DIVERSIFYING FROM WITHIN

Community Policing and the Governance of Security in Northern Ireland

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The subtle and complex nature of Northern Ireland’s transitional landscape presents acute difficulties for the community policing concept. As the core to the police reforms in the country, its implementation has faltered in the face of institutional inertia within the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). This has been further exacerbated by a failure of the police to adequately increase the co-production of security through improved engagement and utilization of Northern Ireland’s diverse community infrastructures. This paper will assess the delivery of community policing by the PSNI, while exploring their engagement with Northern Ireland’s grass-roots community organizations, and specifically those involved with the governance of security at the local level. Thus, through a framework of adaptation, engagement and delivery of community policing by the PSNI within the unique context of Northern Ireland’s security ‘otherness’, the paper will explore the key issues to police–community interaction associated with the broader vision of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) on community policing.

Introduction

It may be observed that the changes to policing in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles have been almost as critical as the more tangible effects of the conflict itself. As a barometer of both political and social (dis) satisfaction with policing and its symbolic role, the continual process of police reform and reconstruction now reflects a significant proportion of what may be termed the ‘change dialectic’ (O’Rawe 2003; McGloin 2003). Indeed, such was the extent of this ‘dialectic’ on the need for reform throughout the conflict that ‘implicitly, bargaining about policing became meta-bargaining as to the nature of the conflict …’ (Campbell et al. 2003: 42). In regard to the conflict, and indeed the broader ‘peace process’ in Northern Ireland, the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ was reached on 10 April 1998. Cementing the progress made from the Loyalist and Republican ceasefires in 1994, the Agreement was about the establishment of a peaceful and democratic means to resolve the intractable social and political differences engendered by over three decades of conflict. The Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) was set up as part of the 1998 Agreement, culminating in the publication of what is otherwise known as the ‘Patten Report’ (Patten Report, 1999). Chaired by the former Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, its broad task was not only to give policing back to the people of Northern Ireland and reconnect the police with those whom they serve, but attempt to resolve an issue that, for many, was at the heart of the conflict (Patten Report, 1999). Thus, the Patten Report may be viewed as symptomatic of a perceived need for an end to incremental and politically nuanced ‘tinkering’ with

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policing, and the beginning of a substantial, inclusive and permanently acceptable change process (Topping 2008a).

As the final ‘stepping stone’ along the journey towards a lasting peace in the country, the Patten Report, as the most ‘significant’ and ‘complex blueprint’ for police reform in the world, was part of an overarching consensus that if policing could somehow ‘be got right’, the other pieces of the jigsaw would fall into place (O’Rawe 2003; Bayley 2007; Office of the Oversight Commissioner 2006; NIPB and PSNI 2007). In the run-up to ten years of post-Patten policing, there has been a growing momentum to such change, espoused in the significant political progress and devolution of local governance to the polity (Belfast Telegraph 2007a; 2007c). Indeed, the Office of the Oversight Commissioner (OSC), established out of the ICP to ensure the ‘faithful and comprehensive’ implementation of the 175 recommendations (Patten Report, 1999: para. 19.2), has indeed confirmed that the vast majority of the recommendations are now complete, as espoused in the end to the OSC’s term of office in May 2007 (Office of the Oversight Commissioner 2007). Thus, with the ‘dialektik’ of policing having changed dramatically, the ‘meta-bargaining’ with regard to policing is now concerned with the nature of policing the peace; and the ubiquitous link between politics, policing and the rule of law has now been replaced by a broad social agenda focused on creating safer communities.

Examining the Patten recommendations in more detail, the central plank to the reforms may be conceived in two distinct ‘streams’ (Kempa and Shearing 2005; Topping 2008a). The first, which has arguably reached its natural denouement, is the reform to the ‘systems’ of policing, such as badges, recruitment, training and human rights, as the more physical and visible realignments. The second ‘stream’, related to a broader vision of diverse policing, is ‘concerned with broader questions around the governance of security, or, policing broadly conceived’ (Topping 2008a: 5). It is this second ‘stream’, and Patten Recommendation 44, which states that ‘Policing with the Community should be the core function of the police service …’ (Patten Report 1999: para. 7.9), that will provide the focus for the paper.

Indeed, community policing, or ‘policing with the community’ under the rubric of Patten, is undoubtedly pivotal to police programmes and reforms across the globe (cf. Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Groenewald and Peake 2004). As a ‘hugger-mugger’ of practices (Brogden 2005), representing everything from an organizational philosophy to a style of service delivery, community policing is essentially concerned with decentralized, expansive, problem-oriented and community-anchored policing (Loader 2000; Dixon 2004; Oliver and Bartgis 1998). Thus, the core theme of the paper is premised first upon exploring Patten’s more ‘diverse’ vision of policing and its desire to promote a broader landscape of security governance. Second, it will highlight the need for community policing to be conceived as a more expansive, deliberative and ‘bottom-up’ process of policing in the post-conflict setting of Northern Ireland, while detailing some of the obstacles to the realization of Patten’s vision. And, third, the paper will offer a tentative assessment of the theoretical and practical issues that underpin the adaptation, engagement and delivery of policing within the context of the localized security provision, often characteristic of communities across the country.

**Methodology**

The research for the paper draws upon extensive, qualitative interviews with the PSNI, community-based organizations, District Policing Partnership (DPP) members and
politicians in Loyalist/Unionist and Republican/Nationalist areas of Northern Ireland. In total, 67 interviews were carried out between November 2007 and May 2008.

In reference to the PSNI, it is interesting to note David Bayley, as an international scholar and expert on policing in Northern Ireland. Arguing that while much has been written in relation to policing in the country, he contends that there has been very little empirical research undertaken with either the police organization or the policing institutions (Bayley 2007). Undoubtedly, this ‘resistance’ by police to independent, academic research is by no means unique to Northern Ireland. However, it was evident from the fieldwork, and the initial ‘gatekeeper’ encounters with the PSNI, that such resistances were partly fuelled by previous (and contested) research conducted with the former Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (Ellison 1997). Indeed, over ten years later, Ellison’s thesis on institutional sectarianism within the RUC gilded the suspicion with which this research was initially received by the PSNI. Thus, in view of the difficulty in conducting empirical, independent research with the PSNI, it makes the present study both valuable and unique in relation to the extensive access gained to officers on the ground.

To digress slightly, it was decided at the research design stage that the study would be conducted within East and West Belfast, as predominantly homogeneous Loyalist/Unionist and Republican/Nationalist areas, respectively. Thus, while the extent of the ‘generalisability’ to other areas in Northern Ireland may be limited in one sense, in another, it is generally recognized within social research methodologies on Northern Ireland that ‘East and West Belfast are different … Unlike North and South of the city, the East and West are relatively homogeneous in terms of their religious composition. For precisely that reason, however, they have become … bastions for their respective communities …’ (McLoughlin and Miller 2006: no p.n.). Therefore, policing issues within these areas arguably have a resonance with the wider community in Northern Ireland, although this may be limited to urban rather than the more rural and isolated areas of the country, often sheltered from the more damaging effects of the conflict.

In November 2007, access was granted to begin semi-structured interviews with the PSNI’s Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) within the East and West Belfast District Command areas (DCAs). In total, 35 interviews were conducted with officers, broken down as follows: two Full-Time Reserves; 16 Constables; seven Sergeants; eight Inspectors; one Chief Inspector; and one Superintendent (average length of service 16.1 years). Despite the aspiration of Patten Recommendation 44 that community policing should be the core function of the entire service, it was clear at an early stage that only the NPTs (and related Community Affairs/Relations Officers) engaged in this style of policing, giving credence to the decision to exclude response-type officers from the research. The author was also given the freedom to interview any of the NPTs willing to participate, rather than officers being pre-selected by supervisory ‘gatekeepers’.

It must also be noted that at the time of the research, there was a complement of 40 NPT officers in East Belfast, and 24 NPT officers in the West Belfast DCAs (figures obtained during fieldwork). Thus, 15 officers were interviewed from each area, giving an interview sample of 37.5 and 62.5 per cent of all neighbourhood officers from East and West Belfast, respectively. Of the remaining five officers, three were drawn from other departments (although concerned with community policing), one officer from the Policing with the Community Branch, with one officer retiring from the PSNI during the course of the research. On average, each interview lasted for 43 minutes, mainly
conducted in the NPT offices of the respective area during ‘down times’ in officer shifts so as to minimize interruptions and call-outs.

In respect of the interviews conducted with the Loyalist/Unionist community organizations (LCOs) and Republican/Nationalist community organizations (RCOs), they were largely sampled and selected using a ‘snowballing’ technique. With no previous research available on such groups, especially with regard to those involved in the governing of local crime issues, they were identified through the close associational networks characteristic of Northern Ireland’s civil society (Brewer 2001). Having made the initial ‘cold contacts’, often through police officer identification of ‘key’ groups and individuals in the community (although such groups were sometimes self-evident from local newspaper reports), the credibility of the researcher was quickly developed over the course of the fieldwork. Once the researcher’s ‘community credibility’ had been built up, it allowed access to a range of organizations, from highly organized and developed restorative justice-type groups through to independent residents’-type associations who played an active role in local crime and community safety issues, either in parallel or in cooperation with the PSNI. In total, 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted with such groups, with 11 drawn from each sample area. There interviews were usually conducted in situ, which ranged from the offices of organizations (where available) to local community halls and meeting places commonly used. On average, the community-based interviews lasted 45 minutes.

Finally, five interviews were conducted with members of the DPPs, with three members of the East Belfast DPP sub-group (two political and one independent) and two members of the West Belfast DPP sub-group (one political and one independent). The members were contacted directly through police contacts and the publicly available channels of the Belfast DPP offices. The remaining five interviews were conducted with politicians from each of the sample area, with three from East Belfast representing the Loyalist/Unionist community, and two from West Belfast representing the Republican/Nationalist community.

Background

In the run-up to ten years of post-Patten policing, Northern Ireland has emerged from a protracted, internal armed conflict and entered into its most ‘stable’ period in recent history. With the transition from conflict to peace having progressed significantly in recent times, the country is now at an advanced stage of what the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) termed ‘normalization’. Set up in January 2004 by the British and Irish Governments, the purpose of the IMC is to provide an independent and impartial assessment of the level of paramilitary activity and the normalization of security measures in the promotion of stable and inclusive devolved government in the country (IMC 2007). However, it must be remembered that Northern Ireland is only at a stage of what may be termed ‘positive peace’, or merely the removal of cultural and structural violence (Holen and Eide 2000; Blain 2008)—more aptly described as a ‘conflicted democracy’.

Against a backdrop of persistent (and worsening) sectarian division (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006), an ever present security threat from dissident Republican terrorists (Marchant 2007; Belfast Telegraph 2008a; 2008b; 2008c) and continued paramilitary ‘policing’ in both Loyalist and Republican areas, it represents the continuing ambiguity towards peace and policing in the Province. Even in spite of Sinn Fein’s historic acceptance of the state’s policing institutions in January 2007, the PSNI’s orientation
towards a community policing philosophy and practice has been no less simplified in the new era of relative peace (Belfast Telegraph 2007b; Ruteree and Pommerolle 2003). As argued by Mulcahy, ‘in the aftermath of a … conflict, peace itself can constitute a crisis to the extent that it undermines the policies, practices and assumptions ingrained and institutionalised over the years’ (Mulcahy 1999: 278).

Indeed, this potential ‘crisis’ in respect of ‘ingrained’ practices and assumptions within both the police and the community has manifested itself in a number of subtle ways, which shall now be explored in more detail.

First, there has been a distinct lack of clarity with regard to the implementation and definition of Patten’s core vision within the PSNI. Beyond some general policy aspirations relating to ‘policing with the community’ (PSNI 2002a; 2002b), there is a broad consensus within the PSNI ranks as to the absence of any corporate identity or leadership to guide the service on its community policing mission. As noted by one senior officer:

… our officers are operating in a vacuum. They know there’s something called community policing, but they’ve never been told … so they’re blindly staggering about. And meanwhile our bosses are trumpeting to the world that we operate a community-oriented service. But nobody knows any of the science of it; none of the middle or senior managers are committed to it. (PSNI Officer)

Thus, the post-Patten era has been characterized by an indeterminate ‘drift’, with neither the PSNI nor the community entirely sure as to what may be expected in the context of a more ‘normalised’ policing agenda (Buerger 1994). Indeed, the thick, amorphous ideal of ‘policing with the community’ has refracted into a variety of piecemeal policies, practice and initiatives, which, beyond the local, have amounted to something short of a core function of the entire service as mandated by Patten (1999: para. 7.9). This was graphically illustrated by one ranking PSNI officer concerned with community policing, who indicated that:

… we’ve now got a generation of police officers who have been told that neighbourhood policing is the model, but have never had any training whatsoever, and we’re ten years on from the commencement of Patten! We have sold a story to the world we are a community policing service. Even to this day we have no training—it shows the hollowness and the emptiness of the project … the commitment of our leaders! (PSNI Officer)

Second, it was recognized by one of the former Patten Commissioners, Clifford Shearing, that policing ‘outside’ the state was a fact of life in Northern Ireland (Shearing 2000). Indeed, it remains a fact in Northern Ireland that overt and insidious paramilitary violence still lurks in both Loyalist and Republican communities insofar as ‘sadly, the first port of call in a lot of cases is still the paramilitaries, and that’s the reality’ (LCO; Irish News 2008a). However, moving away from the popular conceptions of ‘rough community justice’ or ‘punishment beatings’, there are a vast array of voluntary and community organizations that have a long tradition of what may be termed ‘sorting things out’ (Brewer 2001; Knox 2002; Monaghan 2008). As an indicator of the strength within Northern Ireland’s civil sector to deal with local deficits in state security provision, this point was not missed in the nineteenth and final report of the Oversight Commissioner, indicating that:

… the Policing Board, the Police Service, and the Northern Ireland Office need to be alert to the effects of the well intentioned … community groups and their overlapping mandates can have on
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community engagement, as well as the capacity of the police service to deal with demands. (Office of the Oversight Commissioner 2007: 16)

Even beyond the ability to merely 'sort things out' and maintain comparatively low levels of crime, there are many groups that form part of the rich social capital and grass-roots social networks of Northern Ireland’s community sector that have an identity based around their ability to govern security (Brewer 2001; Jones 2007; Acheson and Milofsky 2008). Derived from both the internal ‘policing’ and the external ‘security’ exigencies of the Troubles within Loyalist and Republican areas, this identity has been maintained and carried through into the peace-time context, albeit oriented towards managing more ‘normalized’ crime issues. As recognized by one Republican community organization, such ‘abilities’ also have an intrinsic value for state-based policing. Because, where such state and community security capacities are bound together:

… the police will then get the benefits of all the community strengths. Because one thing about the Nationalist and Republican areas that they are particularly good at—they have a good community infrastructure, good groups, good organisations. People are willing to set up and work …. So they [police] will then see the benefit of having that. (RCO)

However, as noted by O’Rawe (2003), engagement with this tranche of society was an opportunity missed during the reforms to policing. Thus, with government and police mindsets apparently fearful of either relinquishing power to or genuine engagement with such non-state security provision (Gormally 2003; McEvoy et al. 2002), Patten’s broader vision was effectively dismissed as what may be viewed as a ‘common conceptual platform to interpret the complexification of security provision across a whole range of configurations and … bridge the gap between state-centric and pluralist views of security’ (Dupont 2004: 87).

In overview of the issues that underpin policing in the post-Patten conflicted democracy, the implementation of a ‘broad’ community policing philosophy within the diverse and divided landscape of Northern Ireland still remains far from complete. However, the historic acceptance in January 2007 of the state’s policing institutions by Sinn Fein for the first time in their history, and laterally the majority of the Republican and Nationalist community, has undoubtedly helped to square the policing circle in Northern Ireland. With Sinn Fein having conducted extensive public consultation and debate on policing throughout the country since their political watershed, it has engendered significant political, as well as practical, policing progress on the ground. Indeed, as succinctly coined by the former Vice-Chair of the Northern Ireland Policing Board, Denis Bradley, ‘in seven years of police reform, it has revised 85 years of conflict’ (quoted in NIPB and PSNI 2007). It is within this context and the new, inclusive social and political backdrop to policing in Northern Ireland upon which the remainder of the paper shall focus. Considering Patten’s original, all-encompassing vision of community policing, the paper will explore the need for the police in societies of alternative and plural auspices of security governance to diversify from within, along with tentative suggestions relating to the realities of such police–community interaction in the new political dispensation. Based on the lessons from fieldwork, the paper is organized within a framework of police adaptation, engagement and delivery with such security ‘otherness’.
Adapting to Diversity

A core theme to the academic and policy discourse in Northern Ireland has been its close affinity with notions of legitimacy/illegitimacy in regard to policing and security governance conducted ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the state. As may be observed:

…the ubiquity of contemporary non-state policing raises important normative and policy issues about what attitude democracies should take …. Does it constitute a vital assistance to weak states faced with under-resourced public police, or does it constitute a threat to the state by allowing a function to be conducted by private elements over which the state should have monopoly. (Baker 2002: 30)

However, it is interesting to note an emerging contention from both sides of the divided community during the fieldwork—that policing is still ‘bigger’ than the police. Thus, there is a diversity of community-based roles, rationalities and capacities that underpin this ‘bigger picture’ and the ‘alternatives’ to state-based conceptions of policing. The supply of such security ‘alternatives’ may be viewed as characteristic of the myriad of Troubles-based cultural, social, political and sectarian issues that necessitated such ‘otherness’ in the first place. However, it is this contextual point that, from the research, appears to have been overlooked (consciously or otherwise) by those concerned with implementing the PSNI’s community policing policies. This resonates with the consensus from within the ranks that community policing ‘has all been sound-bite policing [and] initiatives were trotted out to get Patten signed off’ (PSNI Officer).

In this regard, it is clear why community policing (as the core of Patten) has been criticized as being a-historical, for failing to account of such diversity, and lacking as to how community policing (and policing more generally) may be adapted to such local context (Brogden 2002). Logically, any difficulties in implementing community policing cannot merely be judged against the traditional legitimacy/illegitimacy discourse. Rather, the lack of momentum to the implementation and uptake of community policing may be attributed, at least in part, to a failure of the police to adapt and incorporate the latent diversity of ‘soft power’ extant within Northern Ireland’s grass-roots community sector (Vaughan 2007). Indeed, with ‘policing more broadly conceived’ more to do with real-world influence in terms of its success or failure in any given context, it cannot be conceived in a vacuum, apart from society (Fielding 2002). Rather, it must be located within wider processes of social and political change (Brogden 2005). Thus, there is no particular monopoly on knowledge or vantage point from which the whole ‘picture’ of policing and security governance may be observed. Community policing within diverse and transitional contexts must therefore be open to the fact that the police ‘vocabulary’ may not sufficiently recognize nor can it unquestionably represent diversity from within (Black 2000; Rose and Miller 1992).

To digress slightly, it is a notable feature of Northern Irish society that levels of recorded crime have tended to be (and still remain) significantly lower in comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom (NIPB 2007b; HMIC 2007; PSNI 2008b). Unlike the often compared transitional democracy of South Africa, which suffers from ever rising and extreme levels of violence, the people of Northern Ireland appear to have relatively little to fear (Altbeker 2005; Shaw and Shearing 1998). Though, in returning to our main point, a clear lesson has emerged from the research within both the police and the community contexts—that such sustained levels of social control and reduced crime within the post-conflict transitional space are not due to the successful
implementation of any overarching (community) policing policy. Indeed, it was generally recognized through the fieldwork with the PSNI that their ability to conduct community policing (and manage crime more generally) would be significantly attenuated if it were not for the level of community-based security governance that provides both supplemental and parallel ‘policing’ at the local level. Indicative of the community sector attitudes across Republican and Loyalist areas, one group simply noted ‘it [crime] would be a hell of a lot worse off I can tell you … if this place was England, it would be a tinder box …’ (RCO). Interestingly, it was also evident from the research within the diverse community levels that, in many cases, the PSNI were also happy to ‘sit back’ and allow such ‘others’ to do their work ‘because it was doing their [PSNI] job for them’ (LCO).

Thus, as a paradox to the notion of community policing as a mechanism to harness community support and provide supplemental assistance to the police mission (Johnston and Shearing 2003), much of the local and diverse security provision in the Province acts as the primary source of ‘policing’. Here, it may be observed that such local community organizing has the capacity to deal with problems outside the remit of state policing insofar as ‘the beauty of empowerment is that it appears to reject the logics of patronising dependency …. Subjects are to do the work themselves, not in the name of conformity, but to make themselves free’ (Rose 2000: 334).

Within this non-state policing context, such ‘alternative’ security governance ranges from providing responses to interface violence (Jarman 2002; 2006); community-based restorative justice initiatives (CJINI 2007b; Mika 2006); citizen patrols coordinating hundreds of volunteers; youth intervention services; and the coordination of multi-agency community safety forums, generally outside the remit of the state. It must also be observed that ‘the communities over the last number of years have been used to very swift justice … and it’s that knowledge within the community that leads to that swift justice’ (LCO). Indeed, these advanced community networks can link and bridge across the divided communities and also provide both short and long-term solutions to the perceived and actual deficiencies in state-based provision of security.

It is therefore critical that community policing, as a potential tool for the police to engage and adapt to wider community needs and capacities, be fully open to such influences (Acheson and Milofsky 2008; CJINI 2006). Indeed, such community capacities may be evidenced through the recent Northern Ireland Office accreditation and funding of the Loyalist-based Northern Ireland Alternatives restorative justice programme (CJINI 2007b). And, in view of the impending accreditation (at the time of writing) of the Republican-based Community Restorative Justice Ireland scheme (CJINI 2007a), it only strengthens the argument for the legitimacy and utility of such community-based capacities, not just policing, but for wider criminal justice considerations. However, a significant barrier to such holistic thinking as a means of deepening democratic policing and improving the delivery of Patten’s broader vision is the apparent inability of the PSNI to ‘see’ the connection between community policing and the governance of security as a wider ‘public good’ (Wood and Shearing 2003; Loader 2000).

Thus, the research has indicated that, within at least some of the upper echelons of the PSNI, the rules and practices established within community-based security governance still tend ‘to be judged to be illegitimate in terms of the very Westphalian ideal that they
are moving beyond’ (Kempa and Shearing 2002: 30). This point was succinctly made by one senior officer, who stated that:

I have personal experience of being at meetings … and the likes of the people [community organisations] they were talking about involving were horrifying the PSNI there. The idea that people from the restorative justice programmes, the Safer Neighbourhood programmes—the idea horrified them; it was anathema to the ‘old school’ RUC / PSNI establishment … that there would ever be the like of civil representatives, those type of people …. (PSNI Officer)

And, in combination with persistent government-level refusal to fully trust or accept the work of the highly developed community sector, there will continue to be resistances to the ‘threat’ of bodies outside the state who may aspire to power and influence in the field of security (Gormally 2003; McEvoy et al. 2002; NICVA 2005 Stenson 1993).

It would therefore appear that the use of community policing as a tool with which to allow the PSNI to adapt to the diverse surroundings of Northern Ireland’s peace-time context has been at best limited. In part, this may be indicative of the ‘informed scepticism’ that pervaded the interviews of many PSNI officers in both East and West Belfast. With many officers aware of those individuals in community organizations who were ‘involved’ in paramilitarism during the conflict (and, in some cases, were still known to be), it is not surprising that there may be a resistance by the police to think and work more broadly and trust that which they do not know (or indeed know too well). This, in turn, may curtail the extent to which any ‘new’ ‘community governance policing’ can be introduced into the traditional police monopoly (Wood et al. 2008). Thus, it is indicative of wider, politically nuanced apathy within the PSNI towards effectively intervening in the non-state policing arena and to capitalize upon local community-based security governance (Kempa and Shearing 2005).

**Engaging with Diversity**

When engaging with diverse auspices and providers of security governance, a vital premise for any community policing policy is ‘to build upon community strengths rather than [communities] being viewed as competing or challenging loci of power or influence’ (O’Mahony et al. 2000: 126). As an essential building block from which accountability, transparency and shared common goals for policing may develop, engagement between the police and communities also possesses the ability to ‘tell’ us something about the normative ordering of a particular society (Ellison and Martin 2000).

Traditionally, police engagement with the divergent communities in Northern Ireland (as with many societies harbouring marginal and divided communities) is governed by a tension between the *necessity* and the *desirability* of working with the police (Jarman 2002; Walklate 2003). With implicit cultural and political barriers to police engagement compounded by more general disconnections between the police and working-class communities in many areas of Northern Ireland (where such plural security provision tends to be more dense), engagement is a question of ‘whether there is any desire to know the “other” and build practical and effective relationships between the police and members of the local community …’ (Jarman 2002: 69).

Within such a tentative framework, the lessons from Northern Ireland have demonstrated that police–community engagement has also tended to act as a conduit
for inter-communal relations, or simply the manifestation of pro/anti-policing sentiment within Unionist and Republican communities, respectively (Walker 2001). This may be further complicated by arguments that the police may only be willing to engage with those whom they perceive as most closely representing their own aspirations and objectives (Friedmann 1992). Thus, what is needed within such a polarized climate of police–community engagement is ‘a radically different conception of social order in which consideration is given to the conditions under which groups are prepared to cooperate … mutual recognition of difference is a preferable premise for community involvement than an assumed consensus’ (Crawford 1995: 122).

A starting point at which to imagine more effective police engagement within diverse fields of security governance is the fact the police are ‘multiple reality’ organizations (McLaughlin 2007). Community policing should then logically be utilized as a link to the local (and often socially marginal) contexts of multiple ‘security realities’ on the ground. First, it is those on the ‘outside’ or periphery of police engagement who have the most to benefit from localized security considerations. This may include communities traditionally alienated from normative policing considerations, those opposed to the state police, or groups concerned with the promotion of their own security agendas. On a second (and related) point, it is those at the peripheries who possess the local knowledge in regard to the nature and causes of underlying problems, and who are best placed to develop effective solutions. And, third, it helps to decentralize any perceived deficits of power in dealing with problems back down to the local level (Kempa et al. 1999; Karn 2007). Sitting neatly with some of the more general theories of community policing as a decentralized, expansive and community-anchored style of policing (Dixon 2004), effective engagement is undoubtedly appealing to police and communities alike. However, as shall now be explored, the difficulties of managing such engagement with communities in Northern Ireland are more complex than initial inquiries would suggest.

Beyond some of the localized and disparate engagement between the PSNI and the diverse security provision that was evident from the fieldwork, community policing as a tool for engagement has tended to oscillate between two distinct ‘styles’: those of ‘safe strategies’, and those of ‘critical strategies’ of engagement. In reference to the former, an interesting example of the PSNI’s attempt to engage with communities may be evidenced in relation to Neighbourhood Watch. Indeed, closer scrutiny of with whom it engages is revealing, despite remaining as a much lauded strategy by the PSNI and the Northern Ireland Policing Board, along with some of its more generally recognized limitations (NIPB, CSU and PSNI 2007; Fleming 2005). In view of data obtained from the PSNI (Freedom of Information, received 14 December 2006 on file with author), the vast majority of the schemes are based in predominantly Protestant areas. On the one hand, heavy reliance on such a ‘safe strategy’ is reflective of a police mindset seemingly unconcerned with a need to engage across divides and within the diverse auspices and providers of security at the margins. Though, on the other, it also reflects some of the lingering issues of continued segregation and police legitimacy, not necessarily attributable to the PSNI. Thus, with such impediments to broader engagement seemingly ingrained into the fabric of police and community thinking, it only serves to demonstrate the PSNI’s inability to adopt engagement strategies that specifically deal with diversity outside the comfort zone of the post-Patten status quo (Topping 2008). This is not surprising when considering that, ten years into the post-Patten policing era, there is a
feeling within the PSNI that beyond localized officer initiative, ‘in essence there has been zero product and no advancement … ten years after Patten there is not even a training course for something we say is the way we do things—how can we do things if not one person has even been trained?’ (PSNI Officer).

Turning to the issue of ‘critical engagement’, it represents the limits to which the PSNI are willing to at least officially engage with those at the important ‘margins’ of Northern Ireland’s communities. In reference to ‘community activists’, or those people and groups with positions of power and influence within Loyalist and Republican spheres of security governance, their engagement with police is far removed from the ‘cosy’ conceptions of community policing envisaged by Patten to solve low-level crime and disorder (Jarman 2006). As identified from the fieldwork, such engagement is mainly limited to conflict management, interface violence or as mediation between the police and public in the face of serious anti-social behaviour incidents. Thus, policing in this respect tends to ignore the potential benefits and creating the necessary conditions of proactive engagement with the diverse range of ‘others’ in the first instance, many of whom are better placed to provide solutions not readily amenable to the seemingly one-dimensional reality of PSNI (community) policing policy.

A final consideration with regard to police engagement with diversity is the potential for effective community policing policies to render the law more accessible to those at the ‘edges’ of society (Roche 2002). Thus, where such local interests in security governance are effectively managed and incorporated into policing agendas, it can both improve relations between state and non-state auspices and providers of security, while assisting in the mutual recognition and regulation of capacities within acceptable parameters (Kempa and Shearing 2005), though, in practical contrast to such an assertion, it may be observed that the ‘top-down’ nature of policing engagement and interaction with the grass roots has generally failed to connect police with the creativity of people at the (edges of) local community levels (Acheson and Milofsky 2008).

This has been highlighted most clearly through the role of the District Policing Partnerships (DPPs). With a statutory monitoring remit under Part III of the 2000 Police (Northern Ireland) Act to consult, identify, monitor, engage and act within the community in accordance with the objectives of the policing plan, the DPPs were established as part of the new institutional accountability and oversight infrastructure created through the reforms to policing under Patten. Playing a significant role in one of the most far-sighted police governance structures in the world, the DPPs are a vital part of ‘policing with the community’ in Northern Ireland (Topping 2008a). Thus, as a tool for the police to reach out and engage with communities, they provide a platform for local catchments to voice concerns about policing issues, though, as shall be observed, they are far from the representative forums for plural debate with which to engage at the local community level, or indeed with community capacities.

With the DPPs having suffered from (unfeasibly) low attendances, political manipulation, along with contested and biased membership since their inception, they have failed to appeal to the diverse range of grass-roots community structures across the sectarian divides (Belfast Telegraph 2006; Topping 2008a). As the research has also highlighted, the body of DPP work in consulting and engaging with communities, including the monitoring of local policing, has a negligible impact upon the daily routines of the rank-and-file community officers, as those at the coalface of community policing. Further described across PSNI, political and community fronts as a ‘waste of
time, money and resources dedicated to producing wish lists to Santa’ (East Belfast Politician), they have become a ‘shallow, sad reflection of what Patten had envisaged … [and] there’s no bite with them at all, and that suits the police, because they don’t want that critical engagement’ (PSNI Officer).

Thus, in combination with the apparent lack of ‘openness’ to the DPPs, summarily described as little more than ‘talking shops, stage-managed to avoid controversy’ (Mulcahy 2006: 175), the lessons for engaging with diversity are clear: that mechanisms for engagement must be conceived as deliberative, ‘bottom-up’ processes based upon engagement with pre-existing community infrastructures. Indeed, broad-brush approaches to engagement, whether through ‘safe’ or ‘critical’ strategies, or the ‘top-down’ nature of the DPPs undoubtedly fails to embrace local paradigms of security provision within specific social and cultural contexts.

**Delivering within Diversity**

Delivering effective community policing across a diverse, transitional landscape is arguably one of the most challenging aspects to policing the peace in Northern Ireland. It is important to remember that not only do communities benefit from inflated police numbers and resources in comparison to similar jurisdictions, but so, too, the police benefit from the advanced local mechanisms of security governance (Brewer 2001; HMIC 2007). And, as uncovered within the research (at least within Loyalist areas), such synergy between the police and the community is more than anecdotal. Indeed, numerous political and community respondents in the field have indicated that the PSNI, in the face of apparent resource constraints, have referred (directly and indirectly) members of the public to known paramilitary members to ‘sort their problem out’ (LCO). Therefore, in delivering effective community policing within such diverse contexts of security governance, it must be premised to some extent on re-balancing the de facto legitimacy enjoyed by local security ‘otherness’ in order to align standards of policing with local normative values (Dupont et al. 2003).

Here, the delivery of community policing must be re-focused on two levels to balance such a legitimacy/resource dilemma. First, its delivery must be premised upon removing ingrained assumptions of police primacy in dealing with local problems (Fielding and Innes 2006; Stenson 2005). Thus, it is important to decentre police thinking, avoiding unnecessary competition with diverse security provision insofar as what tends to be ‘awarded to the individual in the form of autonomy is taken from the state in its competence; what is available to the state in its capacities for social regulation is taken from the individual in the form of private autonomy’ (Black 2000: 610).

Second, and fundamental to the former, community policing must be both cognisant and constitutive of the generic local social capital that underpins the community organizing of the areas in which police work (West Belfast DPP member). It is clear from the research that, beyond the limited initiatives of a number of community officers within the PSNI, both Loyalist and Republican communities perceive the police as an institution to be ‘outside’ of local community norms. Part of that problem is that the post-Patten era of policing has been almost exclusively about the changes to the PSNI themselves, with no consideration as to delivering ‘policing with the community’ beyond the first stream of reforms. Therefore, with policing at both the operational and policy levels unable to ‘see’ such neighbourhood-level properties, it has been used as a tool to manage the diverse
expectations within Northern Ireland’s new, inclusive dispensation rather than deliver on adapting and engaging with its diverse make-up (Nolan et al. 2004; Topping 2008c).

Another facet to the challenge faced by the PSNI in the delivery of a community-oriented service is the weight of expectation placed upon Patten’s core vision. However, with the reductions in both PSNI numbers and overt paramilitary policing, Northern Ireland’s perceived status as a low-crime society has gradually been eroded over the last number of years (Brogden 2000; Irish News 2008c). In comparison with the transitional democracy of South Africa, with a police-to-population ratio of 1:348, England and Wales at 1:381, Republic of Ireland at 1:354 and Canada at 1:381, it is clear that Northern Ireland still has one of the highest police-to-population ratios in the Western world at 1:235 (South African Police Service 2008; Bullock 2008; PSNI 2008a). However, there is a distinct belief throughout some sections of the PSNI that even in spite of the current policing levels of approximately 7,400 officers (due to be reduced further to 5,000 over the next five years— an anecdotal figure from interview with senior officer), the organization does not have the capacity to deliver effective community policing, reducing its role to one of response policing. Thus, when combined with the end of the traditional ‘blank cheque policing’ policy from the Northern Ireland Office (Tomlinson 2000) and the modern fiscal constraints on policing generally, it has left the PSNI to concentrate resources upon that which can be measured (McLaughlin et al. 2001; Ashby et al. 2007).

As noted by one officer, this has had the effect of reducing the whole community policing philosophy to an exercise in producing ‘stark statistics’ (PSNI Officer). Such a position has been clearly demonstrated through the recent defence of policing by commanders in West Belfast. With stoical adherence to apparently falling crime figures in the face of both political and community criticisms about police performance from the community, it was aptly described as ‘policing by numbers’, or ‘excel culture’ (PSNI Officer)—a tactic that has little to do with local engagement or the concepts of community policing in the first place (Irish News 2008b; Jeslow and Parsons 2000).

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that, within Northern Ireland’s transition, there has been no uniform expectation as to what may be expected of the PSNI in the drive towards Patten’s vision of a community-oriented service. Outside of the ‘official’ discourse from the NIPB indicating ‘record levels’ of confidence in the police (NIPB 2007a), the author’s own research has uncovered significant levels of dissatisfaction with policing at the grass roots of Loyalist and Republican areas. Indeed, the clear message from the fieldwork was summarized by one community group, who stated that:

It’s [policing] non-existent .... Nobody really sees any difference. In fact, they’d [the community] probably argue they see less police on the ground than there use to be ... it’s definitely gotten worse. (LCO)

Looking more specifically at Loyalist areas traditionally supportive of the police, this perception may in part be due to the reduced numbers of visible officers available to deliver community policing compared to the Royal Ulster Constabulary ‘hey-day’, which peaked at 13,500 officers (Mulcahy 2000). In regard to managing such expectations, it must also be noted that, within some Unionist/Loyalist communities, ‘the big fear is now, Republican areas have signed up for policing, and that all the resources are going to get sucked into those areas to try and impress .... And people feel they’ve maybe missed their chance of things improving. So there’s a fair amount of disillusionment’ (LCO).
And, within newly supportive Republican areas, it is felt that not only do the PSNI simply ‘miss the mark’, but they also ignore the community infrastructures concerned with governing security (and which maintained low crime rates) that existed prior to their acceptance of policing. Thus, it may be observed that ‘Many would say that the police are still on probation, and they’re not coming up to the mark very well …. And quite often you would have people saying ‘we policed it well enough on our own for long enough. If these guys [PSNI] aren’t better, what’s the point?’ (RCO).

Reiterated in the words of one politician, the delivery of ‘policing has definitely gone backwards from where it was 18 months ago [when Sinn Fein signed up to policing]’ (Andersonstown News 2008). Thus, it is indicative of the complexity to policing in Northern Ireland, and the fact that within many Republican (and some Loyalist) areas where police legitimacy is still contested, communities remain ‘satisfied’ with policing simply due to the continuing absence of a visible PSNI presence.

It is clear that the delivery of community policing must therefore be concerned with managing the diversity of expectations within transitional contexts, as well as delivering tangible results on the ground. In regard to Patten’s broad vision of community policing, with no definitive policy or leadership within the PSNI to guide its delivery, it was always in danger of being conceived (and delivered) as an overarching, ‘aspirational good’ when ‘there is no single set of … goods conceivable across all moral or material worlds … any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would be of little use in thinking about particular distributions’ (Walzer, cited in Vaughan 2007: 354).

As the lessons from Northern Ireland have also demonstrated, only when community policing both adapts and engages its delivery to the expectations and organization of localized, plural security provision may Patten’s true vision of policing more broadly conceived be delivered. Thus, if there is a key aspect to the delivery of policing more generally in post-conflict transitions, it is the need for both state and police thinking to be open to ‘opportunities for fresh and innovative approaches to basic issues that elsewhere are frozen in politicized and technocratic debates on crime’ (O’Mahony et al. 2000: 1).

**Conclusion**

In summary, it is clear that the PSNI’s ‘policing with the community’ philosophy has struggled beneath the sheer weight of division and diversity within Northern Ireland’s transitional landscape. Indeed, it is in significant contrast to its near neighbour, An Garda Siochana in the Republic of Ireland, and the relatively ‘normal’ social and political contexts in which it operates, that the difficulties for the PSNI may be compared (cf. Brady 1974). While part of that difficulty still lies with the social and political barriers to accepting the PSNI across the sectarian divides, more fundamental reasons underpin the PSNI’s inability to ‘diversify from within’. First, in implementing community policing generally:

There was no co-ordination—the community policing initiative lacked focus and lacked an effective leadership. And laterally, a staff officer in the civil service, a psychologist … was made to be in charge of something as fundamental and as essential and as critical to the future of the PSNI—it was essentially given to a junior, middle ranking civil servant with no police background and no relevant
leadership or management background … it's not a criticism of the person, it's not who's right, it's what’s right! (PSNI Officer)

Second, as pointed out by Ellison (2007), the externalized nature of the Patten reforms conceptually and physically divorced the reforms to policing from the ‘realpolitik’ of policing and security governance on the ground. Thus, the hard questions as to how local policing within local contexts should be crafted have only just started to emerge within Northern Ireland’s new and inclusive political support for policing institutions (Topping 2008c).

As a result, while the PSNI have been radically transformed in line with Patten’s first ‘stream’ of reforms, the changes to policing on the ground through his second ‘stream’ have largely been negligible. It must also be noted that, in many areas of Northern Ireland, policing largely mirrors the reactive style of policing characteristic of the Troubles, albeit in a peace-time context (Topping 2008a). Thus, in terms of failing to effectively adapt, engage or deliver an effective programme of ‘community governance policing’ that incorporates the body of community-based security governance, there has been an implicit failure by the PSNI to accept the roles, rationalities or capacity for diverse security provision in its own back garden (Shearing and Wood 2003). However, it is vital to remember that no democratic policing service can be effectively delivered where contests as to the legitimacy of that service are played out in the provision of security by ‘others’ at the local level. It is therefore important not to develop an overly ‘cosy’ conception of those at the forefront of local security governance across Northern Ireland’s communities, despite their potential benefits. From this objective viewpoint, such local security provision can at best only provide supplemental rather than alternative methods of dealing with crime and deficiencies in crime management within the overall provision of security by the state, although, from this perspective, the use of community policing by the PSNI to harness even the minimal supplemental assistance available through local security capacities is questionable, insofar as it was described as:

… a lost opportunity. It certainly wasn’t ‘bottom-up’ because there’s been no significant bottom-end ‘buy-in’ to it … the visible ‘buy-in’ has been a the middle and higher levels because that was the horse to back. There were a lot of opportunists who talked the talk, but never walked the walk. (PSNI Officer)

Finally, from the fieldwork, it is clear that the PSNI’s current ‘emphasis’ on community policing appears to be less of an organizational mindset embraced throughout the whole service, and more of an abrogation of frontline policing duties left in the hands of a few ‘specialist’ officers. And, until this position can be addressed and policing is located within the wider mesh of social transition and diversity, the police will continue to remain on the ‘outside’ of the diverse policing arrangements that continue to underpin and sustain the ‘strong, bonded and durable community structures across the Province’ (Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein President quoted on BBC One, The Politics Show, 20 April 2008).

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