

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BECOMING BOMBS: MOBILIZING MOBILITY IN THE WAR OF TERROR

Jeremy Packer

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BECOMING BOMBS: MOBILIZING MOBILITY IN THE WAR OF TERROR

> An automobile is a lethal weapon, an instrument of power – the little man given a hundred and fifty big horses. Under the stress of hostility, he may use this power quite irrationally.
>
> (Zolotow 1955, p. 14)

The war is on and we are all becoming bombs. Let me repeat. The war is on and whether you like it or not (upon entering the US Homeland), you are becoming a bomb. In the US's new war of terror a specific formation of the war machine has been turned upon its own citizenry. Citizens and non-citizens alike are now treated as an always present threat. In this sense all are imagined as combatants and all-terrain the site of battle. Mobility, the crossing of terrain, is in differing ways a prime form of weaponry. Contextually, it has become something of a cliché to recognize the increasingly mobile global population. Yet, the explosive possibilities of such mobility and how this alters the relation of governed and governance are something which has yet to receive ample theoretical attention. Gillian Fuller (2003) stresses that 'We might move more, and through increasingly complex landscapes, but we are also more streamlined and proceduralised in these movements'. When such movement is increasingly processed and treated as if it might be a bomb, mobile subjects are made enemies in terms of the state's relationship to them.

This essay examines previous forms of governing, or proceduralising, mobility and the legitimating logic for doing so, and how these have been radically altered post 9/11 via implementations of Homeland Security. Whether at border crossings, airport terminals, roadside police interrogations, ports, or security checks at government buildings, what is often referred to as 'freedom of movement' has become one site where the 'Homeland's' security is seen to be at risk. Points that Fuller notes are thresholds where we are checked. Conceptions of whom has such freedom to cross, how, when, where, and with what velocity, has all changed. As the Department of Homeland Security's website (dhs.gov 2002) states, 'The increasing mobility and destructive potential of modern terrorism has required the United States to rethink and rearrange fundamentally its systems for border and transportation security'. Yet, mobility is also imagined as a productive force for ensuring homeland security as a number of programs call upon the auto-mobile citizen

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to expand the capacities of state surveillance. For instance the Terrorism Information and Prevention System called for citizens to keep an eye out for potential terrorist activity while in their cars. The 300,000 transportation industry workers were called upon by the American Trucking Association and the Department of Homeland Security to take part in Highway Watch which would conscript truckers as part of a mobile surveillance system. This is not to simply state that a more repressive form of power is being enacted in which mobile individuals are constantly being told 'No. You can not enter (or leave) here'. Though for many this has been the case.[1] Rather, how mobility is governed and used to govern has changed. It is in essence a question of 'how has mobility been differently problematized?'[2] What follows is a detailed examination of how the governance of one form of mobility, automobility, provides insight into the broader problematic. When every car is imagined as a possible car-bomb, the rules of the road obviously change.

These new formulations draw from those derived of previous problematizations of mobility. The technologies of governance present in the not so distant past have surely been ramped up, but they are not wholly new. As the head of Technology and Public Policy Program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies states (Lewis cited in Shachtman 2003) in reference to the most far-reaching of these new technologies, Combat Zones that See (CTS), 'it's just connecting things that already exist'. In fact, the very technologies used under the guidance of what I call the automobility safety regime (Packer 2003); have been applied extensively in this new security regime. Yet, it is partially the availability of such technologies that makes for their easy application. David Lyon (2003) makes evident that such new applications have been widespread in the U.S'.s war on terror. Homeland Security in this regard is a new use of old tools; a governmental and corporate game of shifting resources and expenditures from one profitable arena to an even more profitable one. But, it is also much more than that. The logic of automotive safety has worked part and parcel with a biopolitical formation of disciplinarity and control. Safety as a set of practices and a legitimizing discourse has been both a goal of biopolitics and a means for ensuring discipline and implementing a control society. More specifically it is one means for 'governing at a distance'; that is, organizing, regulating, and making productive the mobility of individuals and the population alike without direct governmental control.[3] In other words, the goals of ensuring the safety of an auto-mobile population and the efficiency of the automobile system demands that driving subjects become highly normalized and self-disciplined.

The goals of national security are now imagined as depending upon the same disciplinary and control technologies that have proven effective in both increasing automotive safety and in legitimating and extending the very possibilities for a control society. To make clear, Homeland Security is not simply a means for creating the conditions for the safe existence of citizens or

for guaranteeing the security of the nation. It is also a means for further implementing what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001, p. 38) have termed Empire which is 'based on a state of permanent exception and police action'. Such a state of exception turns all terrain, including the Homeland, into a battlefield and all traversing it become actionable forces for police/military use or intervention. Previously the logic of safety was used as the moral cause by which the activation of a control society had come about in the realm of personalized transport. And under such conditions the stated role of the police was to help save lives by enforcing rules of vehicular conduct. Under current conditions attempts for achieving the control society – as described by Gilles Deleuze (1995) and later articulated as the primary mechanism of power for Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001) – are animated in regards to mobility via security concerns. What follows is (1) an examination of how the logics of safety and security differ, specifically as they relate to mobility and (2) an investigation of how these logics are activated through a particular mode of mobility, the automobile. This essay then examines these fundamental changes through a historical and theoretical analysis of how the control society has been operating in relation to automobility; changes that it is argued are experiments ultimately for controlling all forms of human mobility.

Safety to security

The most notable attacks against the United State's hegemony have been carried out with or on transportation technologies. The 9/11/2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are the most obviously spectacular examples of a transportation technology becoming a bomb, but we need to realize it is only one among numerous cases in which transportation technologies have been and continue to be turned into weapons against US interests, for example, Beirut 1982, Twin Towers 1994, Oklahoma City 1995, USS Cole in 2000, the almost daily car bombings in the current Iraqi civil war. The car-bomb has been a weapon of choice for the IRA and liberation forces in Palestine and elsewhere. Various forms of mobility – as points of reaching the mass, as signifiers of the global reach of capital – have also been the object of attack (most notably the airplane and train) and under Section 801 of the first PATRIOT Act (Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) attacks on mass transportation systems were no longer defined as a crime *per se*, rather such attacks were now to be defined and tried as acts of terrorism. Transportation technologies and systems are now a major theater in the terror war.

One of the problematic elements of such attacks for an RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) guided military, under biopolitical formations of Empire, is that the suicide bomber, as Hardt and Negri (2004), p. 54) explain, makes

apparent 'the ontological limit of biopower in its most tragic and revolting form'. Where RMA military strategy works to minimize its own military casualties in acknowledgement of the productive capacity of life, the suicide bomber inverts this notion to acknowledge and exploit the destructive (resistant) capacity of life. As a problematic of governance, the suicide bomber exposes the limits of disciplinarity as a means for governing at a distance. If all can be bombs, may be bombs, governing at a distance can not depend upon mere processes of disciplinarity and panopticism as means for internalizing the gaze and creating docile citizens. In a biopolitical order the pastoral relation of state and subject makes life the end-goal of and motor for creating a productive population/state. When life is not equally invested as a desired ends by state and citizen alike, life is no longer only that which must be groomed and cared for, but rather it becomes a constant and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing.[4]

The governance of mobility then needs to be understood in terms of this new problematic, mobility as immanent threat. Over the past 80 years transportation was imagined as an arena fraught with danger to the citizen subject. The question was, how can we keep them from endangering themselves as well as others? The problem posed by transportation technologies and their attendant citizen subjects was not their mobility per se, but rather whether it would create a problem in ensuring safe travel. In the new state of war, the subject isn't a becoming accident, but a becoming bomb. The accident is something through which a set of internalized modes of safe conduct and safe technologies can be activated and initiated in order to save mobile subjects from themselves as well as prevent breakdowns in the technological order. Under the regime of Homeland Security, it is not the safety of citizens that is of primary concern, but rather the stability of Empire's social order most generally, and more specifically the security of the state form. It is a war in which the state form fears all that may become problematic, become bomb. So the new mode of problematization treats all mobilities as potential bombs. Citizen's become bombs, not simply by choice or through cell propaganda and training, but by Homeland Security itself. It treats all as potential bombs, thereby governing us as if each and all may become bombs. Effectively, we are all therefore becoming bombs whether we would ever choose to be or not.

In the biopolitical regime, mobile safety is a key technology of governance; it is a means of hedging against the cultural and economic damage posed by unsafe practices at the level of the social and the individual. The relationship between the state and citizen under a rubric of safety could be described as a sort of paternalism, or what Foucault (1978) has described as pastoralism. In this conception, each paternal subject of the state, the 'safe citizen', is looked after as an individual subject worthy of care and protection and as an integral part of the population as a whole. Subject and population are imagined as

mutually constitutive. The safe driver is not just the product of the safe road system, but also its producer. Thus individual and social safety are inseparable. The goals of the one are imagined to create the outcome for others. Safe individuals create safe societies. Health, or the maintenance and creation of the productive capacity of the body – biopower, provides a good example. The general health of the society, the 'public health', depends upon the relative health of the individuals of which it is comprised. Healthier individuals for instance, minimize the spread of communicable disease and decrease the overall strain placed on the health care system, which allows for the better allocation of medical resources, which leads to healthier individuals, and so on. Traffic safety has been similarly imagined and in fact is in some governmental quarters treated as a public health issue. In order to create a safe driving environment, each individual's driving behavior is targeted for alteration both for their own benefit and the benefit of other drivers. Thus, a safe driving environment depends upon safe individual drivers, while the safer the environment as a whole, the safer each individual. Two coalescing changes in the political formulation of citizen to state are altering this formulation for the governance of automobility. The first will be characterized as a shift from the 'safety society' to the 'security society'. The second alteration, has been gaining force since the 1960s when technological solutions to traffic safety were beginning to be imagined as more effective than driving behavior modification.[5] Increasingly, the technological solutions work through communications, command, and control networks (C3) with the military leading the way of their development. Under these changes, rather than being treated as one to be protected from an exterior force and one's self, the citizen is now treated as an always potential threat, a becoming bomb. And the imagined means for diffusing such bombs are C3 technologies.

In the security society, the constitutive is replaced by the combative. Mobile conduct is not treated as constitutively productive (i.e. creating safer roads), but rather as potentially destructive (creating a threat to the social order and the nation). The individual problematized in the safety discourse can side with the goals of safety, but not necessarily have to identify with the state or nation. The problematized individual of security is asked to primarily identify with the nation, but is treated by the nation as that which is its very threat. This severe disjuncture creates and depends upon a constantly imagined threat, an almost paranoid schizophrenia of self-to-nation relationship. Am I the enemy of the state (as surely I am treated before getting on a plane) or am I a friend of the state (helping the state in its surveillance practices of keeping constantly vigilant on the look-out for potential terrorists as with the TIPS program)? No longer is the constitutive nature that of self and society, but rather self and nation. I am part of the nation in-so-far-as I see (particular?) others as threats to the nation. Through an internalization of the state logic of other as becoming bomb, I accept my schizophrenia. I, in fact, am asked by the

state to help enact the logic of threat in my everyday life through a self-actualization of surveillance and ever-readiness. I am asked to do so during and via my mobility. Extended mobility becomes not only a more malleable threat as bomb, but the potential extension of the self-state surveillance network. In this war of all against all, our mobility is imagined as a problem and solution.

Auto-control society

Control society is an emergent formation of power that according to Gilles Deleuze (1995, p. 175) corresponds to a 'particular kind of machine . . . cybernetic machines and computers'. Their modus operandi is not, as this quote might seem to imply, technologically determined. Deleuze (p. 175) stresses that in order to understand the complexities and contours of this new formation 'you must analyze the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component'. In many ways earlier forms of automobility, though clearly not a form of confinement, operated within a disciplinary apparatus in which forms of surveillance, testing, knowledge production, and partitioning worked to produce docile mobile subjects. A quick historical look at the cybernetic and computer technologies used in automotive practices tells a story of a slow progression from disciplinarity to control. Key elements of the logic of control have driven automobility for a long time. What C3 control was imagined to create in earlier scenarios was a reduction in loss of life and an increase in productivity. This fully controlled version of automobility saw itself as amenable to an efficient market and a happily safe driver. Under the truth regime of Homeland Security, auto-control imagines itself as the ultimate sapper. Space is not a minefield, mobility is a mine.

One element of the model of the control society is the management of access to space. That is, the ability to be mobile, to move from one place to another, can be governed at the level of the individual. Within a disciplinary regime this access took place in terms of the precept, particular forms of mobility accorded with the rules of conduct for that space. Rules could not necessarily disallow access to mobility in general or to particular spaces according to who (one is), but rather only according to how (one acts). For instance, driving might be governed according to population (only those aged 16 and older) and by the rules of conduct of the road (at certain speeds, in certain directions, in particular types of vehicles). Thus, automobility and the spaces it created were controlled according to a set of precepts which were surveyed and internalized. It was only at particular checkpoints, most notably borders, though secondarily anti-drunk driving road blocks, and in cases of police-witnessed rule infractions that the *who* of mobility was made evident. This was done through technologies of verification, most notably the drivers

license, but also proof of insurance, automobile registration and license plates.[6] As will be noted below, these forms of verification can increasingly be activated in movement and not only at the immobile checkpoint. Through the integration of various communications, insurantial, verification, and information technologies the precept/surveillance couplet can be replaced by the password.

As Deleuze argues we need to see into and before the dawning of this control society in order to prepare modes of resistance. He looks to Felix Guattari's imagined future in which all must use an electronic card to move into and out of particular spaces. This card allows great flexibility for control across time and space as each checkpoint can constantly be updated and reprogrammed to allow or disallow access to any and all card-holders. It is not the precept, the rule for conduct, that determines access, but rather the constantly modulatable password, actualized via the pass-card. If we take this future as our ground zero, we can move in time in two directions. Forward, we can imagine not simply specific sites through which one must pass, nor cards which stand in as a sign of one's identity. Rather, as recent science fiction movies *Gattaca* and *Minority Report* make clear, the body, in conjunction with biometric recognition technologies, is imagined to be its own technology of verification.[7] But, in both of these movies there are still checkpoints or mobile surveillance forces that must survey and search space for individuals. In simple terms it is still the space that is the site of control, not the very mobility of any given individual or population. A change in this relation would demand that space itself be a perpetual checkpoint. In Deleuzean terms this space would be neither striated nor smooth, but smoothly striated. There would not be a singular grid organized and regulated through checkpoints, rather space would always be centered by an individual's movement through space. Forces of control would always be multiply focused on organizing, rerouting, speeding up, and halting the multitudes of mobilities. Mobility would become that which is the imagined 'site' of control, not space. For this to happen, all mobilities would have to be fully monitored and at least potentially remotely controlled. That is the dystopic vision of a control society future; all individuals fully remotely controllable.

Historical homelands and future combat zones

It is in the past and the future past, that we can see the beginnings (for technological, military, economic, and political reasons) of this future auto-control society. The automobile in the United States, where it currently accounts for over 90 per cent of travel (fhwa.dot.gov 2003), has grown to become the primary mode of transport over the past century. This near universal use shows no sign of abating and in fact the number of miles driven

per capita rose over 50 per cent between 1970 and 2000. Acknowledging the enormity and ubiquity of automobile use and its continued growth, an obvious point of investigation into the technologies and machinic arrangements of the (be)coming control society is automobility. The automobile has been a site for remote control innovations as early as 1925 and it has primarily been achieved via a network of communications technologies; most often at the behest of safety and economic efficiency. What follows is a brief history of some of the developments and imagined plans for creating a fully controlled automobile/highway system. More importantly, it is through an examination of these imagined futures that we can witness just how deeply rooted and widely spread the desire for auto-control society has been over the past century. Furthermore, contemporary imaginings regarding the automobile are taking place in two distinct arenas. First, are pre-9/11 initiatives for what have generally been called automated highway systems (AHS) or more specifically the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS); research and development upon which began in the early 1990s via a billion US dollars of start-up capital from the Congress. Second, is the current development of a program titled Combat Zones That See (CTS) touted for initial use as part of the US military's operations in Baghdad. These two historically and technologically overlapping initiatives need to be thought of in tandem as a set of theaters for experimenting with implementations of control society. It is not simply that there is a desire to control automotive conduct, but the more far reaching consequences are that the automobile acts as the site for experimentation on the control of all bodily mobility.

The history of the imagined future of the automobile tells us much about not simply the future, but the underlying cultural, political, and economic logics that continue to animate dreams of technological and social mastery over everyday life. Central to nearly all these envisioned futures is the fully automatic automobile or what is often called the driverless car. In these visions driver becomes passenger in his (gender specificity used here for historical accuracy) technologically-chauffeured streamlined mobile 'rocket ship'. As recently as 1997, 2005 was supposed to mark the commercial viability of an AHS (electronicsweekly.com 1997). This is not too surprising. As begun at the 1939 World's Fair, predicting the driverless automobile has been an integral part of envisioning and marketing the future.

As one of the earliest, and certainly the most widely cited and recognized automotive future, General Motors' (GM) Norman bel Geddes' designed 'Highways and Horizons' (more often referred to as Futurama) exhibit, provided what would become a fairly common sensibility of what this future world might look like. In this vision cars were radio controlled – a feat accomplished in 1925, the car of which was said to be driven 'as if a phantom were at the wheel ('Radio Driven Auto' 1925)'. The set of six enormous dioramas were viewed by Fair visitors from their moving seats. Futurama

envisioned a highway system that seamlessly drifted into, through, and out of the rapidly expanding 'Midwestern City of 1960'. The driverless automobile and its attendant highway system was not only the engine for suburban expansion, but also an individuated coach to the furthest reaches of the US where mountains, the monotony of the plains, and vast bodies of water all would easily be surmounted. The automobile would motor commerce and family adventure; free markets aligned with the freedom of movement said to be part of the natural make-up of American's frontier spirit. It is vitally important to note that Futurama's vision of the automobile was a vision of *the* future. The automobile was conceived of as the central force to understanding and implementing a better life, a better tomorrow.

GM would revisit the future numerous times over the next six decades most notably with their 1964 update of Futurama again at a New York World's Fair. During the 1950s the future popped-up all over the place for GM. In particular their Firebird series of cars (the self-proclaimed 'laboratory on wheels') with its turbine engine was presented as 'an amazing experience in automatic car control'. In addition to showing up at promotional events and GM's various Motorama events, the car appeared in GM's 1956 women-directed short 'Design for Dreaming' in which the driver proclaims 'Firebird II to control tower, we are about to take off on the highway of tomorrow', at which point the happily middle class couple drive into the future. The Firebird's electronic guidance system was said to be ready for the 'electronic highway of the future' which GM, along with General Electric and other major industrial manufacturers, flirted with throughout the decade. Given the post-war/cold-war intermingling of scientific exuberance and anxiety, GM's auto-future is no great surprise as it offers up a vision of social progress through better science and personal satisfaction through the consumption of the fruits of that science. But, at a time when the Interstate Highway System was really taking off in its already antiquated non-electronic form, the notion that what America needed was a new system, prior to the implementation of the original, seems now more than simply a bit far-fetched. What does become clear is the longstanding desire for a more fully free, yet electronically controlled highway system. Freedom in the interior space of the automobile (free from driving) is always dependent upon an obligation to an electronic system. Yet, this electronic highway would pass from designer's dream to traffic engineer's Holy Grail.

The diagram, from the US Department of Transportation's *Urban Freeway Surveillance and Control: State of the Art* (Everall 1972) – or more accurately, art of the state – makes apparent the auto-centric nature of auto-control.

This particular vision of control appeared in 1972, before a number of events radically changed the driving environment, including the OPEC oil crisis, extensive emissions controls and safety standards that were just beginning to alter the US market. Furthermore, on-board computers, GPS



FIGURE 1 A multifunctional freeway corridor surveillance and control system.

systems, black boxes, and other communications devices had not yet arrived in automobiles. In other words, much of the regulatory and technological forces currently at play simply didn't exist or had yet to be integrated into the automobile. Yet, this diagram of power points to some of the underlying methods and goals of such 'surveillance and control'.

The automobile quite clearly operates as the central focus of such initiatives and in essence operates as the sender, message, and receiver in a communicative network encompassing the automobile driver and 'central control'. Notice in the diagram the single circle titled 'Vehicle presence detectors'. Three important points can be gleaned from a closer analysis of this single node in the diagram. First, 'presence' is primary as it is the space which is imagined to both pre-exist the vehicle and to supersede its importance. After all, it is the 'freeway' (let us withhold irony for the moment) being surveyed and controlled while the vehicle is treated as a potential problem, as a disrupting force in that spatial system through its potential to create inefficiencies – via breakdown, accident, or collective congestion. Second, this singular point in the diagram represents nine specific groupings of emission/recognition technologies including – though not limited to – photoelectric, infrared, sonic, radar, inductive loop, magnetic, pneumatic, hydraulic, chemical, and smoke detectors. Thus various communicative forms are made conspicuous to the freeway monitoring systems. For instance, the exhaust system is a medium and CO2 emissions are the message. The freeway is not only imagined as a track on which cars are guided and moved along, but it is turned into a surveillant recognition machine in a broad control network. Lastly, this recognition is just one element in what is imagined as a circulatory system akin to that in the human body in which various other systems recognize and respond to potential blockages, inadequacies of flow, contaminated elements, and full-blown ruptures. The system is then what is at stake and in many ways it is a closed system. Individual mobilities are merely an element to be managed for the relative health of the whole.

In many ways this was still the operative logic for AHS right up to 9/11/2001. Government granted research money and the promised profits of a new market fueled extensive research, development, and public relations hype. News stories told of a not-too distant future where highway deaths would be radically diminished by eliminating human error from the system. Furthermore, the cost benefit ratio of developing a far more efficient automated system versus building more highway lanes was said to make undeniably common sense. Within the economic sector AHS was described as a boom industry worthy of capital investment and was said to be a quantum leap for efficiency and the minimization of productivity losses that were due to traffic jams. On the consumer level it was sold as a means for expanding freedom and ensuring greater safety. AHS would turn the car into an efficient networked mobile office and a safe media-packed family room. These networked

capabilities were not only a consumer driven 'option', they were also the means by which this newly automated highway could be made to function. As in early models of highway management a C3 system was envisioned as the activator for such dreams.

The history of the 'convergence' or 'synergy' of communications and automobiles goes back much further than is often imagined.[8] GPS units, satellite radio or even GM's On Star system are merely a few of the recent combinations of communications and automotive technologies. But, as explained in regards to 1970s 'art of the state' the automobile has been understood as primarily a mobile communicative actor in a larger system. Yet, the automobile wasn't exactly a networked actor, but rather a sign emitter. In recent versions of AHS/IVHS adjacent automobiles speak to each other while also speaking more broadly to the system. This networking capability is that which has made and will continue to make the expansion of surveillance and ultimately control possible. Rather than building a ground-up central control system, recent versions envision the networking and integration of already existent technologies including mobile telephony, GPS, light emitting diodes (LED), satellite radio, Black Boxes, digital video recorders, computer processors, as well as a host of internal engine, tire, weather, and performance monitors. These technologies and others have been used most extensively in private sphere fleet applications and by the military (more on this later). Integrated Communications and Navigation is the industry catch-all for such 'services'. 'Every new wireless location tool that has appeared in the marketplace has been used in fleet tracking systems of one variety or another', claims one industry website (comm-nav.com 2005). The economic gains associated with employee and asset surveillance and control have pushed trucking firms and rental car companies to the forefront of such applications. The network is altered by and integrative of existent technologies and adaptable to new ones as they come on board. Of equal importance, each car is no longer imagined as a problem to be overcome (how to avoid congestion, breakdown, the accident), but rather the very means by which the system comes into being. Each automobile is a mobile intelligence collecting machine, data processing unit, and capable communicator that passes along information to other cars which is then further collected, made predictive, and acted upon by a smart highway.

In control society, the stability and maintenance of a system is not necessarily what is at stake. In fact, it is precisely adaptability and mutability that signify and fuel 'its' health or success. It is a constantly unfolding set of assemblages in response to changing scenarios, goals, and speeds. Yet the rhetoric used by Homeland Security's leader, Tom Ridge (dhs.gov 2003), is that of systems maintenance. 'The Department of Homeland Security is committed to further securing our nation's highways, mass transit systems, railways, waterways and pipelines, each of which is critical to ensuring the

freedom of mobility and economic growth'; rhetoric diverges from tactic, while maintaining the ironic stance on freedom of mobility. Securing here is seen as stasis; in Texas they might say 'to hold down the fort'. But, what happens when the state form shifts from the fortification of a position, to fortifying a means of control? How can we think security not in terms of homeland defense, but in terms of offensive (in both senses of the term) mobilizations? Can automobility become a means for an extension of control, not simply a threat to a fortified position?

If as argued, the earlier auto-mobile individuals was subject to the normalizing power of safety, what animates the subject of security? Deleuze suggests that in a society of control the individual is replaced by the dividual; a modulating subject adjustable (able to adjust?) to differing expectations for productivity, consumption, and political conduct. The mild discomfort over adjust-ability links to differing conceptions of freedom and the role of agency. As power in a Foucauldian/Deleuzean conception of freedom of movement in control society is not simply a break with the repressive confinement of disciplinarity. In this formulation freedom is not counterpoised to power, as if power is only that which limits freedom. Rather, freedom of movement is both the problematic for control and the motor that powers its expansion. It is through the mobile subject that expanded and flexible forms of productivity, consumption, and control are made possible. Yet, as the Department of Homeland Security has made so abundantly clear, mobility is also seen as a threat to the very infrastructural networks by which mobility of US capital and military expansion/excursion is/are enacted. It thus should come as no surprise that the most autonomous, adaptable, and modulatable form of mobility, automobile travel, is a preeminent battlefield in the war of terror domestically and abroad.

In July of 2003 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), announced it was looking to; (1) create Combat Zones that See (CST) and (2) recruit private industry to do the research and developement work necessary for such creation. The Department of Defense's 'high risk', 'high payoff' (darpa.mil 2003a) research arm wanted to 'produce video understanding algorithms embedded in surveillance systems for automatically monitoring video feeds to generate for the first time, the reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting information needed to provide close-in, continuous, always-on support for military operations in urban terrain (darpa.mil 2003b)'. DARPA and critics[9] claimed these objectives were technologically feasible and, more importantly, militarily necessary where 'Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) are fraught with danger (darpa.mil 2003b)'. What DARPA called for in essence was the full surveillance of mobility in a circumscribed zone. What would seem to be a monumental administrative and technological task was according to DARPA not simply possible, but accomplishable with fairly simple and readily available technologies, items they call COTS (Commercial

Off The Shelf). COTS organized development is an appeal to already existent private industry surveillance specialists to create an all seeing and all knowing surveillance apparatus. An apparatus that DARPA hoped would provide the exact sort of intelligence needed in the RAM-inspired wars which are built around intelligence collection and the minimization of a loss of American lives. The specific way CTS will operate and the means by which it will do so provides evidence for clarifying three integral logics of the terror war.

First, as numerous civil liberties watchdogs and military specialists have made clear, CTS could easily be transferred not only from a war zone to the homeland, but from urban centers to expansive spaces. One Pentagon researcher claims the program 'seems to have more to do with domestic surveillance than a foreign battlefield and more to do with the Department of Homeland Security than the Department of Defense (Shachtman 2003)'. If we believe this sort of military intelligence – a precarious endeavor for numerous reasons, not the least of which as Bratich (2006) points out is the potentiality of disinformation – regarding CTS then we must treat the war in Iraq as in part an experimental theater in which tactics for future modes of homeland governance are being invented, tested, honed, and advertised. That is, the use of such technologies and their attendant media spectacularization, make ready not only the technologies, but the American media audience being primed for their eventual use at home. As argued above, in this new state of war, the state of exception, all terrain has become a battlefield. The war on terror is not simply being conducted on enemies abroad, but upon citizens and non-citizens in the homeland. So will it come as any surprise that after CTS is battle tested abroad, it may very well be implemented in the US?

Second, the operation of CTS is built upon already existent technologies and easily transferable to the US context. As with IVHS, the strength and affordability of these technologies is their networkability. Simple technologies can be made complex through their integration. CTS combines digital surveillance cameras directly attached to a processing unit which transmit already analyzed and compressed data, thereby significantly reducing the amount of bandwidth needed if all the data captured by camera were transmitted to a central processor. Via a network of video cameras the entirety of a spatial field of governance could in theory, be completely and entirely surveyed in real time. This alone is not groundbreaking; it is instead the recognition software under development for automobiles and movement which is new. Even this though is simply an extension of facial recognition technology. However, even with facial recognition technology the 'face' or identity of a conspicuous subject comes from a previously existent data base. Some process of identifying a particular individual or population as dangerous is used to create a compendium of risky identities which facial recognition technologies comb the data looking for a match. With CTS however, identity

is replaced by mobility; past (an accretion of one's past deeds) is replaced by the future (that which might predictably come to pass).

Lastly, mobility itself has now been given an identity. Not simply the individual who is mobile, but in this instance, the automobile (not necessarily the driver) is provided an 'intelligence' or is made into an acting being. The activity of the being is used to predict future actions (movements and targets) of each particular vehicle. This tracking and predictive element could be viewed as an additive form of intelligence collection to be placed into the mix with other forms of dataveillance to more fully construct knowledge about the subject. Or, as I'm arguing, this mobility could be replacing the individual as the means by which dangerous identities are formulated. This production of a predictive mode of mobility assessment creates a risk identity for that mobility which in no way depends upon the individual driver. The identity of the driver is of no consequence; traditional identity categories come not to matter, only movement. As DARPA states,

> Predictive modeling, plan recognition, and behavior modeling should alert operators to potential force protection risks and threat situations. Forensic information (where did a vehicle come from, how did it get here?) should be combined and contrasted with more powerful 'forward-tracking' capabilities (where could the vehicle go, where is the vehicle going) to provide operators with real-time capabilities to assess potential force protection threats. MPA should assist operators in correlating and identifying links between seemingly unrelated events.
>
> (darpa.mil 2003b)

Recognition is dependent entirely upon pattern recognition culled from movements in space and time. Through a series of ever-modulating algorithms, themselves based upon the movements within the system itself, the future is created. In essence, the identity of a threat is the prognostication of future 'force protection threats', not in terms of a particular terrorist, but rather 'vehicles'. Identities become risk assessment algorithms of mobilities. It is not who is a threat, but what vehicular movement can be used to predict a threat. This is not to say that traditional identity categories used in profiling will disappear. But, in a state of perpetual war-mindedness, when it is unclear who may come to next threaten US hegemony, ever-modulating hybrid threat-identities are likely to be produced. Other factors, such as the vehicle itself, as has happened with truckers, have become threat-identities. In the case of the trucker as a specific bomb, a program to track and control access to potentially dangerous spaces has been initiated.

Closer to the Homeland, we can see some of the earliest uses of such identities and other emanations of C3 hybrids which are beginning to appear in an-as-yet networked fashion. Some of these are taking place in relation to

crime control, another via insurance companies' offer to decrease rates for safe drivers, at least one by Homeland Security itself, and in a related way the militarization of the driving population itself might be seen as a part of this process. Before getting to specifics, it needs to be acknowledged that none of these events in and of themselves mark the instantiation of a control society, nor do they guarantee that Homeland Security will even necessarily be the primary motivation for its implementation. And certainly, it could be argued that when one is looking for signs of it, our findings may be more than slightly overdetermined. But, one of the goals of criticism, at least as envisioned by scholars from Marx and Weber, to Foucault and Deleuze, and, more recently, Hardt and Negri, is to not only describe the past, but describe the trends that continue to animate the future. When Marx was writing about the nature of industrial capitalism in the mid to late nineteenth century, most production still existed outside such structures and most of Western Europe's population, let alone that of non-industrial nations, worked in agriculture. Similarly, the bureaucratic state described by Weber. When Foucault wrote his histories of the present – of disciplinarity or sexuality – he was writing also 'fictions', not only of the past or present, but I would argue of the future as he considered them to be experiments with the real. That is, experiments with the future in so far as thought is an engagement with how things will come to be. Deleuze succinctly points to such a conception when he describes the goal of philosophical thought to be engaged not only with description, but with imagining resistant futures that must in a sense respond to that which has yet come to be. Or as Hardt and Negri point out, the forms of labor, political organization, and resistance forming under the rubric of Empire, may not yet have fully come to fruition, but the object is to draw out the tendencies which seem to be catapulting the past and present into the future. Keeping such sentiments in mind, any attempt to 'predict' the future is not only fraught with danger, but guaranteed in some ways to failure. More importantly, the goal of prediction is not to simply 'get it right'. Rather in this instance, it is to point out why such a future should not come to be.

The insurance industry has been at the forefront of developing safety scares and 'solutions' in regards to automobiles for nearly a century. Two current examples will show that as they've been at the forefront of earlier safety campaigns, they are currently using risk analysis to imagine a future world in which C3 can control their own financial future and our automobile future. One such push by the insurance industry is the expanded use of what they call 'bait cars' (Eisler 2004). These are automobiles that can be fully tracked and controlled from afar by the police, which are placed in crime-susceptible areas for the sole purpose of 'baiting' citizens into stealing them. As of late 2004 over 100 police departments around the US were using such bait as a means to cut down on automotive thefts. Insurance companies provide 'bait cars' for police departments in many instances and

the National Insurance Crime Bureau's spokesperson made clear that 'everyone – me, you, even President Bush', saves money as a result of such a program. This does raise the question of whether someone who doesn't own an automobile or someone fortunate enough to live in New Hampshire, the only state who's citizens are not legally bound to 'own' automobile insurance, benefit. It also makes one wonder if President Bush has to pay the insurance for his Secret Service provided limousines. In any event, the supposed economic benefits are said to support the use of entrapment techniques and more insidiously legitimate the use of police tracking and control devices for the benefit of fighting crime. This sort of technology can already be purchased as a crime-prevention option for some cars and is part of the package of services provided by GM's OnStar system which allows for remote tracking and some elements of control, such as turning the engine on and off or locking/unlocking doors.

Another measure in experimental use is most succinctly described by the website 'Why Not' (whynot.net 2005) which offers up ethically challenging technology scenarios for the internet citizenry to debate and vote upon. Here is the scenario.

> Create a combination of technologies (GPS, radar or sonar, automotive system monitoring, video cameras, weather devices) to monitor everything your car does and its environment. Monitor location, speed, brake application, use of turn signals, seatbelts, radio, road conditions, etc. Use this information to apportion liability in the event of an accident or as evidence in court for defense or prosecution.
>
> Insurance companies would offer lower premiums to drivers who choose to have these technologies (collectively called 'black box') installed. They would be paid for by insurance companies out of greater profits or drivers out of lower premiums. Safe drivers would choose to install the black box to be rewarded for their safe driving. Drivers with black boxes would presumably drive more safely.
>
> Eventually, insurance companies might only insure drivers with black boxes. Then every driver would have to have one and every driver would drive more safely, saving billions in property damage, litigation and medical expenses, not to mention addressing a leading cause of death among healthy young people.

The logic that economic self-analysis, coupled with the eventual pricing out of the market of the 'unsafe' (or the poor) is seen as the ultimate means by which to save lives. The insurance industry has in fact begun just such incentives based programs on a limited scale. One major concern with such technologies is their obvious potential to be integrated into a command and control scenario in which all automobiles on the road could be monitored and controlled.

This neo-liberal solution to traffic safety places the onus upon the market and consumers to 'freely' choose whether the system will come into being. And in case you are wondering, as of late 2005, the 'yes' votes outnumber the 'no' votes 4 to 1, on 'whynot.net'.

Lest all the blame be placed upon the insurance industry, we can turn to the automotive industry and a group of Hummer owners who both see their SUVs as an integral element in Homeland (or Autoland) Security. Volunteer Hummer owners are creating a nationwide network, known as HOPE (Hummer Owners Prepared for Emergencies), that will act to reach disaster areas unreachable by vehicles not built for military theaters; which Hummers are as they are the civilian version of the military's Humvee, most recently made infamous in the second war in Iraq due to its lack of protective shielding against mines. If 'all terrain' is now a potential hot spot for the War on Terror, then not only does it open itself up to civilians being treated as a potential threat, but under neo-liberal military strategy, civilians can offer themselves up as auto-citizen soldiers in such a war.[10]

Ford motor company is currently channeling such civilian sentiment via their most recent SUV prototype. At the 2005 North American International Automotive Show, Ford debuted the SynUS, said to be 'Vaulting Into the Automotive Future'. Ford (fordvehicle.com 2005) describes this future world and how the SynUS will combat such dangers in its promotional copy.

> As the population shifts back to the big cities, you'll need a rolling urban command center. Enter the SYNUS concept vehicle, a mobile techno sanctuary sculpted in urban armor and inspired by the popular B-cars of congested international hotspots. Short and slim for easy city maneuvering, it looks bank-vault tough on the outside – with intimidating and outrageous styling that even features a vault-style spinner handle in back with deadbolt door latching. When parked and placed in secure mode, SYNUS deploys protective shutters over the windshield and side glass. Small windows on the flanks and roof are non-opening and bullet-resistant. The SYNUS concept also signals security through its use of a driver-side dial operated combination lock on the B-pillar. Flat glass in a slightly raked windshield furthers the armored-car look of this concept.

Such is Ford's description of its 'rolling urban command center' that will enable drivers to 'secure' themselves in 'international hotspots'. The SynUS is clearly not alone in preparing citizen drivers to play a part in this new militarized driving environment. This melding of corporate, military, and consumer goals through the rhetoric of terrorist threats points most clearly toward how consumer citizens will be asked to buy into an auto-controlled future.

Bombs how?

Whether it be safety or security as the legitimating force behind the impetus toward the expansion of surveillance and control, the outcome may be the same; that is, the coming of the control society. Yet, in terms of popularly acceptable reasons for resistance, risk in the face of safety has been in almost no cases seen as legitimate when it comes to automobility. So how do we fight these logics and the forces used to carry them out now when they are used in the name of security? If as Deleuze (1995), p. 175) states the way to fight disciplinary power was to throw a wrench into the works, with control there is a call to create noise or to 'create vacuoules of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control'. Or differently figured (p. 178); 'It's not a question of worrying or hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons'. Turning oneself into a literal bomb may produce ruptures in the system and fully elude the logic of the biopolitical control project. But this is clearly not what is called for here. Bulent Diken and Bagge Lausten (2002) make this point in their brief assessment of counter-control resistance. They point out that formations of power are as equally defined by what escapes control as what does not. Yet, that which escapes – in this case the suicide bomber – turns on what Deleuze and Guattari see as a form of escape defined by self-destruction and the death of others which is both unproductive and useful to the very logic of the terror war itself. The suicide bomber is often a response to US induced terror abroad, while it also now produces not only fear of itself in the US, but legitimates the US war of terror being turned inward. Citizens are made to fear the external threat of terror which legitimates their own treatment as a potential terrorist; as themselves a becoming bomb.

The overarching strategies and specific tactics used to engage mobile subjects may be one point of resistance. When under the rubric of security a furthering of the control society is enacted, 'is that not the war being waged?' And in such a war, if all are governed as a threat, 'are we not one?' This should make us fearful of the new war, but also force us to recognize that we do have the capacities to become non-active members in the networked system. It is recognized that the auto-controlled society depends upon the networked capacity of all acting as mobile surveillant and control agents. Saying no to security and the current state of fear may be an element of resistant strategy. Refusing to buy into (quite literally as more and more of these mobile technologies are purchased 'freely') the use of said technologies whose outcome is your own surveillance and control may be another. Yet, with this said, some of the very mechanisms by which this form of escape or refusal to operate are being called acts of terrorism or being villianized by right wing watchdog organizations. Has it come to the point where any critique or attack of network power and the associative control society is called an act of

terrorism? If so, what does that leave as a 'creative tool'? What are the capacitors, lead wires, and timers that will ignite resistant fuses?

Notes

1 It bears mentioning that in some cases, the Guantanomo Bay military base for instance, in terms that Michel Foucault (1988) called domination rather than power in the last interview he gave before his death, access to mobility and the legal-juridical apparatus is completely denied. Individuals under such forms of domination can not act through any acceptable channels to resist, effect or reformulate their situation. In absolute terms they may, depending upon how complete their confinement, have the 'power' to take their own life, thus usurping the state's sovereign potential to do the same, but for all intentions and purposes they are powerless. Gilles Deleuze (1995, p. 182) suggests this return of sovereign forms may be an integral part of the changes coinciding with the dawning of the control society. 'It may be that older means of control borrowed from the old sovereign societies, will come back in to play, adapted as necessary'.

2 Problematize as it is being used here follows from Michel Foucault's understanding of the term.

3 In its more traditional usage 'governing at a distance' is understood as the forms of governance that follow the maxim that 'government is best that governs the least'. I have argued elsewhere (2006) that a more expansive understanding of 'governing at a distance' provides a means for understanding how mobility makes problematic such governance as the reach of the nation state increases over larger spaces. Furthermore, one dominant means for enabling such reach while also 'governing the least' has been the interconnection of transportation and communication technologies.

4 Even the notion of grooming and 'caring for' gets inverted as part of the preparatory program of the suicide bomber is cutting ones hair, shaving, shining ones shoes, and generally perfecting the presentation of self for the afterlife.

5 The publication of Ralph Nader's *Unsafe at Any Speed: The designed in dangers of the American automobile* in 1965, the congressional hearings that followed its publication, and the resultant creation of the National Traffic Safety Agency mark this shift.

6 The work of Craig Robertson (2006) provides an explanation of what he calls technologies of verification.

7 Kelly Gates (2005) points out that biometric technologies and their imagined uses have been reimagined and redirected following the events of 9/11.

8 Popular notions of synergy and convergence, specifically in relation to communications and automobiles, has been critiqued for the simplistic notion of what comprises a technology (Hay and Packer 2004). The automobile, GPS, or even the car radio are themselves an amalgam. The automobile in this sense is an ever changing arrangement of technologies,

cultural forms, and governmental programs. It is an always in process imaginary potential that is altered through its attachment and integration with other technologies. GPS is not simply added to the automobile, it creates a new technological form.

9 'There's almost 100 per cent chance that it will work, said Jim Lewis, who heads the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, because it's just connecting things that already exist'. (Shachtman 2003)

10 See Mark Andrejevich's (2006) discussion of the involvement of citizens as a key element of neo-liberal strategy in Homeland Security.

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