleged’ reasoning behind the de Gaulle vetoes, making the question of its actual influence a crucial one.
Notably he said that “Britain was not yet fit to join the Community because her political interests, economic needs and cultural traditions were still incompatible with those of the core continental European countries.” He went on to say that “the cohesion of all its members … would not last for very long and that, in fact, it would seem like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction” .

The second reason for emphasis on the ‘Special Relationship’ is the fact that it represents one of the cornerstones of British foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. After all “Almost every British policy will react in one way or another upon our relations with the USA” . This fact makes the accusations of Anglo-Saxon collusion harder to discount. Combine this with the asymmetric or unequal balance of power within the relationship, with America’s increasing interest in the Integration Project and Britain’s Sisyphean difficulties in maintaining her global ‘duties’, and one finds an intriguing dynamic emerging.

The period under review also represents one of the most problematic and difficult in that it is the peripeteia in British history, as it is during this time that Britain’s decline begins to manifest itself the most clearly. That is, it is during this period that the “vast and deep mutation to be effected” began to reach critical mass, turning what had been a global powerhouse into a regional, second tier power. For this reason the intricacies of the 'Special Relationship’ during this period are important to the understanding of the formation of British attitudes towards European integration.

Supervisors:  Dr Ralph Dietl and Dr Lee McGowan