Almost without exception, both the development and operationalization of police accountability in Northern Ireland have gone hand-in-hand with the much lauded and complex reform process set in motion by the far-reaching recommendations of the Independent Commission for Policing in Northern Ireland (ICP, 1999). Beneath the international attention focused upon the polity’s policing affairs over nearly four decades, it may be observed that ‘knowing’ and ‘overseeing’ what the police ‘do’ have become integral to the country’s contemporary policing (and political) landscape.

As part of the implicit ICP policy of ‘wrestling’ policing from the state and giving it ‘back to the people’ (Topping, 2008b), creating one of the world’s most accountable police services has become the bedrock of community trust and legitimacy not just in the police, but so too the state – not withstanding the importance of policing to the wider political settlement and stability in the country (O’Rawe, 2003). Thus, on both vertical (structural) and horizontal (socio-political) plains, the
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has become governed by a host of statutory, governmental and other bodies – generally conceived as the global ‘gold standard’ of police oversight, not limited to operational policing, human rights, public order policing and organisational governance (Ellison, 2007; Office of the Oversight Commissioner, 2007; Topping, 2008a).

Yet in spite of the embedded nature of accountability mechanisms in terms of their legal and policy status, it may be argued that function has not necessarily followed form with regard to the outworking of police accountability – and especially so when set within the transitional and shifting context of the policing landscape of Northern Ireland. As will be observed below, a number of ‘mediating realities’ serve to challenge both the efficacy of the various mechanisms in place to hold the police to account. Indeed, the evidence would suggest the policing and security environment is something other than that which is conducive to the delivery of ‘normal’ policing, with: a continuing terrorist threat; social and religious segregation; ritual public disorder; and ‘alternative’ policing provision variously coalescing to challenge the outward projection of policing in the country as ‘mission successful’ – and accounts thereof (Topping and Byrne, 2012c). With Northern Ireland further described as a ‘criminological netherworld’, police accountability thus remains as a subjective and flexible assessment of policing – rather than an objective metric of police performance and oversight (Ellison & Mulcahy, 2001). In this regard, accountability for policing by PSNI in terms of what it ‘does’, what it delivers and what it is responsible for on the ground remains far from clear-cut (Topping & Byrne, 2012a).

Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the key junctures of police accountability within a Northern Ireland context. Indeed, the intention is not to detail nor assess the efficacy of police oversight and monitoring as ‘encoded’ through the
police governance structures *per se*. Rather, it sets out to explore the limits of police accountability as a function of the environment in which it is conceived. Ultimately, the chapter argues that accountability for both institutional and operational ‘police action’ in the country has become a ‘site’ of contest in and of itself – of which the official ‘accounts’ of policing are but one version of reality.

**The Value of Accountability in Transition**

When considering the value of police accountability within conflicted settings such as Northern Ireland, a key starting point must be to consider what precisely accountability stands for. While much of the country’s international (academic) attention has been focused upon the past fifteen years, concern over policing practice (and laterally oversight) extends far beyond the halo of the ICP and the ‘modern reach’ of police reforms (Ellison, 2007). Indeed, looking back to the formation of the Northern Irish state in 1921 and the PSNI’s predecessor – the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), created in 1922 – policing has never been far from controversy as a function of the country’s troubled domestic affairs (McGloin, 2003; Ryder, 1997). With the RUC during this period as the most visible manifestation of law, order and politics, the *de facto* conflict in which it operated only served to heighten the symbolism of policing and subsequent action as delivered on the ground (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996). From the introduction of various draconian and discriminatory legislation since 1921 through to the close association of police command and control with a partisan Unionist government, the empirical evidence points to the RUC having played a significant role in both precipitating and holding what may be described as the ‘thin green line’ between the triumvirate of British government, Loyalist/Unionist and Republican/Nationals factions (Buckland, 1979; Scorer &
Hewitt, 1981; Hillyard, 1988; 1994; Ni Aolain, 2000; Moran, 2008). It is not, however, the intention of this chapter to recount the historical antecedents of the Northern Ireland conflict, nor the actions of the police during that period. Rather, it is instructive to turn to the parallel processes of police accountability and oversight (as broadly conceived) as the precursor for the need to ensure that state transgressions through the police did not go un-checked.

Turning to O’Leary & McGarry (1996), they point to early forms of police accountability insofar as the Labour government’s interventions in Northern Irish affairs during the 1960s left them ‘stunned’ by the lack of police independence from the dominant Ulster Unionist Party at the time. And it is from that point where a thirty-year process of ‘inquiry’ into police practice and operations may be viewed. Among many, these included the Hunt Report (1969), which examined the structure of the RUC (and their reserve, the ‘B-Specials’) regarding their exclusively Protestant makeup (O’Rawe, 2003); the Cameron (1969) and Scarman Reports (1972), exploring the civil disturbances associated with the beginning of the Troubles in the country; the Widgery Report (1972) that examined the deaths at the civil rights march Derry, otherwise known as ‘Bloody Sunday’; and the Bennett Committee (1979) which undertook an investigation into the interrogation practices of the RUC.

It is therefore the cumulative picture painted by these various reports and inquiries which points to the fact – both organizationally and operationally – that policing needed to move away from its centralised, militaristic and partisan approach (Weitzer, 1999). Euphemistically known as the ‘Barbed Wire Act’ (the strict and often arbitrary enforcement of the law), this period of oversight may also be viewed as the foundation from which the necessarily robust and new forms of accountability needed to be created as part of the ICP’s vision. And at its core, this ‘new
accountability’ was about creating a whole new set of structures capable of changing the RUC into an acceptable policing service for the entire community which was to be: professional; effective and efficient; fair and impartial; free from partisan control; accountable, both under the law and to the community; and operate within a coherent and cooperative criminal justice system which conforms with human rights norms (O’Rawe, 2003:1017).

Before moving to consider the infrastructure of police accountability developed as part of the ICP, however, it is important to consider the value of accountability as part of the wider policing transition in Northern Ireland. In terms of introducing meaningful social, democratic, community and political oversight into policing, it was the ICP which stated:

in a democracy, policing, in order to be effective must be based on consent across the community…[where the] community recognises the legitimacy of the policing task, confers authority on police personnel carrying out their role in police and actively support them. Consent is not unconditional, but depends on proper accountability. (ICP, 1999:22)

Though beyond the visible, structural level, it is interesting to observe that accountability as envisaged by the ICP consisted of three additional strands as part of ‘getting policing right’ (O’Rawe, 2003). Firstly, it advanced creating an accountability system for policing premised upon minimising the space in which police transgression could take place or become justified. In spite of the weight of evidence highlighting the need for external police oversight (as noted above c.f. Ellison & Smyth, 2000), it was police officers themselves during the conflict who
often failed to see the damaging consequences of their actions and omissions. As characterised by the former Chief Constable Hugh Annesly when defending the actions of the organisation during the conflict:

I do not accept the change argument. I do not believe that there is anything inherently wrong with the RUC that needs to be changed. I do not accept the organisation is wrong and must be fixed. (RTE Television Interview, 1995 cited in O’Rawe, 2003: 1030)

Thus, police accountability flowing out of the post-conflict era necessarily had to be created as a neutral, independent and effective ‘space’ – not just for getting the police to account for their activities, but to allow actions to be publically scrutinized as an attempt to build community and political trust and legitimacy. It may be further observed this was an *a priori* minimum starting point from which political and community trust in policing could even be conceived in the context of that which went before in terms of police action and activity (O’Rawe, 2003).

The second key strand to the ICP’s notion of ‘proper accountability’ also lay with the need to take accountability beyond fundamental cultural and structural policing issues (as noted above) and embed accountability for what may be conceived as ‘everyday’ policing (Topping, 2008a). Reflecting wider societal changes away from the worst excesses of conflict-related violence, it was imagined that once fully developed, police accountability structures would allow oversight of the police to shift metaphorically from being the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, to the fence at the top (O’Hara, 1996; Hayes & McAllister, 2005). As part of the ICP’s central community policing ethos, this strand would further allow accountability to act as a
conduit for building trust at the level of locale – while simultaneously displaying that policing was more than simply holding the ‘thin green line’ associated with the ‘big’ issues of conflict-related policing, such as communal violence, bombings and shootings (Ellison, 2000).

The third strand of the ICP’s accountability agenda may be viewed as a vehicle through which both Loyalist/Unionist and Nationalist/Republican communities could also be ‘re-educated’ about the ‘new’ policing landscape following the creation of the PSNI in 2001. As Topping (2008b) contends, it is important to set accountability for policing within the context of those communities in which it is delivered – and especially so within the (still) divided and polarized society of Northern Ireland (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). With the ICP reforms radically altering the policing landscape, evidence would point to the fact this has impacted on public expectations and perceptions of the police, regardless of operational activity (Byrne and Monaghan, 2008). Within Loyalist communities – as those traditionally more supportive of the police – the disbandment of the RUC, as a police force comprising officers seen as ‘theirs’, combined with significant reductions in police numbers – currently 6,900 compared to the 13,500 officers during the RUC ‘hey-day’ – has created a distinct and substantial sense of ‘loss’ and reduced sense of service delivery (Mulcahy, 2000; 2006; Topping, 2008b; PSNI, 2014).

Conversely, within many Republican communities – as those traditionally opposed to policing and criminal justice system more broadly – police accountability has on the one hand become a means through which to ‘measure’ and ‘signpost’ the steps taken by the PSNI to distance itself from the style of policing associated with the RUC at a community level (Weitzer, 1999). On the other hand, due to the historical separation between Republican communities and the state more generally,
police accountability during the post-ICP era has become the medium through which those communities practically learn and understand about the limits of ‘normal’ policing – having in many cases never consensually engaged with the police in the past (Mulcahy, 1999). In this regard, accountability as effected through the ICP can be seen as both a neutral and mediating vehicle through which to redefine and redraw the boundaries of police activity and operations as part of the ever ‘normalising’ policing environment. Furthermore, as part of developing trust and legitimacy in the PSNI within both Loyalist and Republican communities, this process necessarily needed a new ‘space’ within which communities could re-imagine accountability as a connection with the police beyond merely to them.

In terms of the value of police accountability within the conflicted and transitional setting of Northern Ireland, it is clear that the concept of accountable policing extends well beyond that which can be defined as part of ‘standard’ police performance metrics. Indeed, in this context police accountability has become as much a symbol of the changing police and political order as it has a sophisticated set of oversight structures. As captured by Ellison (2007), the value of accountability set within the country’s wider police reform process may thus be viewed as a central tenet contributing ‘to the very foundations of political order upon which democratic freedoms so often depend’ (p.243-44).

**The Mechanics of Police Accountability**

Before considering the collective of structures that comprise police accountability in Northern Ireland, it may be argued that both their strength and capacity are drawn from the stringency of the ICP reform process itself. Not only did the final ICP report make 175 recommendations for policing change in the country, but so too these were
overseen by the Office of the Oversight Commissioner (OOC), established to ensure the ‘faithful and comprehensive’ implementation of those recommendations (ICP, 1999: para. 19.2). Across nineteen reports and 772 performance indicators, the final OOC report noted that virtually all recommendations had been completed – as part of one the most complex and far-reaching experiments in police reform ever attempted in the world (OOC, 2007).

At a basic level, much of the attention related to police accountability in the country rests with the much vaunted legal accountability of the PSNI to the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI). Established prior to the ICP under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, OPONI is considered to be one of the most robust and independent bodies in the world tasked with adjudicating on PSNI operational and disciplinary matters where the prospect of police misconduct exists, including discrimination, malpractice, incivility, failure in duty and oppressive behaviour (Mulcahy, 2006; OPONI, 2010-2012). As a means of building core, community-wide legitimacy in the ‘new’ PSNI, ‘without the establishment of the OPONI, the entire [ICP] reform process would have stalled…and its role in enhancing the legitimacy of the PSNI should not be underestimated’ (Ellison, 2007:261). At an annual operating cost of approximately £9m, the OPONI has no financial targets, in line with the ICP’s attempts to avoid ‘false economies’ in the delivery of its role (McGarry, 2004; OPONI, 2013). Indeed, with 8465 complaint allegations dealt with during 2012/13, the return on the investment in the OPONI as part of cementing independence are incalculable in terms of its worth to societal trust and confidence in the police (Ellison & Smyth, 2000; Mulcahy, 2006; OPONI, 2013).

Below the level of police complaints per se, the next key and necessary oversight body created through the ICP was the Northern Ireland Policing Board
(NIPB). As a body designed to provide a procedurally ‘thick’ police authority for the country (Black, 2000; Ellison, 2007), the vision of the ICP was:

to go beyond the supervision of the police service itself, extend to the wider issues of policing the contributions that people and organisations other than the police can make towards public safety. (ICP, 1999: 29)

Across a series of performance, audit, risk, partnership and resources committees – as well as the full Board of the authority itself – the NIPB is charged with holding PSNI to account across a range of ‘everyday’, operational and financial policing matters, not limited to crime levels, human rights, community policing, public order, recruitment and equality issues (NIPB, 2013). It must also be noted that the NIPB additionally acts as a key intersection of police operational matters for socio-political accountability and oversight. With the NIPB itself comprising nineteen independent and political members, it provides the main platform upon which both cross-party and cross-community policing issues can be debated.

Yet in spite of what appears to be a robust structure it is important to note that the NIPB is not unique in terms of its flaws as a police authority (c.f. Raine and Keasey, 2012). On a broad level, the cyclical issues of violence, disorder and legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland continue to pervade its oversight role on ‘normal’ policing matters (Byrne, Topping & Martin, 2014; Clarke, 2014). Furthermore, the Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO) have, for the past two years, strongly criticised the NIPB for the lack of meaningful target setting as part of the performance management of police operations (NIAO, 2013; 2014). With the Board obliged under
section 28 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 to make arrangements to secure continuous improvement of policing, the NIAO have indicatively stated:

the performance indicators included within the Policing Plan 2012-13 are reasonable. However, 40 of the 44 performance standards included in the Plan lack sufficient clarity as to the degree of improvement required and the timeframe within which it is to be achieved. (NIAO, 2013:4)

Thus, the evidence would suggest that in spite of the ICP’s vision for the NIPB, the reality of police accountability is that of a procedurally ‘thinner’ version of the ‘thick’ aspiration set forth by the ICP (Ellison, 2007; Topping, 2008a). The implication being that the ‘measuring’ of policing has become a superficial, rather than substantive process. This is especially so where PSNI can satisfy such accountability regimes as a distinct and separate goal in and of itself without significantly impacting on operational policing delivery.

The final piece of the main police accountability ‘architecture’ in Northern Ireland is the establishment of Policing and Community Safety Partnerships (PCSPs). Formed under the Justice Act (NI) 2011, these statutory partnerships are the key community ‘bridge’ between the PSNI, the NIPB and local policing matters. With one PCSP for each of the country’s 26 council areas, they comprise political and independent members for the purposes of consulting and engaging; identifying and prioritizing; monitoring and delivering on policing issues of community concern (Topping & Byrne, 2012a).

On the one hand, the PCSPs were created to replace their much criticised predecessors – the District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) – summarily described as
‘talking shops staged managed to avoid controversy’ (CAJ, 2005:16; c.f. Mulcahy, 2006; Ellison, 2007; Byrne & Monaghan, 2008; Topping, 2008a; Topping & Byrne, 2012a). But on the other hand, evidence would suggest that little has changed to improve their effectiveness, efficiency or ‘politiking’ on policing under the new PCSP regime. In reference to the latter, with wider (often sectarian) politics often dominating debates at the expense of ‘everyday’ policing matters, it is of note that current figures indicate that 41 per cent of ‘independent’ members in fact have political affiliations; with only 3 per cent of PCSPs comprising any members from ethnic minority backgrounds; and no members under eighteen (Topping & Byrne, 2012a). Thus, the practicable degree of community input into local policing matters remains notional, rather than substantive – with recent research by the principle Belfast PCSP for example, indicating that 54 per cent of the public do not know what the function of the PCSP is; and only 5 per cent indicating they would contact their PCSP on policing and community safety issues (Belfast City Council, 2014).

Additionally, they lack the potential for critical engagement and oversight on local policing matters insofar as they may be viewed as forums that do little more than provide PSNI a platform upon which:

They are better able to voice the feelings of the community than elected local councillors…either by operationalising the biases of the community forums…or by inter-personal gleanings from the ‘respectable’ public…”

(Brogden, 2006:15)

While current space precludes a fuller critique of the broad police accountability structures in Northern Ireland, their collective ‘swarm’ would certainly point to a
system which (in spite of its flaws) has facilitated a societal ‘leap’ in terms of full social, political and democratic participation in policing matters – a position unthinkable fifteen year ago (Mulcahy, 2006; Ellison, 2007). It must also be noted that the ‘layers’ of police accountability (as detailed) are additionally supplemented by an assemblage of statutory and non-government oversight bodies and structures, including: the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission; the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary; the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland; and the Committee on the Administration of Justice. With each variously reporting thematically and via an ad hoc basis, as far back as 2007 it was the then Deputy Chief Constable of the PSNI who noted that together, these bodies had further generated approximately 1070 recommendations above and beyond those of the ICP (Topping, 2008a). In this respect, the current position on police accountability structures is detailed by Ellison (2007:265), stating:

Arguably, Northern Ireland has some of the more farsighted and robust structures for police governance (particularly in terms of accountability, oversight, and complaints mechanisms) that exist anywhere, not to mention the normative and statutory emphasis on human rights, which is placed center stage in terms of police operational policies, strategies, and procedures. In this sense, the ICP may indeed have gone some way to providing the framework for the establishment of democratic and accountable policing structures in Northern Ireland. Only time will tell.

Accounting for What? The Conflicted Picture of Policing and Security in Northern Ireland
Having considered some of the normative and structural issues of police accountability in Northern Ireland, it is important to consider wider evidence related to what precisely these structures hold the police to account for. It may be observed that the structures and processes put in place under the ICP were predicated upon Northern Ireland becoming a settled, inclusive and peaceful society (Ellison, 2007; Topping, 2008b). To that extent, the current suite of accountability measures have, therefore, been oriented towards dealing with ‘normal’ policing matters – such as reducing levels of crime, building police confidence and delivering community policing. However, as shall be explored below, the environment in which the PSNI deliver policing is anything other than conducive to that vision of normality, with the accountability structures functionally remote from the ‘real politik’ of policing on the ground. Thus, the remainder of this section seeks to define the ‘edges’ of police accountability as part of operational policing as part of this environment.

It may be observed that the criminological ‘netherworld’ of Northern Ireland presents a number of counterfactual narratives around the official notions of policing and crime. This in turn helps to provide both an understanding of, and insight to, the complex dynamics underpinning the ‘positive peace’ in the country as it emerges from a protracted, internal armed conflict – and as a means for understanding the limits of police accountability more fully (Ellison and Mulcahy 2001; Eide & Holm, 2000; Topping, 2009).

To begin with, evidence would point to the fact that in spite of the transition from conflict to (relative) peace, Northern Ireland suffers from low levels of crime. Unlike the violent transitional democracy of South Africa (Altebeker 2005) – often compared to Northern Ireland – the ‘official’ projection of the country as a low crime society has both been cemented and bolstered by the significant political progress
which has itself facilitated the historical devolution of policing and justice powers to Stormont for the first time since 1972 (McDonald & Townsend, 2011). On the one hand, such low crime levels have tended to be explained through a Durkheimian school of ‘solidarity in conflict’ as part of sociological accounts of close-knit communities and ‘grapevines’ prevalent across the country (Brewer 2001; Shaw and Shearing 1998). On the other hand, ‘official’ measures of, and processes of accounting for, crime and security confirm the conception of Northern Ireland as a low-crime, transitional ‘netherworld’. From the first International Victim Survey in 1989 reporting Northern Ireland as Europe’s low crime comparator (Brogden 2000; Van Dyk et al. 1990), contemporary evidence points to the lowest levels of conflict-related violence on record; the lowest levels of recorded crime in the past twelve years; along with victimisation rates at approximately 13 per cent – the lowest since records began in 1998, which also compares favourably to England and Wales (Lyness et al. 2004). Furthermore, the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) continues to claim that satisfaction levels with the PSNI remain at record high levels (Toner & Freel, 2010; NIPB 2014). However, beyond simple attributions and correlations of police activity to this status quo, a range of other evidence must be considered as part of the accountability debate in terms of considering what the PSNI are held to account for.

Firstly, it is notable from research by NIPB that crime rates within what can be defined as predominantly Protestant or Catholic wards vary significantly – with higher crime rates generally within Catholic wards in comparison both to Protestant wards and the country as a whole (NIPB, 2007). Secondly, relating to accountability for the delivery of ‘normal’ policing – and specifically looking at violent dissident Republicanism – while their terrorist capabilities are far lower than the threat posed
by mainstream Republican paramilitaries at the height of the conflict, evidently
dissident factions are still engaged in an armed campaign, along with the delivery of
‘civil policing’ within certain areas of Northern Ireland. This agenda has manifested
itself through the planting of viable explosive devices and concerted efforts to kill
members of the security forces across the country (*Belfast Telegraph*, 2008a, 2008b,
2008c; *Belfast Telegraph*, 2010; *Irish News*, 2008; 2009) – resulting in the deaths of
British soldiers Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey outside the Massereene Barracks
in Co. Antrim on the 8th March 2009; and the murder of Constable Stephen Carroll on
the 10th March 2009; and Constable Ronan Kerr on the 12th April 2011 (McDonald &
Townsend, 2011). Indeed, it is a continuing feature of the post-conflict landscape that
the threat of politically motivated violence remains at ‘severe’ as defined by MI5
And this is not withstanding the fact that HMIC (2011) have recently criticised the
PSNI for only classifying 25 per cent of terrorist incidents in the country as such
within the technical definition of the term – suggesting the levels of terrorist activity
are in fact significantly higher than officially recorded.

It is also important to recognise that paramilitary activity has not been limited
solely to those from a Republican background. Within many Loyalist working-class
communities paramilitary structures remain in place and able to control communities
and orchestrate wide-spread violence – as witnessed in East Belfast during June 2011
and December 2012. In terms of the former, with approximately 500 people involved
in violence over three nights, it included gun battles between Loyalist and Republican
paramilitary groupings along with the shooting of a Press Association photographer.
And in reference to the later – more recent outbreaks of public disorder referred to as
the ‘flag protests’ – have resulted in approximately 500 arrests, 700 PSNI officers
injured and a cost to the public purse of approximately £20 million (McDonald, 2012; Mulgrew & Erwin, 2014). It may therefore be seen that as part of any account of policing in the country, the PSNI and the services it delivers cannot be divorced from these wider realities – where the presence of proscribed organisations at the community level along with their terrorist capacity remain far from being consigned to the annals of Northern Irish history (McDonald, 2011a; 2011b).

Turning to the organisational arrangement of the PSNI, in contrast to the ICP’s vision of normality and its community policing core, it still retains a structure mainly suited to the delivery of public order and security-focused policing (Topping, 2008a). As identified by HMIC, in comparison with ‘most similar forces’ in England and Wales, the PSNI’s retention of (necessary) public order and counter-insurgency capabilities is stark. Within the PSNI, the immediate post-ICP period was characterised by the fact only 35 per cent of its District Command Units (DCUs) (at least up to 2006) claimed to be carrying out operational policing under ‘normal’ conditions (HMIC, 2007). Furthermore, there are approximately six times as many officers dedicated to public order policing, with four times as many officers dedicated to intelligence duties than ‘most similar forces’. Thus, when combined, for example, with a total of 86,073 overtime hours undertaken by PSNI officers in 2005/6 alone over the same period to cope with the extra public order demands, the significant overtime in the aftermath of over forty days of public disorder as a result of recent Loyalist/Unionist disputes over the ‘flag protests’ (The Telegraph, 2013), and the fact over 1200 officers have been injured in public order situations between 2005-2012, it gives a clear indication that accountability for policing matters in the country stretches far beyond the simplicity of crime levels (HMIC, 2006; McDonald, 2012).
Continuing on the theme of public disorder, it is also vital to outline current ‘levels’ of public order incidents and events, at least as mediated by those in charge of delivery and oversight – namely the PSNI, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) and the Parades Commission. Turning firstly to the Parades Commission, as the statutory body set up to provide determinations and direction on parades and protests in Northern Ireland, it may be evidenced that parades, as the more traditional focus of public order policing in Northern Ireland, remain a constant feature of the country’s socio-political fabric in addition to ‘normal’ crime and criminality. With an average of 3641 notified parades per year from 2003/4 – 2010/11, there has been a steady increase in the number of parades over this period, indicating both the popularity and cultural sustainability of this particular form of expression and assembly – albeit with approximately two-thirds of all parades identified as ‘Loyal Order/broad Unionist’ (Bryan, 2000; Parades Commission, 2012).

Related to accounts of public order policing, the post-Patten era has, however, been demarcated by a significant shift away from the use of force by the PSNI, especially those associated with parades and protests (Ni Aolain, 2000; Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1996; 1997). This has been especially illustrated by the use of Baton Rounds and since 2005 of their replacement by Attenuating Energy Projectiles (AEPs). Since 2005 the PSNI have fired 1723 AEPs, although the annual figures range from none in 2006/07 to 350 in 2011/12. This is in contrast to the late 1990s, when the RUC fired 6,949 baton rounds in 1996, with more than 6000 of these being fired in a single week at the height of the Drumcree dispute (Mulcahy, 2006). More recently, turning to the serious public disorder which spread across Northern Ireland in 2011 during 20th June – 16th July 2011, of the 350 AEPs fired during this period, approximately 85 per cent of those were discharged under the auspices of
protecting officers or members of the public (PSNI Freedom of Information Request F-2011-023272). Thus, in parallel with the central prominence of community policing within PSNI, use of force remains a significant concern to the country’s peace-time narrative (Topping, 2008a; Byrne, Jarman & Topping, 2013).

Within this contested environment, additional empirical evidence outside that of the NIPB’s much vaunted confidence statistics in PSNI points to significant dissociation of many Republican/Nationalist, and to a lesser extent Unionist/Loyalist communities, from the vagaries of normal crime issues and interaction with the police, not necessarily as result of PSNI themselves (Ellison & Mulcahy, 2001; Mulcahy, 2006; Byrne & Monaghan, 2008; Topping, 2008a; Topping & Byrne, 2012a). And when over-laid with continuing police legitimacy issues associated with the legacy of the conflict and parades/protests as noted above, it is clear that the accountability function of the NIPB and PCSPs becomes a negotiated process – pulled between their statutory obligations and procedures related to ‘normal’ police metrics – and the reality of the landscape outlined, which sits outside the traditional police accountability boxes to be ‘ticked’ (Byrne & Monaghan, 2008; Lundy, 2011).

In overview of the conflicted and often contradictory picture of policing in Northern Ireland, it is therefore clear that a significant lacuna exists. On the one hand, the very nature of accountability measures and metrics are focused upon monitoring PSNI for ‘everyday’ policing matters. Yet on the other hand, the empirical reality of the post-ICP landscape would suggest that many fundamental dynamics related to the delivery of policing are not considered – publicly or in policy – as part of any official discourse or ‘measure’ of the policing environment. Thus, in terms of accounting for what the police ‘do’ and in spite of wider evidence considered, the default position for PSNI operational accountability remains that all problems:
are frequently identified as police problems to which there are police solutions. Any change is attributed to police causes ignoring changes in the wider social system. (Fielding & Innes, 2006:136-7)

**Community Policing and the PSNI: Accounting for ‘Core’ Service?**

Aside from the architecture and reality of that which comprises police accountability in Northern Ireland, an equally important focus of inquiry relates to accountability for what PSNI delivers as part of its core service. In terms of the ICP, a key goal was to move PSNI from counter-insurgency to a community orientation, with ICP recommendation 44 stating that community policing (or ‘policing with the community’ under the ICP rubric) ‘should be the core function of the police service’ (ICP, 1999: para.7.9). Thus, as part of considering accountability for what PSNI ‘do’ within a transitional context, it must be remembered that community policing is ‘not an independent variable, but must be located within a wider mesh of social and political change…’ (Clegg *et al.*, cited in Brogden, 2005:90).

A key proposition for the delivery of community policing in Northern Ireland relates not just to its technical delivery (discussed below), but also the symbolism of that which it represents. As the foundation for a ‘shift’ in wider police-community relations in the country, community policing as mandated by the ICP represents the ‘staged death’ of ‘traditional’, conflict-related policing by the RUC; and the ushering in of a new era of effective, democratic and community-anchored service by the PSNI (Kappeler & Kraska, 1998; Loader, 2000; Topping, 2008a). Yet in spite of a continuous ‘stream’ of PSNI policy and ‘self-certification’ as to the delivery of community policing in the post-ICP era (and empirically unsustainable claims about
its relation to reductions in crime and police confidence), a range of additional evidence would suggest that accountability for its delivery is more complex than simple claims ‘to it being implementing’ (PSNI, 2012; Byrne & Monaghan, 2008; Topping, 2008a; 2008b; Topping, 2012; Topping & Byrne, 2012c).

As argued by Brogden, one of the first key stumbling blocks to wider accountability narratives about the ‘success’ of community policing by the PSNI is the fact:

police organisations with no tradition of decentralised decision making encounter major problems. The decentralisation required by community policing, and the resultant increased autonomy of the rank-and-file, may have three effects…it may mean a loss in effective management controls as a consequence of decentralisation…it may result in a loss of wider accountability and control. Finally, loss of external and internal supervision may lead to a breakdown of professional standards of behaviour by police officers. (1999:180)

At least structurally, it has already been noted (above) that during the post-ICP era, the PSNI have (necessarily due to the terrorist threat) retained a relatively militaristic, hierarchical and counter-insurgency structure (HMIC, 2007). Claims of the PSNI to have community policing as a core mission are further stretched when evidence also points to the fact only 10 per cent of the organisation (or approximately 700 officers for a population of 1.8m) are actually dedicated community/neighbourhood officers (Topping & Byrne, 2012c). Additionally, the problem of measuring community policing ‘as something that never was’ is further complicated as part of the post-
conflict landscape in Northern Ireland (Innes, 2005). At a basic level, measures of ‘success’ for community policing practice vary greatly in their scope. From its ability to maintain peace and order in transitional societies, through to reducing fear of crime, community policing creates an infinite pool of approaches that ultimately generates a need for an infinite pool of measures upon which police organisations could be held to account (Jesilow & Parsons, 2000; Fielding & Innes, 2006). And no less in this jurisdictional context, reductions in sectarian violence, terrorism and hostility towards the PSNI for example, are often held to be blunt indicators for the ‘successes’ of community policing (Topping & Byrne, 2012c).

A wide range of qualitative research also exists to challenge the ‘record’ levels of confidence in the PSNI set forth annually by the NIPB – as a key metric of community practices (NIPB, 2014). Across many Loyalist and Republican communities – and especially in socio-economically deprived areas – the reality of policing is that a sizeable portion of the population are disengaged, dissatisfied and lack confidence in the PSNI as part of delivering this ‘everyday’ service (Ellison, Pino & Shirlow, 2013; Topping, 2008a; 2008b; 2009; Ellison & O’Rawe, 2010; Byrne & Monaghan, 2008; Topping & Byrne, 2012a). Yet it is precisely this tranche of society whose voices have been silenced in the official accountability discourse due to the limitations of current measures employed to capture community satisfaction with the PSNI (c.f. Topping, 2012). In this regard, the political imperative policing being seen ‘to be gotten right’ may be observed as part of its centrality to the wider peace process in the country (O’Rawe, 2003; Ellison, 2007).

Finally in regard to community policing as a metric of the performance accountability of the PSNI, it is important to return specifically to Brogden (1999) as part of considering internal, organisational issues in addition to the structural points
already raised. As detailed by Fielding & Innes (2006:129), ‘the broad appeal of community policing relates more to its iconic status and homely name tag than to its conceptual clarity of concept or unambiguously demonstrable effects’. And no less for the PSNI, community policing within the rank and file of the organisation remains at best, ill-defined. With no formal training within the PSNI for community policing, it is perhaps the ‘catch-all’ use of discretion which has become the public face of ‘doing policing the community way’ (Newsletter, 2009). Yet far from feeding into the community relations and engagement, current data suggest that PSNI officers have often (mis)used and abused their discretion to dispose of offences for which it was arguably, never intended, such as sexual assaults, possession of firearms, endangering aircraft and even hoax bomb alerts (The Detail TV, 2013).

Similarly, the accountability of the PSNI for the delivery of community policing has also become skewed as part of the pervasive ‘target culture’ which also dominates the organisation – contrary to the principles of ‘common sense’ policing in the first place (Loveday, 2006; Topping, 2009). While current space precludes a more detailed analysis of the issue within PSNI, it is an indicative quotation by a community police officer who stated in relation to accountability, measurement and community policing:

put it like this, for example last year, we said we’d increase our youth diversion referrals for the year…that target might be five a month – you can get those in one night and that’s it done for the month, so the rest of the month you needn’t bother. It’s the same for other targets you know. (Topping, 2009: 177)

Shadow Policing: Accounts of Policing Outside the PSNI
The final strand to consider as part of the complex picture of police accountability in Northern Ireland relates to policing delivered outside the state. However, it is not the intention here to consider policing from the perspective of well-rehearsed, paramilitary ‘justice’ as a form of policing during the conflict and post-conflict phases of transition (Morrissey & Pease, 1982; Hillyard, 1985; Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers, 1998; Silke, 1999; Knox, 2002; Monaghan, 2008; Topping & Byrne, 2012b). Rather, a perhaps more interesting course of inquiry relates to the body of legitimate, non-state voluntary and community actors who engage in broad practices of policing – itself contributing to the low crime rates to which the country has become accustomed (Topping & Byrne, 2012c).

With attention on policing and its reform so focused upon PSNI and its role per se, there exists an unchallenged, criminological presumption of PSNI ‘ownership’ in terms of dealing with crime and criminality within the jurisdiction. This has been further perpetuated by the fact Northern Ireland continues to act as Europe’s low crime capital, in spite of the recent internal armed conflict (Ellison and Mulcahy 2001; Van Dyk et al. 1990; Lyness et al. 2004; PSNI 2012). It may therefore be observed that:

- a significant gap in academic or policy debate has been a sufficient interrogation of the dynamics underpinning the production of security generally, and policing specifically, with the presumption of causal security relations having remained firmly with PSNI (Topping & Byrne, forthcoming).

On the one hand, it can be observed that substantive capital has been generated from the position the PSNI occupies as being widely regarded one of the most accountable, overseen police services anywhere in the world – with police-centric, bureaucratic
accountability as *the* definition of police ‘work’ by PSNI (Bayley 2008; Ellison 2007). Yet on the other hand, this has reduced the space in which alternative policing discourses have been allowed to challenge the PSNI’s ‘expertise’ and centrality over policing matters (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Topping and Byrne 2012a). And in spite of the fact that ‘there is no monopoly on knowledge, or even no single vantage point from which the whole can be observed…’ (Black, 2000:599), it can be argued that the ‘policing accountability vocabulary’ in the country does not sufficiently recognise nor represent the diverse ways in which policing is exercised (Rose and Miller, 1992). Indeed, research would point to the fact that communities have in fact been by-passing the state policing apparatus on crime issues, therein raising the need for dominant narratives of accountability for PSNI in the provision of policing to be re-examined (Baker, 2002; Topping & Byrne, *forthcoming*).

While empirically difficult to quantify within standard frameworks of police accountability and action, the issue of non-state community contributions to the policing landscape is by no means new. At least anecdotally, local and international academics have argued that a tradition of ‘sorting things out’ has long been a strength of the country’s civil society networks stemming from the conflict (Jarman, 2002; 2006; McEvoy *et al.*, 2002; Kempa & Shearing, 2005; CJINI, 2006). Even the OOC made a significant note on the capabilities of the community sector in Northern Ireland, stating:

> the Policing Board, the Police Service and the Northern Ireland Office need to be alert to the effects the well intentioned…community groups and their overlapping mandates can have on community engagement…’ (2007:16)
The only recent attempts to quantify more fully these amorphous collectives of civil society organising around policing matters may be observed in the research of Topping & Byrne (2012c; 2014, *forthcoming*). Defining these policing contributions across six key categories of: community advocacy; education and intervention; emergency response partnerships; crime prevention; and restorative justice/mediation, much of this policing activity tends to be concentrated in socio-economically deprived Loyalist and Republican areas of Northern Ireland – precisely where police interventions, legitimacy, trust and effectiveness are most vehemently challenged (Topping & Byrne, 2014 *forthcoming*).

However, the intention here is not to detail nor quantify such non-state policing down to fine levels of granularity within the areas where it exists. Rather, it is the fact it *does exist* outside that of policing delivered by the PSNI which is of importance. In this regard, such ‘shadow policing’ may be seen to expose further the limited nature and rigidity of current police operational accountability metrics within what is a fluid and contested policing environment. Because accepting even to a minimal extent the existence of ‘shadow policing’, the PSNI cannot lay claim to sole responsibility for the control of *all* crime in the country – rendering their accountability metrics in terms of confidence, levels of recorded crime and victim satisfaction as only a partial account of their action (NIPB, 2014). This argument may be further extended insofar as the existence and persistence of ‘shadow policing’ in the country points to the fact that metrics of PSNI performance are defined exclusively by police organisational *outputs* – devoid of accounts related to community-level *inputs* as defined through the ‘shadow policing’ reality (O’Mahony *et al.*, 2000).
The genesis of this dichotomy may thus be drawn back to the centrality of ‘getting policing right’ to wider transition in the country, as the final piece of the peace process ‘jigsaw’ (O’Rawe, 2003). Beyond the imperatives of structural change and reform of the PSNI, accountability for PSNI action thus acquires additional layers of meaning. On the one hand ‘officially’ accepting that such non-state policing exists may be viewed as an opportunity to enhance policing and develop accountability at a local, operational level. But on the other hand, it may also be seen to constitute a threat to the PSNI and all that it and the wider systems of accountability have come to stand for as part of attempts to build a new, inclusive and permanently acceptable policing ‘system’ for all sections of society (Topping, 2008a).

**Conclusion**

In overview of police accountability in Northern Ireland, aside from the broad lack of academic attention paid to the issue, it may be observed that developments in the country have implications for understandings of police accountability beyond the simple ‘measurement’ of what police organisations ‘do’—and not just for societies emerging from conflict, but also for any countries underpinned by Western policing traditions (Bayley, 1994).

With police accountability in the country having attracted global attention because of its stringency and structure, questions of ‘where to next?’ remain. With little more to be achieved (at least structurally) as part of either the ICP or holding the PSNI to account for their actions, current regimes of austerity perhaps pose a threat to the high standards to which Northern Irish society has become accustomed on social, political and operational plains (McAleese, 2013). The implication being that if the PSNI is at the top of the ‘accountability tree’, and to which other jurisdictions aspire,
then can or should such levels be sustained indefinitely where the delivery of policing remains conflicted. And how long is enough?

As can be observed, police accountability also remains a significant strand of the wider political discourse in the country as a means of promoting legitimacy, social cohesion and post-conflict narrative. Yet at the same time, accountability precisely relies on these qualities to be effective in the first place as part of ‘shared’ understandings of policing. But as the evidence would suggest, the robust legal and structural police accountability measures in place appear to be a necessary feature of the policing landscape, as the nucleus from which community and political trust in the police can grow.

Even if the ‘new’, post-ICP era of police accountability were to be transplanted elsewhere, policing will remain an inherently unenviable task insofar as:

- the wholesome notions of community with what is inherently problematic social practice tends to elide the adversarial aspect of policing by implying whatever is done is done in the interest, and with the consent, of the people…the fact that policing is usually done to someone, as well as on someone’s behalf, is conveniently forgotten. (Dixon, 2004:252)

In this regard, the evidence points to the fact – whether set against sectarianism, race or class – what is fair in terms of policing for one section of society will remain unfair for another (Brogden, 2005). Therefore, police accountability cannot be divorced from the wider societal conditions in which it is situated. And while far reaching accountability mechanisms can be welcomed on principled grounds, as Northern Ireland has demonstrated, their presence can additionally act as an expression of
community distrust and lack of legitimacy in the police. Such policy dilemmas are reflective of deep-rooted social and political problems not readily resolved through structural change of police institutions alone. With the country still under a severe terrorist threat, there remains tension between holding the PSNI to account for ‘everyday’ policing and the (necessary) need for the organisation to retain its counter-terrorist capability. Indeed, this paradox does not sit readily with the either the ICP’s core aspiration of PSNI as a community-oriented service or the dominant community policing ‘mode’ of police accountability as effected through the policing institutions.

Finally, it is also clear that police accountability, as part of the country’s transition, is a partisan term weighted to capturing the ‘positive’ realities of police activity. In turn, the harsh realities of the country as a post-conflict society have been conveniently ‘ushered’ to the side, as an aberration of that which is politically necessary to account for on policing matters. Similarly, alternative narratives of policing, such as those associated with non-state ‘shadow policing’, have been bureaucratically ‘squeezed’ out of police accountability discourse. As an informal (and sometimes competing) form of policing, it does not marry with PSNI’s community policing performance and measures thereof. It is thus clear that police accountability, as set within the post-conflict landscape of Northern Ireland, is itself a site of empirical, policy and political contest and cannot be analysed nor understood through the lens of standard police metrics alone.

As Bayley (2008) contends, if this is what it has taken to fix Northern Irish policing in terms of international attention and expertise, finance and the grandest experiment in police reform ever attempted in the world, then the prospects for other societies are bleak. In this respect, changes to police accountability regimes should only ever be viewed as a means to an end where it is necessary to alter relations
between the police and the public. However, it is the *maintenance* of accountability which should remain a negotiated and dynamic process, as both a mirror of societal relations (or lack of) with the state police, and a motor to empower those for whom policing is only something controlled by the police.
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