Neil Jarman Managing Violence after Conflict

Violence after Armed Conflict

- Moving away from armed conflict can be slow
 - Violence persists, if in different forms
- Lack of state legitimacy
- Persistence of armed groups / spoilers
 - Discontent with peace agreements
- Inter-ethnic tensions
- Culture of violence

Building Peace and Security

- (Re) establish state monopoly of use of force
- Building trust and relationships
- Institutional reforms
 - SSR and DDR
- Responding to acts of violence

Disorderly Peace

- Protests over Orange parades
- Recurrent rioting and disorder
 - Segregated communities
- Continued paramilitary activity
- Lack of trust in police

Drumcree 1996


Building Peace

- Managing tensions and violence
- Building legitimacy of police
- Standing down armed groups
- Creating sense of security
 - Civil society and co-production of security


Northern Ireland

- Armed conflict from 1969-94
 - State Irish Republicans (IRA) British Loyalists (UDA – UVF)
- Paramilitary Ceasefires 1994
- Peace Agreement 1998
- Police Reform 2001
- Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons
 2001-10

Falls/Shankill – Springfield Road



Falls/Shankill – Springfield Road



Policing Northern Ireland

- Front line of security during conflict
- In 1999 there were
 - 13,000 police
 - 300 police killed during conflict
 - 11,400 British soldiers
 - None now
- Security sector reform high on political agenda

Policing Northern Ireland

- Polarised perspectives
- Disliked by Catholics:
 - Militarised force
 - Partisan RUC were 92% Protestant
- Liked by Protestants
 - Defence against 'terrorists'
 - Brace sacrifices

Police Reform

- Part of peace agreement
- International body to develop new model
- Patten Report 1999
 - Seen as international best model
- Challenge to gain acceptance and legitimacy

Key Elements

- Symbolic changes
- Representative
- Human rights compliant
- Reduce use of force
- Accountable and transparent
- Policing with the community

Symbolic Changes

- New name and uniform
 - From Royal Ulster Constabulary
 - To Police Service of Northern Ireland
- New badge broad range of symbols
- Still armed, still militarised







Representative

- Reduce numbers
 - From 13,000 in 2001 to 7,000 in 2013
- Increase number and % of Catholics
 - 8% in 2001 31% in 2013
- Balance gender
 - 13% women in 2001 27% in 2013

Human Rights Compliant

Training HR proofed by Human Rights
 Commission

- Senior officers all human rights aware
- Annual human rights report by independent legal expert

Reduce Use of Force

- PSNI only armed force in UK
- High use of plastic bullets
- Shift to less lethal force
- Use of water cannons



Accountable

Multiple layers of accountability

- Chief Constable reports to Policing Board
- Local commander reports to Police and Community Safety Partnerships
- 3. All complaints to Police Ombudsman
- 4. Thematic reviews by Criminal Justice Inspector

Policing with the Community

- Patten 'policing is too important to leave to the police alone'
- Lack of mutual trust and legitimacy
- Nationalists suspicious of police
 - SF did not support reform process
- Build trust through working together

Bottom-up Activities

- Dealing with inter-communal tensions
 - Mobile Phone Networks
 - Community based actors
 - Stewarding / marshalling of parades
 - Organisational responsibility
 - Monitors
 - Human rights groups
- Responding to paramilitary violence
 - Community Restorative Justice

Managing Interface Tensions

- Responding to widespread rioting
 - 1996 summer of disorder
- Maintaining communication
 - Use of new technology
- Creating and managing networks
 - Within communities
 - Between communities
 - With police

Managing Interface Tensions

- Standard model from 1997 onwards
 - Reduced scale of disorder
- Created and developed working relations
 - Built trust between police & activists
 - Slow, patient and persistent
- Paved way for political acceptance of policing

Marshalling Parades

- Marshals existed but ineffective
 - No training or authority
- Training programme developed 1997-98
 - Based on football stewards
 - Cited in Patten Report
- Manage marchers and work with police
- More than 1,100 marshals trained by 2003

Marshalling Parades

- Organisers take more responsibility
 - Acknowledge impact on community
- Improved behaviour at parades
 - Marshals not part of formal parade
 - Limits provocation, reduces tensions
- Can be well co-ordinated with police
 - Reduce police manpower









Monitoring

- Models used in USA and South Africa
 - Lessons for NI
- Human rights monitoring of police
 - From 1996 CAJ, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch
 - Observe and report
- Civil society monitoring of tensions
 - From 2002 peace activists, students, academics
 - Observe, deter and inform







Paramilitary Punishments

- Problems of 'kneecapping'
 - 1994 2003: 200-300 per annum
 - Low level crime & internal discipline
 - Main victims young men
- Paramilitary power and authority
- Community expectations
 - Absence of trust in CJS
 - Need a swift response

Paramilitary Groups



Paramilitary Groups



Restorative Approach

- Restoration not retribution
 - Recognise hurt caused
 - Education and employment programme
- Role of Ex-Prisoners
 - Paramilitary buy-in
- State suspicion
 - Process of verification and accreditation
 - Now part of CJS

Building Security

- Slow process to build trust
- Goes backwards as well as forwards
 - Flag protests in 2012-13
- Need for inclusive approach
- NI one of safest parts of Europe
 - But still have occasional riots

