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**Managing Violence after
Conflict**

Violence after Armed Conflict

- Moving away from armed conflict can be slow
 - Violence persists, if in different forms
- Lack of state legitimacy
- Persistence of armed groups / spoilers
 - Discontent with peace agreements
- Inter-ethnic tensions
- Culture of violence

Building Peace and Security

- (Re) establish state monopoly of use of force
- Building trust and relationships
- Institutional reforms
 - SSR and DDR
- Responding to acts of violence

Disorderly Peace

- Protests over Orange parades
- Recurrent rioting and disorder
 - Segregated communities
- Continued paramilitary activity
- Lack of trust in police

Drumcree 1996

Building Peace

- Managing tensions and violence
- Building legitimacy of police
- Standing down armed groups
- Creating sense of security
 - Civil society and co-production of security

Northern Ireland

- Armed conflict from 1969-94
 - State – Irish Republicans (IRA) – British Loyalists (UDA – UVF)
- Paramilitary Ceasefires 1994
- Peace Agreement 1998
- Police Reform 2001
- Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons 2001-10

Falls/Shankill – Springfield Road



Falls/Shankill – Springfield Road



Policing Northern Ireland

- Front line of security during conflict
- In 1999 there were
 - 13,000 police
 - 300 police killed during conflict
 - 11,400 British soldiers
 - None now
- Security sector reform high on political agenda

Policing Northern Ireland

- Polarised perspectives
- Disliked by Catholics:
 - Militarised force
 - Partisan - RUC were 92% Protestant
- Liked by Protestants
 - Defence against 'terrorists'
 - Brace sacrifices

Police Reform

- Part of peace agreement
- International body to develop new model
- Patten Report 1999
 - Seen as international best model
- Challenge to gain acceptance and legitimacy

Key Elements

- Symbolic changes
- Representative
- Human rights compliant
- Reduce use of force
- Accountable and transparent
- Policing with the community

Symbolic Changes

- New name and uniform
 - From Royal Ulster Constabulary
 - To Police Service of Northern Ireland
- New badge – broad range of symbols
- Still armed, still militarised





Representative

- Reduce numbers
 - From 13,000 in 2001 to 7,000 in 2013
- Increase number and % of Catholics
 - 8% in 2001 – 31% in 2013
- Balance gender
 - 13% women in 2001 – 27% in 2013

Human Rights Compliant

- Training HR proofed by Human Rights Commission
- Senior officers all human rights aware
- Annual human rights report by independent legal expert

Reduce Use of Force

- PSNI only armed force in UK
- High use of plastic bullets
- Shift to less lethal force
- Use of water cannons



Accountable

Multiple layers of accountability

1. Chief Constable reports to Policing Board
2. Local commander reports to Police and Community Safety Partnerships
3. All complaints to Police Ombudsman
4. Thematic reviews by Criminal Justice Inspector

Policing with the Community

- Patten – ‘policing is too important to leave to the police alone’
- Lack of mutual trust and legitimacy
- Nationalists suspicious of police
 - SF did not support reform process
- Build trust through working together

Bottom-up Activities

1. Dealing with inter-communal tensions
 - Mobile Phone Networks
 - Community based actors
 - Stewarding / marshalling of parades
 - Organisational responsibility
 - Monitors
 - Human rights groups
2. Responding to paramilitary violence
 - Community Restorative Justice

Managing Interface Tensions

- Responding to widespread rioting
 - 1996 – summer of disorder
- Maintaining communication
 - Use of new technology
- Creating and managing networks
 - Within communities
 - Between communities
 - With police

Managing Interface Tensions

- Standard model from 1997 onwards
 - Reduced scale of disorder
- Created and developed working relations
 - Built trust between police & activists
 - Slow, patient and persistent
- Paved way for political acceptance of policing

Marshalling Parades

- Marshals existed but ineffective
 - No training or authority
- Training programme developed – 1997-98
 - Based on football stewards
 - Cited in Patten Report
- Manage marchers and work with police
- More than 1,100 marshals trained by 2003

Marshalling Parades

- Organisers take more responsibility
 - Acknowledge impact on community
- Improved behaviour at parades
 - Marshals not part of formal parade
 - Limits provocation, reduces tensions
- Can be well co-ordinated with police
 - Reduce police manpower









Monitoring

- Models used in USA and South Africa
 - Lessons for NI
- Human rights monitoring of police
 - From 1996 – CAJ, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch
 - Observe and report
- Civil society monitoring of tensions
 - From 2002 – peace activists, students, academics
 - Observe, deter and inform







Paramilitary Punishments

- Problems of 'kneecapping'
 - 1994 – 2003: 200-300 per annum
 - Low level crime & internal discipline
 - Main victims young men
- Paramilitary power and authority
- Community expectations
 - Absence of trust in CJS
 - Need a swift response

Paramilitary Groups



Paramilitary Groups



Restorative Approach

- Restoration not retribution
 - Recognise hurt caused
 - Education and employment programme
- Role of Ex-Prisoners
 - Paramilitary buy-in
- State suspicion
 - Process of verification and accreditation
 - Now part of CJS

Building Security

- Slow process to build trust
- Goes backwards as well as forwards
 - Flag protests in 2012-13
- Need for inclusive approach
- NI one of safest parts of Europe
 - But still have occasional riots

