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ALEX VINES

Mozambique celebrated 20 years of peace in 2012. Renamo was a successful guerrilla force that mostly demobilized and disarmed. It also contested four presidential and parliamentary elections. Renamo became the largest opposition party in Africa until, 2002 but has since been less successful due to exclusion politics by the party of government Frelimo, and because of tactical mistakes by Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's leader for 33 years. This paper argues that Dhlakama's leadership was critical in bringing an end to the conflict and delivering Renamo's demobilization, but he was unable to tactically change from a guerrilla mentality. Dhlakama's decision to return to rural central Mozambique in late 2012 and the armed violence that followed in 2013 was out of political desperation. Renamo lacks the support or resources to return Mozambique to civil war, and a splinter party, Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, has benefited.

Introduction

Just over two decades ago in 1992, one of Africa's most brutal civil wars ended in Mozambique and today the country is regarded as having passed through a successful post-conflict transition. Twenty years provides an important moment to reflect on how a rebel group, created by Rhodesia and then nurtured by apartheid South Africa successfully transformed itself into an efficient guerrilla army conducting a campaign that resulted in 1992 in a peace accord. Renamo subsequently demobilized and has focused on the politics of non-armed opposition, becoming the largest opposition party in Africa until 2002 and almost winning a presidential election.¹

Renamo's has since gone into steep decline and according to Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's previous president, this is much to do with the tactics of Renamo's leader, Afonso Dhlakama: 'He failed to transform his mentality from a guerrilla leader to post-war Mozambique. He has never reintegrated properly'.² This article specifically examines how an ex-rebel leader has tried to reinvent himself as a democrat and how important Dhlakama's personality and leadership has been in determining Renamo's fortunes.

Over the last 25 years other former leaders of armed groups, such as Jean-Pierre Bemba (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Charles Taylor (Liberia) have contested in national elections to gain office.³ Yet unlike other cases in Africa such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone or the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) remained a major political force and successfully contested multiparty elections on a number of occasions.

Independence and Civil War

Mozambique obtained independence in June 1975, following a nationalist struggle against Portuguese colonialism by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo).⁴ In February 1977, Frelimo formally declared its transformation from liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The decision came at a time when Mozambique was beginning to skirmish with Rhodesia, and was seeking to attract military aid from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.⁵

Mozambique imposed sanctions against the neighbouring white minority Rhodesian regime in 1976. Consequently, the Rhodesians began to look at ways of arming and training a Mozambican opposition force – Mozambican National Resistance, later called, Renamo. Renamo was created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office (CIO) in retaliation for Mozambique's support for Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas in 1977. André Matsangaissa was its first leader until death in action in 1979. Following a power struggle that rumbled on into the early 1980s, at 27 years old, Afonso Dhlakama became Renamo's second leader in 1980.⁶

Just before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the management of Renamo was turned over to South Africa's Directorate Special Tasks (DST), which fell under the command of the Centre of Staff Intelligence. Some 45 to 60 tons of supplies were airlifted every month to Mozambique between 1980 and 1984 and by the mid-1980s Renamo was getting R12-14 million in equipment.⁷ This ranged from pens and stationary to arms and ammunition – either of foreign origin or with South African identification marks removed prior to dispatch. An advanced communication system with radios was one of the most important DST investments for Renamo as it enabled its leadership to communicate with its commanders long after apartheid South African support had slowed to a trickle. The DST support was four-pronged: military, political, financial and sociological. Renamo was trained and housed in bases at Savong and Zobo City, both near Phalaborwa, St Miele in the northern Transvaal, Entabeni near Louis Trichardt and the adjoining farms Klapperbos and Vofal.⁸

The transfer of Renamo to South Africa marked a turning point in the war, which soon began to escalate. The South African government used Renamo as a tool for destabilizing Mozambique and as a counter to Mozambique's support for the African National Congress (ANC). Its aims were to destabilize Mozambique and bring Frelimo to the negotiating table. Renamo's strength increased between 1980 and 1982 from 1,000 to 8,000 fighters. The Rhodesians and South Africans sought to recruit discontented Mozambicans and dissidents, but Renamo also forcibly abducted to swell its ranks and forced recruits to commit human rights abuses as a method to buttress their loyalty.

The first combat areas were Manica and Sofala provinces, but Renamo quickly expanded its military operations throughout most of the country. By 1982 fighting had spread to Gaza and Inhambane provinces and the country's richest province, Zambézia.⁹

In the early 1980s, Renamo acquired its reputation for savagery. It became particularly well-known for its practice of mutilating civilian victims, including

children, by cutting off ears, noses, lips and sexual organs. Renamo also engaged in numerous attacks on civilian targets such as transportation links, health clinics and schools. A study of ex-combatants after the war in 1997 showed that 87 per cent of Renamo soldiers had been forced recruits, also supported by more recent studies.¹⁰

Frelimo made a bid to end the war in 1984 when it signed the Nkomati non-aggression pact with South Africa, followed by proximity talks in 1985 with Renamo, but both failed and massacres by Renamo continued. Indeed, Renamo changed its military strategy as South Africa's DST reduced its covert aid significantly to the rebels, and prior to the Nkomati accord had airlifted into Mozambique significant amounts of supplies to help Renamo become more self-sustainable rather than relying on rear bases in South Africa.¹¹ By 1986, Renamo units had pushed deep into Zambézia province. At one point it appeared as if Renamo would capture the city of Quelimane, cutting the country into two. More Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops were brought to help regain lost territory to Renamo.¹² During this period, Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel, was killed in a mysterious plane crash and Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's foreign minister since independence became president. This led to a series of reforms, and ultimately peace negotiations with Renamo that began in 1990.

Peace Negotiations

By late 1988, it became clear that there could be no military solution to the war. President Chissano met South African President Botha at Songo in Tete province in September 1988 and secured a pledge that Pretoria would abide by the 1984 Nkomati Accord. Unlike the previous South African pledge, this one seems to have been largely honoured. Chissano also gave senior church leaders permission to open direct contacts with Renamo. A breakthrough came in February 1989 in a meeting in Nairobi, and following several failed initiatives and false starts, direct Renamo-Frelimo peace talks eventually began in Rome in July 1990 mediated by the Sant' Egidio Catholic lay community.¹³

After five rounds of talks, a partial ceasefire was reached in December 1990. In return for Zimbabwean troop withdrawal into the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors. Renamo agreed not to attack these strategic routes. A Joint Verification Commission (JVC) with representatives from eight countries was set up to oversee this. But by January 1991 the ceasefire was seriously weakened with Renamo alleging Zimbabwean violations in 54 locations and Renamo attacking the Limpopo corridor.¹⁴

Widespread famine conditions injected a new urgency into the peace process in 1991 and 1992 as the war prevented the provision of adequate relief to the needy population. As drought spread, Renamo's ability to live off the land steadily collapsed and it became increasingly desperate in its search for food. Renamo's attacks on Mozambique's main urban and semi-urban areas increased. In January 1992, there were 71 attacks alone, largely to obtain supplies but also to force the government to negotiate seriously.¹⁵

During 1991 and 1992 negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo occurred intermittently while fighting continued across Mozambique. After 12 often-torturous rounds of negotiations, a ceasefire was eventually signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 between President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.

Paradoxically, climatic disaster provided a window of opportunity in the peace process. With Renamo increasingly hungry and finding external supply sources drying up, peace looked increasingly attractive.¹⁶

In the only serious violation of the cease-fire, between 17 and 20 October 1992, Renamo forces unexpectedly occupied four towns. Renamo captured these towns to demonstrate its military muscle. The former UN Special Representative for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello recalled meeting Renamo leader Dhlakama in Maringue and pointing out that there was little benefit from his showing his muscle approach and that, 'Now Mozambican people want to know if you also have wisdom'. At the end of the meeting Dhlakama concluded: 'Wisdom, not muscle', and promised, 'No more attacks. Even if I am provoked, and I know I will be, I will not react'. He kept to his word for the rest of the peace process.¹⁷

Under the terms of the General Peace Accord (GPA), demobilized Renamo forces and government troops were to form a 30,000-strong army. Subsequently it was agreed that a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) force of up to 7,500 personnel would oversee the transition period. Multiparty elections were to follow once demobilization was complete and voters were registered.

According to the GPA this termination of armed conflict would contain four phases: the ceasefire, the separation of forces, the concentration of forces for a new army, and demobilisation. Disarmament would also be an integral part of this process. One week after the GPA was signed the UN Security Council approved ONUMOZ.¹⁸

Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants

The implementation of most of the key provisions of the GPA was placed in the hands of the UN. According to UN Security Council Resolution 797, ONUMOZ was to perform a series of tasks including monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire, such as monitoring the retreat of Malawian and Zimbabwean units from Beira, Limpopo and Nacala transport corridors and protecting these corridors with its own forces.

In order to fulfil its mandate, ONUMOZ was provided with both civilian and military departments. The military operation was made up of 6,400 soldiers, 350 military observers and 42 special observers, half of whom were for the police and half for intelligence. The civilian department was to include 220 civil observers of the electoral process. ONUMOZ was mandated to monitor the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of nearly 110,000 combatants from both sides, as well as the creation of the new army and the resettlement of between 5–6 million refugees and displaced people. The cost was estimated to be US\$331 million (US\$1million per day) until 31 November 1993.¹⁹

Immediate Delays

Although the ceasefire was promptly respected, several problems combined to delay the concentration of forces. Lack of trust between both sides was the primary cause of the delays in demobilization and the transition process. For example, a dispute over the selection and location of Assembly Areas (AAs) was caused by neither party being inclined to give strategic advantage to their adversary.

President Chissano and Renamo leader Dhlakama finally met in early August 1993 for their first joint meeting on Mozambican soil. Although this summit eased political tensions slightly, new obstacles were brought forward by Renamo again including demands for funds. At the same time Renamo began to show its first signs of open hostility to the UN and said that it wanted elections held before demobilization was complete.²⁰

Cantonment of Troops

In the first half of 1994 the cantonment and demobilization process was marked by mutinies and riots. Conditions in the camps were poor, a UN ploy that had been designed to encourage soldiers to move on which backfired.²¹ For government soldiers, it was not just a case of dissatisfaction with the conditions in the camps but also a matter of salaries not being paid and promises for compensation not being fulfilled. This was compounded by generalized indiscipline.

Renamo's forces were much more disciplined and their initial dissatisfaction was more directly linked with the physical conditions in the camps. Renamo also suffered from having assembled its men in the camps promptly. With demobilization not beginning the camps became overcrowded. Because of unrest in them the 1 March 1994 date for demobilization became a key objective.

Demobilization and the New Army

Demobilization in fact started on 10 March 1994, marking the start of the third stage of the timetable described above, although the process of cantonment was still carried on. The government and Renamo initially adopted different demobilization approaches. The government maintained a slow pace of cantonment and a moderate rate of demobilization. Renamo on the other hand, kept up a high rate of cantonment while not, in practice, demobilizing its men.

The creation of a new Mozambican army, the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique (FADM), was central to the peace process. It was intended that it should be in place before the elections and be an effective stabilizing force once the UN pulled out after the 1994 elections. The question of how many soldiers would be part of the new army had been the main military point of discussion during the protracted peace negotiations in Rome. The government favoured a larger army, Renamo a smaller one. Both sides in Rome eventually agreed that the new FADM army would be 30,000 strong, attracting 15,000 from each side.²²

The plan to have a 30,000-strong army on the ground before the October elections (thus putting into practice one of the lessons drawn from the failure of the Angola process) was not achieved. The government, apparently unaware of the

state of morale among its own forces, stuck to the dream of a 30,000 strong FADM for several more months.

As the year progressed, discipline broke down in both armies, and a wave of mutinies struck government and Renamo AAs alike. In the end 12,195 soldiers (8,533 from the FAM/FPLM and 3,662 from Renamo) were selected for the FADM about 5 per cent of all soldiers in the AAs. But since this number included far too many middle level officers, even some of the volunteers had to be demobilized, bringing the total initial troop strength of the FADM down to 11,579.

Gradually over time it became clear that it has become a stabilizing institution in post-war Mozambique. The Rome Accord explicitly called for equal representation in it, from leadership to rank-and-file. Joint training courses have engendered a sense of belonging to the same team, helped by equal benefits. The former Renamo supreme commander Mateus Ngonhamo became the deputy chief-of-staff of FADM and made it clear his loyalty now was to the national army. In 2013 the FADM's deputy commander Major General Olímpio Cambora remains the most senior Renamo figure in the national army.

Renamo soldiers appeared more willing to enlist into the new army than their government counterparts, as for many it would be their first ever opportunity to earn a salary and also their politicians had promised them vastly improved conditions under a Renamo government. However, some simply lacked the qualifications. For example, Renamo sought funds in 1995 for driving lessons for its long time military chief of staff General Faustino Adriano to make him more employable.

Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants

Unlike demobilization, which ended in late August 1994, the social and economic re-integration of demobilized combatants was an open-ended process. To assist this, a Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) of monthly support for two years in cash, to be paid for six months by the government and 18 months by the donor community was instituted in early 1994. Demobilizing soldiers were given an introductory course about their rights and duties as a civilian and offered vocational training. They also had to choose the place they wanted to go and received a package of civilian clothing and transport to their chosen destination. The monthly sum was related to their last salary and paid into a local bank although this was difficult for Renamo. It was between US\$7 and US\$24 a month on average and a lump sum of US\$52 for all at the end. The RSS aimed to 'pay them and scatter them' over a relatively short period to remove them from the conflict equation.²³

By 1996, 87 per cent of demobilized soldiers had been integrated into society most of them had secured a food supply or small guaranteed income.²⁴ Overall ex-soldiers were re-integrating quickly. Many married, and depended on the income of their wives. This suggested that the RSS approach worked well although there were some problems with implementation, especially delays in distribution and confusion over procedure. Training courses were less successful, and in some instances raised unnecessary expectations of employment prospects.²⁵

The total reintegration budget was US\$94.4 million: US\$35.5 million of this was allocated to support two years of cash for registered ex-combatants of which US\$33.7 million went directly to demobilized soldiers. According to an evaluation for UNDP the overhead was low (2.5 per cent) and it concluded that 'cash and material benefits for all demobilised soldiers should be the base of all reintegration programmes'.²⁶ In the end, some 92,000 soldiers benefited about 71,000 from the government forces and 21,000 from Renamo.²⁷

Renamo combatants also complained at the time of exclusion from full reintegration benefits because they were not eligible for pensions as they had not had pension allowances deducted from their salaries like government troops. The Mozambican demobilized soldiers' association, the Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados da Guerra, AMODEG tried to assist, but its dependence on particularly state funding made it less supportive of ex-Renamo combatants in their efforts to reintegrate.²⁸

Renamo proposed extending pension benefits to its soldiers as they not been paid salaries during the war, but Frelimo opposed it. Frelimo used the pension debate to demonstrate its political strength. This issue resurfaced in the 2003 municipal elections and in the 2004 national elections but with little impact.²⁹

Disarmament

Official disarmament efforts of light weapons had limited success. ONUMOZ collected just over 200,000 weapons during and after demobilization but none of these was destroyed.³⁰ Indeed the UN failed to effect meaningful disarmament during its ONUMOZ operation and Aldo Ajello admitted disarmament was never his priority, as he believed this would undermine the peace process.³¹ Post-UN efforts have been more successful as confidence in peace at local levels and in senior policy-making circles grew.

Also up to October 2012 there remained less than 150 armed Renamo guards in central Mozambique, 10 of which also escorted Dhlakama as his presidential guard.³² They were poorly uniformed, with shoes falling off and brandishing old weapons.³³ The government wanted to disarm all of them and had offered to integrate them with the national police force, but Renamo rejected this offer.

Transformation into a Political Party

Transformation of Renamo into a political party was supported by a UN Trust Fund, which in the run up to the 1994 election provided some US\$17 million to the former rebel movement. Renamo and the government had quietly signed an agreement in December 1992 with Italy that would provide Renamo with US\$15 million and a further US\$17 million to be divided by all opposition parties. By March 1993 these funds had not appeared and funding and housing became a source of dispute right up to the elections with the private sector, the UN and governments contributing to the Trust Fund.³⁴

As momentum towards peace negotiations increased, Renamo in 1989 recruited between 100 and 200 secondary school students with the promise of scholarships abroad. This was an effort to increase the level of educated supporters, but backfired badly as Renamo failed to deliver any scholarships to these

recruits, who felt disillusioned and lied to.³⁵ Nevertheless despite its violent reputation during the war, Renamo was able to attract new supporters quickly in 1993–1994. In 1995, only 18 of Renamo's 112 members of the national assembly had been fighters. Even the commissions overseeing the peace process were mixed in composition although the ex-guerrillas dominated three commissions that dealt with military issues. Renamo's parliamentarians had few graduate educational qualifications in 1995, only 6 per cent of Renamo deputies have a university degree compared to 24 per cent for Frelimo, and 11 per cent of Renamo deputies have less than a fourth grade qualification compared to 3 per cent of Frelimo deputies.³⁶

Tension between Dhlakama and ex-fighters and newer post-conflict Renamo supporters, looking for an alternative to Frelimo has grown over time. As we will see below, this has resulted in a series of splits and Renamo parliamentarians at times ignoring the decrees of their leader.

Elections

Renamo has contested all four presidential and parliamentary elections since the war ended in 1992. The October 1994 elections enjoyed high voter turnout, above 85 per cent.³⁷ The election campaign saw little violence and a low-key campaign although there was some intimidation by both sides in their stronghold areas. The south and north voted mostly for Chissano and Frelimo while the central provinces of Manica and Sofala were dominated by Renamo, indicating how regional and ethnic politics played a role. The results in the strategic provinces of Nampula and Zambézia, where 41 per cent of the electorate were registered gave Renamo the advantage, but were close; neighbouring villages often voting for opposing candidates. Localized politics and a widespread desire for peace contributed to this complex result, with communities and church groups in some areas encouraging tactical voting, Frelimo's Joaquim Chissano for president and Renamo in the assembly.

Despite its handicaps, including its brutal military past, Mozambique's informal amnesty, traditional healing and forgiveness processes played a role, enabling Renamo to compete against Frelimo peacefully and did not appear to impact on Renamo's attractiveness for voters in central and northern Mozambique.

Since the 1999 elections Renamo has visibly weakened and has not managed to significantly challenge Frelimo's hegemony, with the latter gaining a landslide victory in the 2009 elections. The new parliament, elected in 2009 for a five-year term through proportional representation, is dominated by Frelimo. Frelimo won 75 per cent of the vote and has majorities in all former Renamo strongholds. It now dominates the country to a greater extent than at any time since the inception of the multi-party system in the early 1990s. While voter turnout dipped after the 1999 elections, it has since risen again.³⁸ This is largely due to efforts by Frelimo to register as many new members as possible and get out their vote on the election days.

Positions in the National Assembly are allocated to parties in proportion to their number of parliamentary seats. As Table 3 below shows, Frelimo obtained an absolute majority through winning 191 seats; Renamo has 51 seats and the

Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM), eight (250 total). The National Assembly's standing commission has 15 members, so that becomes 12 for Frelimo and three for Renamo; there are eight working commissions, so Frelimo chairs six and Renamo, two.

For a while in the 1990s Renamo became the largest opposition party in Africa, overtaken by Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2002. Renamo won nearly 40 per cent of the overall vote and the majority in five provinces in both the 1994 and 1999 elections. Its popularity at that time surprised many observers because of its atrocious record for human rights abuses during the war. Its support indicated discontent at continued domination by Frelimo and that the country was still divided and the wounds of the civil war are yet to fully heal. Since the 1999 elections Renamo has been on the decline as an opposition party, as Table 3 above shows, and has not managed to significantly challenge Frelimo's hegemony.

Renamo's decline is due to a number of factors. Clearly Frelimo has benefited from Mozambique's economy, which is still heavily dependent still on agriculture and fisheries, but is gradually diversifying with services and industry accounting for the largest share of GDP. Mozambique has enjoyed stunning growth rates since 1994 with GDP growth estimated by the IMF to be 7.1 per cent in 2011 and this has helped it reconsolidate its grip on power.³⁹

After the 1994 and 1999 election results, where Renamo's vote held up and Dhlakama came close to matching Chissano's vote, Frelimo also concluded that Renamo posed an electoral risk.⁴⁰ The response was to more aggressively counter Renamo, which at times included intimidation and harassment of its supporters, especially during electoral cycles. There have been some electoral irregularities especially in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Indeed, the 2004 election was marred by misconduct including widespread ballot box stuffing, which may have cost Renamo at least two parliament seats. The electoral machine at the time was seen as both more partisan and more poorly organized than in the two previous national elections, and this also worked against Renamo although not enough to have affected the final result of Frelimo victory. Many in Renamo are convinced that electoral fraud by Frelimo denied it many seats since 1994 and a presidential victory in 1999.

Renamo's task has not been helped by its lack of skilled cadre. Although it attracted fresh blood following the end of the conflict this created tension, particularly among those who had remained loyal supporters during the war years. Renamo's poverty and inability to deliver on wartime promises contributed to

TABLE 1
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1994–2009 (PERCENTAGE)

	1994	1999	2004	2009
J. Chissano (Frelimo)	53.4%	52.4%	–	–
A. Guebuza (Frelimo)	–	–	63.6%	75%
A. Dhlakama (Renamo)	33.7%	47.7%	31.7%	16.41%

Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições Moçambique (CNE), 2013.

TABLE 2
 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1994–2009 (PERCENTAGE)

	1994	1999	2004	2009
Frelimo	44.3%	48.5%	62%	74.66%
Renamo (-UE)	37.8%	38.8%	29.7%	17.68%

Source: CNE.

disillusionment. Carrie Manning noted that this decline was already visible in 1995. She observes that:

However, it is important to note that the reintegration process proceeded haltingly in all areas, and was held up as much by government stiffening the requirements for entry into certain posts as it was by Renamo's inability to provide the government with accurate and timely data on its education, health, and administrative personnel. Government officials hung back while Renamo teachers and health workers blocked services to Renamo areas until local populations became impatient of Renamo. This strategy deprived Renamo of both patronage (in the form of civil service jobs) and of local popular support. By the end of 1995, Renamo was beginning to lose ground among formerly supportive populations by refusing to allow qualified government teachers and health personnel to come into its zones. For its part, Renamo was torn between not wanting to yield control of its areas and its personnel, and the need for the patronage that state jobs represented.⁴¹

Between 1999 and 2004, Renamo received about US\$1.4 million per year from the state, but almost half of this is unaccounted for.⁴² Hardly any funds trickle down to the districts and with the fall in the number of Renamo seats from 90 to 51, the subsidy will fall too, which will put a severe financial squeeze on the party since it has never established effective collection of membership dues, and runs no businesses that could raise funds.

Renamo's two peacetime national conferences, in Quelimane in February 1995 and in Nampula in October 2001, also failed to modernize the party. Key appointments are still made by Dhlakama rather than through a free election.⁴³ Although in 2001 Dhlakama was re-elected as party president and a new National Council was elected, with its membership expanded from 10 to 12 to 60 this made no difference to the party's fortunes.

TABLE 3
 PARLIAMENTARY SEATS IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1994–2009

	1994	1999	2004	2009
Frelimo	129	133	160	191
Renamo	117	112	90	51
UD	9			
MDM				8

Source: CNE.

Although Renamo occasionally organized protests such as a boycott of the 1998 municipal elections and public demonstrations against the 1999 election results these did not result in concessions or a material improvement in its fortunes. In November 2000 Renamo staged demonstrations throughout the country claiming that the 1999 election results were fraudulent and these resulted in 40 people killed and over a hundred injured during bloody clashes, particularly in Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. This resulted in arrests, a crackdown and President Chissano cancelled an international trip in order to oversee efforts to calm the situation.⁴⁴

Since the 2000 protests, Dhlakama's authority and ability to mobilize nationally measurably declined. After the 2008 municipal elections, in which Renamo did not win control of a single municipality, Dhlakama boasted that he would swear the defeated Renamo candidates into office to run parallel municipal administrations. To date no such parallel administrations exist. After Renamo's defeat in the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, Dhlakama regularly threatened to hold nationwide demonstrations, but not a single Renamo demonstration was held by 2013. Dhlakama also announced that the Renamo deputies elected in 2009 would boycott the new parliament but all the Renamo deputies including their Secretary General defied him and took up their seats, anxious to claim their allowances.

Dhlakama's strategy has since 1994 has been to regularly obstruct parliament or pull decisions out of it and seek a high level bilateral negotiation between both leaderships. The inability of Dhlakama to transform from an insecure, centralizing guerrilla leader has contributed significantly to Renamo's rapid decline. Michel Cahen who accompanied Dhlakama during his 1994 election campaign noted soon afterwards, 'Renamo's poor campaigning... was, in my opinion Renamo's greatest frailty and it comes in large part from the highly centralised and personalised aspect of the party'.⁴⁵

Since 1999 the party has been marked by visible squabbling and internecine conflict. Fearful of being eclipsed by others, Dhlakama has moved against Renamo officials that have become successful without his patronage. For example after the December 1999 elections, Raúl Domingos suddenly lost his post as head of the parliamentary group, to be replaced by the unknown Ossufo Quitine.⁴⁶ Raúl Domingos had been a key guerrilla fighter since 1980 and became second in charge after Dhlakama and chief negotiator during the Rome peace talks. He became leader of the parliamentary group from 1994 to 1999, and made this one of the few relatively competent parts of Renamo, in the process overshadowing the chaotic party structure and weak presidency office headed by Dhlakama.

Frelimo capitalized on these internal tensions. There followed, from February to May 2000, a series of contacts between Domingos and government Transport Minister Tomás Salomão, which Renamo presented as 'negotiations' with the government over the 1999 election results. However, President Chissano claimed that Domingos had complained that he felt persecuted within Renamo, and might need government protection and that Domingos asked for US\$500,000 dollars to pay off a debt, US\$1 million for Renamo, and a salary

of US\$10,000 a month for Dhlakama. Domingos denied the president's version of events, but admitted he had been negotiating on behalf of Renamo. He was suspended from Renamo's National Council, from its Political Committee, and from the Standing Commission of the Mozambican parliament and in September 2000 expelled from the party.⁴⁷

Raúl Domingos reflects that Dhlakama had become increasingly out of touch with the politics of peacetime Mozambique.

Dhlakama did not like that I was increasingly referred to as Renamo's second in command by ambassadors and commentators because of my efforts in the National Assembly. His mistake was to refuse to engage in parliamentary politics. He never stood for office and increasingly became jealous of me. During the war, he was never insecure in this way.⁴⁸

Dhlakama quickly took the opportunity to get rid of his rival and his departure deprived the party of one of its most effective members, who had led its technocratic wing. Domingos subsequently launched his own political party, the Partido Para a Paz Democracia e Desenvolvimento (PDD) and stood in the 2004 elections attracting 2.75 per cent in the presidential elections and his party getting 2 per cent of the national vote, not enough to win a seat. He has said that if Dhlakama left Renamo's leadership he might re-join the party.⁴⁹

Renamo's internal troubles continued. Joaquim Vaz, its secretary general was forced to resign in July 2002 after a year in the post because of his friendship with Raül Domingos. Dhlakama took over as secretary general and combined it with that of party leader until Renamo's National Council elected Viana Magalhaes as the party's new secretary general in November 2002. He was replaced with Ossufo Momade, as secretary general in April 2005, who was replaced in July 2012 by Manuel Bissopo. From May 2009 Dhlakama relocated permanently from Maputo to the northern city of Nampula. He defended his decision to move to Nampula, saying:

My move to Nampula is to be closer to the electorate. It is easier for me to lead Renamo from Nampula and shows my authority as leader of the opposition. Frelimo, even you have to come from London to see me here in Nampula. As you know I am the Father of Democracy in Mozambique, I brought peace and defeated the Frelimo communists. They continue to want to deny democracy here using fraud; we will be planning nationwide protests unless they seriously negotiate with us. Renamo is still strong despite these Marxist efforts to deny us. We are planning to train up our grass root, and will have a training course for them in March 2011. You asked me about Raúl [Domingos], he left Renamo and has set up his own party and lost elections twice. In a democracy, splits happen, he has a different vision. MDM is not Renamo, but some of our people have been confused and supported Simango. You know, when you are in intensive care and on life support, you do not rule in or out anything. We will consider any alliance that makes sense for us to continue our sacred role as the guardians of democracy in Mozambique.⁵⁰

Dhlakama finally met President Guebuza in Nampula on 8 December 2011 for the first time since Guebuza's first-term inauguration as president of the Republic in 2005.⁵¹ Then on 8 March 2012 an armed confrontation erupted outside Renamo's provincial offices in Nampula between government riot police, some 300 Renamo ex-combatants and Dhlakamas' armed 'Presidential Guard' resulting in two deaths, injuries and 34 arrests.

On 17 April 2012, President Guebuza met Dhlakama again for two hours in the Nampula Provincial Government. Both men exchanged phone numbers and agreed to meet again. This meeting seemed to temporarily reduce tensions but then in October 2012, Dhlakama left Nampula for Satunjira, Gorongosa, in central Mozambique, near Casa Banana, a guerrilla base that served as Renamo's headquarters during the early 1980s. Dhlakama has subsequently threatened that he is training his supporters for renewed conflict and that Renamo could split the country.⁵²

Renamo has complained that only members of Frelimo benefit from the country's new-found natural resource wealth, says it wants more of its demobilized fighters included in the security forces and electoral reform: Dhlakama has even called for the creation of a transitional government, pending fresh elections. Initially Dhlakama called on President Guebuza to travel to Gorongosa to meet him, but then agreed to talks between the government and Renamo in Maputo. Since December 2012, regular negotiations have resulted in little progress although some small concessions seem possible.

In April 2013 there was a further deterioration. Nine people were killed in a confrontation between Renamo supporters and the government in Muxúnguè, Sofala province. The police claimed that Renamo was gathering large numbers of demobilized fighters in Muxúnguè and transforming it into a military base, and used tear gas to clear the area and made 15 arrests. Renamo then responded by attacking the police post in Muxúnguè on 5 April 2013, during which four police and one Renamo attacker were killed. In an attack by unidentified gunmen on road traffic the following day in Muxúnguè, three people were killed.⁵³

The attack on Muxúnguè seems to have been to try to free the 15 arrested Renamo members then held in the local police station. Dhlakama initially admitted in a press conference that he had ordered this attack, but later claimed he had been threatened with death by his generals if he did not order the attack.⁵⁴ This second justification is probably untrue, as Dhlakama is believed to be in tight control of his armed men. It is more likely that he realized that he had admitted to the press that he had instigated a crime.

Clashes in central Mozambique continued as 2013 progressed, getting more serious and frequent. A further deterioration occurred on 17 June when a military post and arms depot at Savana in central Mozambique was attacked by unidentified armed men, killing five soldiers and stealing weapons. Then the head of Renamo's information department Jeronimo Malagueta called a press conference in Maputo on 19 June and announced that Renamo was creating a 'security perimeter' from the River Save to Muxúnguè in Sofala province to protect Renamo's Satunjira base from government attack. Renamo's political advisor Rahil Khan

also urged all foreigners to leave the zone and warned that Renamo would also close the railway linking the Tete coalmines and Beira.⁵⁵

Early on the 21 June, gunmen ambushed traffic along the main north-south road (EN-1) between the River Save and Muxúnguè, causing at least two trucks to crash and burn, resulting in at least two dead and two injured. The government responded by closing the Gorongosa game park to tourists, ordering traffic to drive in military escorted convoys and only during daylight on the River Save to Muxúnguè stretch of EN-1 and in Maputo arrested Renamo's Jeronimo Malagueta. Mining companies also increased their security and Rio Tinto announced it had suspended its coal exports from Tete province. On 6 July the FADM destroyed an abandoned Renamo base of some 50 huts close to the country's main north-south highway.⁵⁶ The FADM in mid-August also attacked a Renamo camp near Muxúnguè resulting in several dead.

In July 2013 Afonso Dhlakama said that he could meet President Guebuza under certain conditions either in central Mozambique or in Maputo and emphasized that he did not want to return to war, but also called for municipal and parliamentary elections to be postponed. Municipal elections are scheduled for 20 November 2013 and national presidential and parliamentary elections for 15 October 2014.

The armed attacks since April 2013 appear to have been calculated by Dhlakama to make him relevant again and strengthen his hand in negotiations as he now sees force as his only real bargaining chip. Dhlakama can still mobilize some support and Renamo has access to arms caches hidden during the UN supervised 1993–1994 disarmament process. Renamo does not have the capacity to return to war, although Dhlakama's 500–1,000 strong rag-tag force in Gorongosa have shown their ability with arms to ambush, disrupt, fight back and kill.

There is a clear need for an effective opposition in Mozambique but Dhlakama has preferred to maintain the rhetoric of armed struggle and in 2013 ordered armed attacks. It demonstrates how he has failed to develop a credible political programme to attract national support, although the armed response in 2013 seems to have attracted some new support in central Mozambique. His insecurity and inability to reform led directly to the creation in March 2008 of a new political party, the MDM, a breakaway group, led by Daviz Simango. Simango was expelled by Dhlakama for allegedly violating party statutes, when he decided to run as an independent candidate in local elections in 2008 because Dhlakama favoured another candidate. The family of Simango is connected to the Partido de Convenção Nacional (PCN) which entered into coalition with Renamo.⁵⁷ Daviz Simango was elected mayor of Beira in 2003 and re-elected in 2008 on a reputation of efficiency.

MDM offers an alternative to Frelimo and Renamo. Interestingly, the MDM was prevented by both Frelimo and Renamo from participating fully in the 2009 National Assembly elections, owing to an alleged failure to comply with regulations. It was excluded by the National Election Commission (CNE) from running in seven of the eleven constituencies in a move seen by many observers as politically motivated.⁵⁸ MDM is viewed by some within Frelimo as an international donors' puppet. Despite the legal obstacles thrown in its way, MDM

won eight National Assembly seats in 2009, owing to its strong showing in Sofala. One of its leaders admitted: 'We have learnt from Renamo's mistakes and Dhlakama in particular'.⁵⁹

Even though MDM is weak, small and associated with international donors, it has forced Frelimo to raise its game.⁶⁰ The election in December 2011 of Manuel de Araujo as MDM mayor in Quelimane (another ex-Renamo supporter) showed MDM still offered an alternative in the local authority landscape although Secretary General Ismael Mussa's resignation in April 2011 signalled MDM's own internal challenges.⁶¹ Dhlakama, when asked about the MDM victory in Quelimane discounted it stating: 'That's nothing! It's not a problem we have with the MDM or with Frelimo. The fact is those elections are illegal and that's why we didn't run'.⁶²

However, Adriano Nuvunga and José Adalima argue that MDM's victory in Beira in 2008 convinced Dhlakama to relocate to Nampula and has been deeply unsettling for Renamo.

Simango had just removed and replaced Afonso Dhlakama from the second largest national political centre of the country. In fact, this explains why Renamo demanded the reopening of the Rome Peace Accords Protocols. It was also an effort to claim that Frelimo and Renamo, regardless of election results were 'the real main political actors'. Moreover, the fact that Dhlakama left Maputo to be based in Nampula (the third largest city) and not Beira confirms the argument of deeper political implications which resulted from the defeat in Beira, a city regarded as a bastion of Renamo. Afonso Dhlakama, a Ndau from Chibabava, had every reason to fight the MDM because Daviz Simango's success, a Ndau from Machanga, meant a deep division within the Ndau family, whose consequences would be more substantive than the division caused by Raúl Domingos, an urbanized Sena, in 2000.⁶³

The reality is that Renamo increasingly finds itself unable to deliver services or field credible candidates and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, having isolated himself in Nampula since 2009 and in rural Gorongosa since October 2012, is increasingly nostalgic for his days as a guerrilla leader – purely oppositionist but unable to deliver on his threats unless backed by violence. The Renamo boycott of the Quelimane by-election in 2011 and the Inhambane by-election of 18 April 2012 ceded further space for MDM to assert itself in peaceful politics.

Conclusion

Renamo has made a remarkable journey. It was created by the Rhodesian CIO and foster-parented by apartheid South Africa and became a successful rebel movement. It limited a secure government presence to the towns, operated in all 11 provinces of Mozambique and accepted peace. The majority of Renamo's fighters were initially forced into its service and it widely used violence and coercion in its operations. As a rebel force it was successful but ill-prepared for its transformation into a peace time opposition political party.

Its military tactics up to the 1992 Rome GPA clearly helped bring about a negotiated settlement and political pluralism to Mozambique. Renamo also demobilized its ex-combatants and it would be difficult today to distinguish ex-Renamo fighters from government troops that remain in the new joint army, FADM. The RSS 'pay them and scatter them' efforts, worked well in Mozambique, especially because ex-combatants were conflict-fatigued and sought a civilian future.

Despite its handicaps, including its brutal military past, Renamo has competed against Frelimo peacefully.⁶⁴ Renamo should be credited for contesting all the parliamentary and presidential elections since 1994 and up to 2002 was the largest opposition party in Africa, with over 100 seats in the National Assembly. This is unique in Africa and a remarkable success for a former rebel group if compared with the RUF of Sierra Leone for example.

Renamo has been in gradual decline since 1995 due to its precarious financial situation and poor record in service delivery to the communities it represented. President Guebuza's efforts to ensure total Frelimo domination of Mozambican politics has been made easier by Renamo leader Dhlakama's inability to modernize and democratize his party in peacetime resulting in Renamo becoming just oppositionist. Afonso Dhlakama treats politics like combat and tries to run his party like a military movement. He became Renamo's second leader in 1980 following a power struggle and has continued that role for 33 years. In contrast there have been nine Renamo secretary-generals over the same period.⁶⁵

Frelimo has effectively exploited this, encouraging division, such as over Raúl Domingos, and seeking to ensure Renamo is contained as a symbolic opposition party that poses no threat to its hegemony.

Twenty years after the Mozambican conflict ended, many Renamo combatants have successfully reintegrated. The international technical support for demobilization and reintegration assisted, as did Frelimo's ability to accept reconciliation. Renamo's biggest mistake has been to keep the same leader since 1980, an individual unable to reintegrate into modern day Mozambique politics but also still relatively young at 60. The result is an increasingly isolated leader who appears to have concluded that the only way to remain relevant is to return to targeted violence and seek concessions from that platform. The rise and decline of Renamo illustrates successful demobilization, but poor elite-level reintegration, with its leader of 33 years Afonso Dhlakama increasingly unable to effectively provide credible opposition to Frelimo except through violence. Dhlakama has failed to make the transition from guerrilla leader to democrat and it is a Renamo splinter party MDM that in 2013 controls the local administrations of two of Mozambique's major cities, Maputo and Quelimane.

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