Intro to this needs Gadamer, as in Phillips Intro to Questions of tradition

Wiles Lectures 2008   Robin Osborne *The history written on the classical body*

1   The Citizen Body

It is conventional to observe that we talk of 'History' in two quite different senses. 'History' is

the past, but it is also writing about the past. Not only writing about the past, but writing

based on past writing. What distinguishes historians from archaeologists is that they study the

past on the basis of the evidence of texts, rather than of material remains.[1] Even when

historians do 'cultural history' what they do is study texts about cultural products; when

archaeologists do cultural history they describe those cultural products.[2] Normally

archaeologists and historians do not study the same past. Archaeologists concentrate their

efforts upon those periods of the past for which there is little or no textual evidence, upon

what is sometimes called 'prehistory'. Historians operate only with those past societies who

have left written records. The Greek and Roman worlds have long been a strange anomaly

here, the object of attention both of a special breed of archaeologists, 'Classical

Archaeologists', often regarded with suspicion by 'real' archaeologists, and of a special breed

of historians, 'Ancient Historians', a group increasingly embarrassed by the imperialist claim

embedded in their title that ancient Greece and Rome *are* the only ancient world worth

studying.

      But the imperialist claim that I am concerned with in these lectures is the claim of

History, the study of the past on the basis of the evidence of texts, to be History, to be the

past. For all that historians have become much more self-conscious about the writtenness of

their product and that it is they who give the past a plot, the effects of drawing upon texts as

the sole or at least the highly privileged source for knowledge of the past is rarely discussed

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[1] cf. 'l'histoire se fait avec des textes', Fustel de Coulanges cited by Marrou (1954) 77, cited by Hartog (1980) 381.

[2] For a case for turning archaeology into cultural history see Morris (2000).3–17, but Morris seems to me to neglect the biases built into basing history upon texts.

in anything more than a desultory way.[3] Archaeologists often write as if the strongest claim material culture has is that it gives evidence for the lower classes.[4]

The world of texts is always a world that is already classified. The giving of names, the putting into language, is classification. A language which made no distinctions would not communicate. But the distinctions made by language are distinctions always already made. When we look at a person (**Kritian boy**) and decide to refer to him as a 'boy' or 'youth' or just 'man', we are slotting this figure into one or other pre-ordained categories. The world of language is a world where boys and youths and men are distinct groups. Of course we can signal our difficulties about classification in any particular case, but the predispositions are to segregate.

But not only to segregate, also to polarise. All these verbal categories are open to negation, 'not a boy', 'not a youth' 'not a man'. Language regularly offers us polar opposites – left and right, up and down – and the advantages of polarizing encourage treating other differences as polarities – town and country, polarity and analogy. Over the past half century, many scholars have argued that the Greeks were peculiarly disposed to see the world in terms of polarities. Important here has been he work of Geoffrey Lloyd, whose *Polarity and Analogy: two types of argumentation in early Greek Thought* was published in 1966. It is notable that when my colleague **Paul Cartledge** was asked to write a general work on the Greeks for Oxford University Press in the 1990s, he organised the whole work around polarities – Greeks v. Barbarians, Men v. Women, Citizens v. Aliens, Free v. Slave, Gods v. Mortals, etc. As the blurb on the dust-jacket puts it,

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[3] cf. Marrou (1954) 77: 'si l'histoire ne se fait pas uniquement avec des textes, elle se fait sourtout avec des textes, dont rien ne peut remplacer la précision'.
[4] cf. Clarke (2003) for the pursuit of the lower classes in Roman art; Cf. Given (2004) for uncovering the stategies of the oppressed through survey and excavation.

'The book explores in depth how the dominant – adult, male citizen – Greeks sought,

with limited success, to define themselves unambiguously in polar opposition to a

whole series of 'Others' – non-Greeks, women, non-citizens, slaves, and gods.'

Behind Cartledge's history lies a powerful trend in literary criticism too, that has analysed

tragedy around the poles of Greek and Barbarian or Athenian and Theban.[5]

When we look at ancient Greek texts we find them continually making distinctions

and claiming contrasts. Herodotos' description of the world famously compares the various

peoples in and around the Persian empire to the Greeks, and that process of comparing and

contrasting leads him to emphasise the ways in which other peoples are the mirror image of

the Greeks. **François Hartog** famously drew attention to this in the 1980s with his *Le miroir

d'Hérodote*, showing, with regard to Herodotos' account of the Scythians, that Scythian

practices were often presented as Greek practices inverted. This is not a matter of peculiar

Herodotean narrow-mindedness – it is hard to think of a less narrow-minded historian than

this man who acknowledges that 'custom governs everything'. It is rather a matter of the

effect of the distinctions language requires when it comes to describing the world and

explaining past events. As Hartog points out, the Persians, when fighting Greeks, are

presented as anti-hoplites; but when it comes to fighting the Scythians, who refuse to stay in

one place and fight, the Persians become a classic hoplite army engaged in classic Greek

military strategy.[6]

We might be tempted to take this tendency to portray other peoples as polar opposites

of the self to be a particular feature of ethnography. We can trace the presentation of others as

the inverse of self back to the *Odyssey*, where agriculture and sacrifice mark out the civilised

world, and pastoralism and failure properly to sacrifice mark out the world of lawless

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[5] Hall (1989), Zeitlin (1986).
[6] Hartog (1980) 269

monsters, like the Cyclopes.[7] And we can trace the portrayal by contrast on into the classical

ethnographic tradition.[8] But not just the classical tradition: it is here that we find the ancestors

of 'orientalism', in the sense in which Edward Said has accustomed us to use that term.[9]

Putting Herodotos' practice into this ethnographic tradition has the advantage of

showing us that we should hesitate before reckoning what we find in Herodotos peculiar to

the Greeks. But it is equally a mistake to see classification by contrast as peculiarly

ethnographic. Herodotos does not reserve his method of presentation by contrast for non-

Greek peoples. He famously turns his 'ethnographic eye' upon Sparta, and the habit of

viewing Sparta as an inversion of other Greek practices comes to shape much historiography

on Sparta, such that scholars have long talked of the 'Spartan mirage'.[10] And what revealed

the 'mirage' as such was not simply the conflicts between different texts, but the availability

of non-textual evidence, in this case the evidence of archaeology.

If what we know about how the Greeks thought about others comes overwhelmingly

from texts, this is not because we are short of material evidence for the Greeks, for we are

not; it is because objects and pictures do not proclaim the opinions either of their makers or

their users. We expect historians to advance propositions and to show that those propositions

derive from propositions made by the historical actors themselves. If we are, as Lloyd was,

writing the history of philosophy, or at least of argumentation, then we reasonably write the

history of the texts in which that argumentation was carried out. But if we are trying to write

a history of how the Greeks saw the world, privileging texts becomes seriously problematic.

For while our communications may be dominated by oral or written texts, those texts offer

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[7] So Vidal-Naquet (1970).
[8] Rives (1999) 11–21 offers an introduction to that tradition.
[9] Said (1978).
[10] First expounded by Ollier (1933–43).

commentary on our being in the world, they are not the means by which we navigate our

daily relations to the world.[11]

Distinctions which are easy to make in texts may be difficult or even impossible to

make 'on the ground'. One famous remark made in what is the earliest extant prose text of any

length written in Athens makes this point memorably. The *Constitution of the Athenians*

included in the writings of Xenophon, but not by him, which dates to the last quarter of the

fifth century, observes that

> 'It is slaves and metics who lead the most undisciplined life in Athens: there, one is not
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> permitted to strike them, and a slave will not stand out of the way for you. I will explain
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> why this is their local custom. If the law permitted a free man to strike a slave or a
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> metic or a freedman, he would often think that the Athenian was a slave and would
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> have hit him; for, so far as clothing and general appearance are concerned, the common
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> people here are no better than the slaves and metics'.[12]

There is no doubt some exaggeration in Pseudo-Xenophon's claim, but it nevertheless

highlights the problem. Distinctions between Athenian and non-Athenian, between citizen,

metic, freedman and slave are all easy to make in texts. But how those distinctions operate in

society is a quite different matter. Slaves, resident aliens (metics), and citizens all had

different positions in law at Athens, but the significance of those differences must come into

question if the differences could not be put into operation at the moment at which they really

mattered.

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[11] When Laqueur writes that 'if structuralism has taught us anything it is that humans impose their sense of opposition onto a world of continuous shades of difference and similarity' (1990: ?19) he seems to me to underestimate the various non-textual ways in which humans relate to the world without imposing such oppositions. Curiously this comment is Laqueur himself imposing opposition on the evidence he discusses as he creates his 'one sex, two sex' model.

[12] [Xenophon] *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.10 tr. Osborne (2004).

Historians have long been aware, of course, that the texts which they employ offer only partial glimpses of life as lived. Scholars repeatedly observe, when it comes to using laws as evidence, that the presence of a law allowing, enjoining or forbidding an action does not indicate that that action was sometimes, always, or never engaged in – often it means the very opposite. Not only do repeated laws on a topic suggest that the problem addressed continued despite the earlier legislation, but the practical obstacles in the way of individuals using the resources which law put at their disposal have often been very significant. But the problems with law are only a particularly acute form of the problems with all texts. Claims made by texts classify the world under particular descriptions, but never show that all or even most people at the time saw the world in that way. That we have almost only texts written by high class men is often presented as a problem for writing the history of women or of 'ordinary' people in antiquity. But in fact not even high class men can have operated in daily life according to the divisions made in the texts they write.

Persons and objects in the world rarely come with labels on (except in ambitious middle-class households where small children are being taught to read). When we do meet an object telling us what it is, then it is usually attempting to persuade us, is aspirational, and is revelatory in no straightforward way. Identification always involves interpretation, and this may be more or less straightforward. Clerical collars pretty certainly identify clergy, and styles of dress enable clergy of different denominations to be more or less securely identified, but identifying a bank manager or distinguishing lecturers from professors on the basis of appearance is virtually impossible. Wiles Lecturers form an identifiable class – you can find a list of them on the website – but not a class that can be recognised in real life, except at the moment of delivery of the lectures themselves.

In these lectures I want to draw attention to the consequences of the different ways in which texts, on the one hand, and material bodies, on the other, divide up the world. I want to

suggest that we will write a quite different history of classical Greece, and in particular of classical Athens, if we turn to the history written not on stone and papyrus but upon the body. And I want to show not simply that there are areas of history about which texts are silent and the material record eloquent, but that in areas of history where texts are loquacious, the history that they offer stands only in oblique relation to the history that those active at the time experienced.

So bodies. My bodies of evidence for these lectures are material as well as textual. I want to ask the questions texts raise about material bodies. Today my question is: what is the citizen body? Is **this** a citizen body? This young man comes from just outside Anavyssos in southern Attica, or Anaphlystos as it was called in his day, which was around 530 B.C. Or are **these**? Hauled up together from the seabed off Riace Marina in the toe of Italy they have become classified as Riace A and Riace B, but the general view is that they were originally just two figures from a larger group, set up as a monument in a sanctuary in the second quarter of the fifth century. Is **this**? from the second half of the fifth century B.C., or at least, it is polite to treat him as such (he's really much younger, a copy made in the Roman period). His exact identity is somewhat debated, even though he may have had a book written about him by the man who made him, but he is known from the weapon he carries as the 'Spear carrier', or Doryphoros. How *can* one identify a citizen body?

The question of what it is to be a citizen has entered UK politics only recently. There weren't any British citizens until 1981; until then there were, technically, only British subjects.[13] That technical change impinged rather little onto the lives of most UK residents, though it significantly changed the relationship of Britain to Commonwealth and Colonial British

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[13] Layton-Henry (2001) 117.

subjects. What *has* impinged upon UK residents is the move in the last decade to have 'Citizenship' become a subject in schools. In 1998 the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) published a document entitled *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools*, explicitly announcing the intention of changing the political culture of the UK.

But what is a citizen? How do we identify the citizen body? The narrowly legal approach defines citizens by descent and residence. So under the British Nationality Act 1981, British citizens are those whose parents had been born, adopted or naturalised or registered as citizens of the UK, whether themselves born in the UK or not, or those who were born and then lived 10 years continuously in the UK.[14] This definition of citizenship creates 'bounded populations with a specific set of rights and duties, and excludes others on the grounds of nationality'.[15]

Those who were behind *Education for Citizenship* undoubtedly exploited the close relationship between the exclusionary definition of the citizen and nationalism, but they did so in support of way of looking at citizenship which stressed not the binary divide between the citizen and the non-citizen, but rather the difference between the citizen and the good citizen.[16] Fundamental here is what Michael Ignatieff has called 'The myth of citizenship', 'The myth of citizenship holds that political life is the means by which men realize the human good.'[17] Most remarkably, the moves attempt to harness the 'myth of citizenship' to an agenda of multicultural pluralism. To quote Bernard Crick, 'Pupils must be encouraged …

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[14] Layton-Henry (2001) 123.
[15] Ichilov (1998) 14
[16] cf. Crick (2000) 116 'surveys show that parents favour the idea of citizenship education (Institute for Citizenship, 1998) but perhaps not always 'political education'.
[17] Ignatieff (1995) 53.

to find and formulate their own values and group identities, but to recognize that in the United Kingdom… there is a diversity of values – national, religious, regional and ethnic'.[18]

The way in which these educational initiatives in the UK have exploited a concept which has heavy overtones of exclusion in order to promote a policy of inclusion can be looked at in a variety of ways.[19] Scholarly discussion has maintained that there are simply various different 'traditions' on the question of what it is to be a citizen that are being exploited here. They variously suggest that before the Romans came along with their juristic notions of citizenship, or before the development of notions of rights in the sixteenth century or of the modern western political tradition inaugurated by Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century, there was simply 'the classical ideal of citizenship', often defined with more or less direct reference to Aristotle and his notion of the citizen ruling and being ruled in turn. But the question 'what is a citizen' was already a major puzzle to Aristotle.

Aristotle devotes considerable space to the question of 'who should be called a citizen (his Greek term being *polites*), and who the citizen is'.[20] He starts by dismissing residence or legal rights as the source of citizenship, since they are not sufficient qualifications, He identifies as sufficient 'having a share in giving judgement and exercising office', treating attending the assembly and serving on a jury as counting for this purpose.[21] In practice, he notes, the citizen is defined as one whose parents are both citizens.[22]

By this point in the discussion Aristotle seems already to have used the term 'citizen' in a number of senses. When he notes that for practical purposes citizens are those both of

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[18] Crick (2000) 120

[19] It was certainly not an ignorant or innocent move; note Crick's use of 'legal citizen' and 'subject' in the following statement (Crick (2000) 117): 'we are a democracy, however imperfect, and its legal citizens should know how it works and how it could be improvied if we could change our collective mentality from being subjects of the Crown to being good and active citizens'.

[20] *Politics* 1275a1. Translations follow Robinson (1962).

[21] *Politics* 1275a23, 30–32.

[22] *Politics* 1276b2–4.

whose parents are citizens, he requires that women can be citizens, and indeed himself uses

the feminine form of the word *polites*, *politis*.[23] But in no Greek constitution known to us did

women have rights to give judgement and exercise office; unlike the boys, not yet enrolled,

and old men, exempted from service, whom Aristotle reckons to be citizens in a qualified

sense, women appear not to meet Aristotle's citizen definition at all.[24]

Aristotle's suggestion that being a citizen involves some sort of sharing in office,

involves him in two puzzles. One is that it means that what it is to be a good citizen will

depend on what offices are available to be shared in, that is, what the constitution is. This

means that whereas what it is to be a good man is absolute, what the good citizen is will be

relative to the constitution.[25] The second puzzle is whether one can really take just going

along to a democratic assembly to be sharing in office. His discussion of the good citizen

leads him to take a stronger line on what counts as 'ruling' or holding office, and he proposes

that 'there are several kinds of citizen, but the citizen most properly so called is he who has a

right to honours',[26] where working men have no rights to honours in aristocratic

constitutions.[27]

Aristotle's argument offers a parallel to the equivocation over 'citizen' in the

contemporary citizenship debate. Talking variously of the 'somehow citizen' (*polites pôs*),

the 'citizen absolutely' (*polites haplôs*), of 'broader' and 'narrower' senses of citizen,

Aristotle finds himself torn between quite different ways of conceptualising the citizen.[28]

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[23] *Politics* 1275b33. So again at 1278a26–8.
[24] *Politics* 1275a16 (cf. 1278a5–6) for qualified citizens.
[25] *Politics* 1276b16–34.
[26] *Politics* 1278a34–6, where 'properly so-called translates *legetai malista polites*. Newman (3.173–4) 'Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of citizen-virtue r4esults, in fact, in a change in his standard of citizenship'.
[27] *Politics* 1278a18–32.
[28] See above n.00 for scholars' descriptions of Aristotle's categories. In view of the discussion to follow, I should observe here that Aristotle makes almost no use of the word *astos*. It occurs once in the *Rhetoric* in a quotation from Euripides' *Medea*, and twice in *Politics*, once at 1278a34 when he remarks, surely with Athens in mind, that populous cities

Here again the tension is between citizenship as an exclusionary category, for which one either qualifies or one does not, and citizenship as an activity which may be well done or less well done, and without which human good cannot be achieved.[29] However successful Aristotle has been in giving the impression to those who read him that there was a single classical ideal of the citizen, as a man who ruled and was ruled in turn, his own text shows there was no such single notion of the citizen in the classical Greek world, but that the concept of the citizen was already a contested one.

Modern discussions regard citizenship in classical Athens as straightforward. 'At Athens, in the fourth century at any rate, a citizen could be defined as someone whose parents were Athenian citizens', writes Mogens Hansen in his standard textbook[30] Hansen then goes on in successive sections to discuss 'Rights of citizenship' and 'Duties of citizenship'. 'The population of Athens,' Hansen has already told us,

> 'like that of every city-state, was divided into three clearly differentiated groups:
> citizens; resident foreigners, called metics (*metoikos*); and slaves. The division shows
> that Athens was a society based on 'orders' rather than 'classes', for the tripartition was
> by legal status, i.e. it was based on privileges, or otherwise, protected by law.
> Membership of a group was typically inherited, and the groups were ordered
> hierarchically…'.[31]

Like Aristotle, modern scholars find themselves unable to maintain a consistent view of what it was to be a citizen at Athens. Hansen's definition is gender neutral, and allows for women as well as men to be citizens. But he then goes on to write that 'The principal

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end up restricting *politai* to those born *ex amphoin astoin*, and once at 1300b31 in remarking on separate courts being set up, one 'for *xenoi* against *xenoi*, one for *xenoi* against *astoi*.
[29] *Politics* 1253a1–4, 1278b 17—24; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1142a10 'and yet perhaps individual well being cannot exist without management of a household (*oikonomia*) and without a political system (*politeia*).
[30] Hansen (1991) 94.
[31] Hansen (1991) 86

privilege of an Athenian citizen was his political rights; in fact they were more than just a 'privilege': they constituted the essence of citizenship'.[32] Women, it appears, were citizens but did not have 'the essence of citizenship'. Even when scholars adopt a legalistic mode of describing citizenship at Athens that employs notions (such as rights) not employed by classical Athenian writers, they nevertheless find Athenian citizenship impossible consistently to encapsulate.[33] Can we do any better?

There are two term which scholars translate as 'citizen', *politês* derived from *polis*, and *astos* derived from *astu* (town).[34] *Polis* gives us the adjective *politikos*, with its 'political' overtones, *astu* gives the adjective *asteios*, the equivalent of 'urbane', and the tendency has been to take *politai* to have primarily a political sense, *astoi* a primarily local sense.[35] More recently Mogens Hansen has insisted that

'*astos* is never used in the sense of 'townsman' but invariably used about citizens and almost synonymously with *polites*. The only difference is that *astos* tends to denote a man of citizen birth, whereas *polites* is used when the emphasis is on a citizen's exercise of his political rights'.[36]

Astos and *polites* both occur in the Homeric poems.[37] As modern scholars have shown 'In Homer, *politai* are not "citizens" but more simply "inhabitants of a *polis*"'.[38] The regular

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[32] Hansen (1991) 97

[33] On whether language of rights is appropriate and whether it is employed by Aristotle see Schofield (1999) ch.8.

[34] The development of citizen terminology in the Greek world has been explored by . Compare also Blok 2005.

[35] This tendency is taken to an extreme by Cohen (2000) ch. 2, 49–63, which begins (49) In the fourth century, the residents of Attika shared a fundamental identification not as *politai* (citizens), but as *astoi* (locals). As *astoi*, they stood in complementary polarity to *xdenoi* (foreigners); See Osborne 2003. That it is a mistake to take *politikos* as having 'political' overtones emerges clearly from the social use of the term by Aristotle *HA* 488a8 who remarks that '*politika* creatures are such as have some one common object in view; and this property is not common to all creatures that are gregarious. Such *politika* creatures are man, the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane', where *politika* is best translated 'social'.

[36] Hansen (1997) 11; cf. Hansen (2006) 48.

[37] Levy (1985)

Homeric term, used 229 times in the *Iliad* alone, for those subject to the rule of a king is *laos*, 'people'; the leader has responsibility to and for the people, but the people do not themselves have a political role.[39]

Throughout archaic texts, living in a particular *polis* or *astu* is enough to qualify one as a *polites.* The earliest author who uses *politai* to mean those able to engage in political life is Herodotos, although he too mostly uses of the word with merely a residential connotation.[40] A particularly clear political use comes when the seer Teisamenos of Elis bargains with the Spartans, who want to secure his friendship and services, insisting 'that he would do what they wanted if they made him their *polietes* and <u>gave him a share of everything</u>, but not on any other condition'.[41]

Herodotos use of *astos* is striking for his choice of it when issues of status are in question. In book one Herodotos discusses Lycian practice of taking their names from their mothers rather than their fathers, and goes on: 'If a woman who is an *aste* cohabits with a slave, the children are considered noble; but if a man who is an *astos*, even if he is the most prominent of them, has a *xeine* wife or concubine, the children have no honour (*atima*)'.[42] Here *astos* status is contrasted both with slave status and with foreign status, making it clear that it involves freedom and being a city resident, but the terms used for the status of the children here, *gennaia* and *atima* point to social standing, not to political capacities.

Herodotos' pattern of *astos* being used as the narrow status term, *polites* as a more general term for free inhabitants of the *polis* is replicated across fifth-century Athenian texts. So in telling the story of the murder of Hipparchos Thucydides describes his assassin

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[38] Scully (1990) 1, cf. index p.222.
[39] See especially Haubold (2000).
[40] Herodotos 5.57.2, 7.156.2, 8.75.1, 9.33.4 and 9.35.1.
[41] 9.33.4, cf. also 35.1.
[42] Herodotos 1.173.5

Aristogeiton as 'a man of the *astoi*, a middling *polites*'.[43] Here *astos* appears as something one is or is not, *polites* as something that admits of further qualification.

We can follow this tendency to use *astos* if issues of legal status are in question and *polites* only rarely to refer specifically to those residents of the city who are politically capacitated, throughout Athenian authors of the later fourth century. So Plato consistently uses *astos* in opposition to other status terms, and particularly to *xenos* and *metoikos*. When describing in *Republic* 8 how too great a desire for freedom destroys democracy, for instance, Plato draws attention to the anarchy that results when sons expect to be like their fathers and have no fear of their parents, and when *metoikoi* are put on a par with *astoi* and *astoi* with *metoikoi*, and *xenoi* likewise.[44]

Plato sometimes uses *polites* to refer to status, but also in much broader ways. The potential breadth of *polites*, even as a status term, is nicely revealed by a passage in *Meno* where '*politai* and *xenoi*' is the phrase used to refer simply to 'all free men'.[45] And for Plato being a *polites*, unlike being an *astos*, is something which admits of being performed well or badly. The issues of who has been a good *polites*, and of how *politai* might be made better, recur constantly through Plato's discussions.[46]

It is now easier to see why Aristotle and modern scholars have such problems with what it is to be a citizen in ancient Greece. Both the words taken to mean 'citizen', *polites* and *astos*, are words that start by meaning members of communities, the community of the *polis* and of the *astu*. *Astos* comes to be used precisely for those given political capacities, *polites* remains widely used to cover a whole range of ways of belonging to the community, of which having political capacities is only one. *Polites* is the term which comes naturally to

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[43] Thuc. 6.54.2
[44] *Republic* 563a1.
[45] *Meno* 91a5
[46] *Prt*. 319a5*, Gorg.* 502e4, 513e7, 515c1, 7, 515d10, 517b7, 517c2, 518b1, *Meno* 90a6, *Theages* 127d7*, Laws* 822e5, 823a2.

the lips and pens of Athenians when they look around and need to refer to those they see, but it never becomes a narrow technical term. Both Hansen's claim that *astos* refers particularly to those of citizen birth, and his claim that *polites* is used to emphasise a citizen's exercise of his rights, are mistaken.

Establishing what exactly an Athenian had in mind when using the word *polites* reveals how social classification worked in Athens. The question which an Athenian implicitly answered when deciding to talk about his *politai* was not the question of who could vote in the Assembly or stand for office but the question of who was a member of the Athenian community and who was an outsider. That membership of the community extended easily to cover women, children, and even in some circumstances metics. Belonging to the community brought about expectations of behaviour, not thoughts of rights, and when asked to break down the class of *politai* the first thought an Athenian would have would be to differentiate between good or useful *politai* and bad *politai*.

[*Politai* were never conceived of as a body. They are never talked of as a body, for all that body analogies may come readily to hand, as when Plato in *Republic* investigates justice in the state by investigating the relationships of parts of the soul.[47] Nor were the *politai* classed together and separated from others. *Politai*, in the plural, are rarely if ever contrasted with any other group. This is partly because any context in which an Athenian wants to contrast the citizen group with a body of non-citizens is likely to be a context in which it is better to talk of 'the Athenians' and a body of identified *xenoi* (e.g. Spartans). But the absence of circumstances in which reference to a citizen body was appropriate is itself a significant historical fact.]

At this point I want to turn to the visual evidence. For art historians have believed that they can indeed detect a citizen body, or at least signs that a body is of a citizen. German

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[47] On which see the classic analysis by Williams (197?), and Ferrari (2006). See more generally Brock (2006), esp. 352–3

scholarship, in particular, identifies the knobbly stick carried by some bearded figures on Athenian fifth-century **pottery** as a 'Bürgerstock' and the cloak which such figures wear as the 'Himation des athenischen Bürgers'.[48] Others see these same signs as signs not of citizenship but of class, talking of the himation turning **satyrs** into 'middle-class folk'.[49] There is no doubt that clothing can indeed 'make people' on Athenian pottery, but there is no reason to take the signals sent to be signals of citizenship.[50]**Hats** indicate roles – the petasos of the traveller, the pilos of the countryman at work; so too does the main garment worn – the exomis is working-man's clothing, as is the garment tied round the waist.[51] But Athenian painters are remarkably inconsistent in marking out status with clothing. Although **slaves** can be marked out by stature, **physiognomy**, marks on the body, or clothing, there are other cases where, although slave status seems probable from the context, **neither** physical size nor appearance (whether of body or of clothing) signals that status.[52] As Sian Lewis has noted, 'In most working scenes there is no clear indicator of status at all, from clothes, length of hair or facial appearance'.[53] And what is true of painted pottery is true also of sculpture.

My assistant from **Anavyssos** has long been associated with an inscription which provides both his name, Kroisos, and the circumstances of his death, he died fighting in the front ranks in war.[54] Is he a citizen? What should we take this sculpted body to signify? The question is not an entirely artificial one here, since the inscription gives the figure a name that is neither Greek in origin nor popular in Athens. This name, surely derived from the sixth-century Lydian king, is otherwise known from one fifth-century Athenian citizen, one fifth-

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[48] For the stick, Heinemann (2000) 332; for the cloak, Krummeich (1999) 67 n.122; compare Lissarrague (1993) 210, writing of a satyr that 'his clothing, chiton and himation, gives him the dignity of a citizen'.
[49] Lissarrague (1993) 210.
[50] For the phrase cf. Heinemann (2000) 332 'Kleider mach Leute'.
[51] Pipili (2000).
[52] Oakley (2000).
[53] Lewis (2002) 79; cf. 138–41. See further Himmelmann (1971), (1994), and compare Clairmont *CAT* Introductory vol. p.35–7.
[54] Athens N.M. 3851, Richter (1970) no. 136

century Athenian metic, working on the Erekhtheion, and one or two certainly or possibly fourth-century men, known at Athens but of uncertain status.[55] One might expect the bearer of such a name to be anxious to display that he belonged to the Athenian community. But neither the body nor the inscription does any such thing. His body belongs to a type, the standing beardless naked male known as the *kouros* which is found in Greek cities from Libya to the Black Sea and from Asia Minor to Sicily. His inscription invites pity for an individual killed in war. Between them they identify him as one of the great army of the lost but not forgotten.

But if Kroisos is not distinctly *Athenian*, is he distinctly a *citizen*? Kouroi have earned their name from the apparent youth conveyed by their beardlessness. How old is Kroisos? Presumably he cannot have fought unless reasonably mature, but can we know whether he joined up aged 17 or 19?[56] Even if puberty came four years later in antiquity than now, real men can rarely have remained quite without facial hair much beyond eighteen.[57] *Kouroi* are the products of projection rather than observation, and show that projecting precise age and status was not the sculptor's concern.[58]

Lack of concern in sixth-century Athenian sculpture for distinguishing those old enough for political involvement is perhaps hardly surprising when Athenians were subjects of the tyranny of Peisistratos and his sons for most of the second half of the sixth century. Tradition held that the Peisistratids even preferred to use mercenary troops in this period. By

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[55] I follow the categorisation of *LGPN* II. Fifth-century citizen *IG* i³ 1183.17, metic, 476.12, 22f.; fourth-century figures *IG* ii² 11917, 11916.

[56] For Stewart (1996) 67 'Well-fleshed, well-muscled, and the right age to be an *eromenos* or "beloved," [the Anavyssos kouros] appeals to what has been called the glance's fetishistic, even narcissistic component which, so far from keeping aloof from what it sees, is captivated by it, desires to identify with it, wants to be at one with it and to emulate it'. I see none of the distinguishing marks of the *eromenos*, particularly in terms of facial hair, in this *kouros*.

[57] Davidson (2006), (2007).

[58] Gombrich (1960), which has been variously critiqued (Beard, Elsner, Osborne) but remains explicitly the model behind Stewart (1990) 75.

contrast in the fifth-century world of Athenian democracy we should expect distinguishing the citizen from the non-citizen to become more pressing.

Fifth-century sculpture does indeed quickly come to show great interest in showing age. The **most famous** of all early fifth-century Athenian free-standing statues is known as the Kritian *boy* precisely because comparison with *kouroi* reveals this to be a markedly youthful body. Some **painters** of pottery choose to portray ages with very considerable precision, and sculptors of this period prove capable of extraordinarily sensitive portayal of different bodily types. But were sculptors interested in those age distinctions that were politically significant – not just the age of 18 but the age of 30, at which Athenians could for the first time serve on the Council of Five Hundred and as generals?

The Riace warriors are certainly over the age of 18, but what of their status? The close similarity of the pose of these figures only draws attention to their extraordinary difference from one another. Warrior A is firm fleshed, fighting fit without giving any sense of artificial bodily development. Warrior B has flesh that is thinner and slacker, muscles that lack the tone. These two warriors live in the world differently. Bruno Latour has called for the introduction of the term 'multinaturalism', drawing attention to how productive would be 'the abandonment of the world into incommensurable and irreconciliable multiplicities'.[59] And precisely because Warriors A and B are in many ways so alike, the differences between them seem the more incommensurable and irreconcilable. We can assess their bodies on a range between hard and soft, but to do so fails to relate them. Because the body is 'that through which we learn to be affected',[60] these two different bodies can only be taken to stand for different ways of being affected. Those differences are, for some modern Italian observers at least, different sexual orientations.[61] What they are unlikely to have been for any

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[59] Latour (2002) 140.
[60] Despret (1999) quoted at Latour (2002) 140.
[61] Taplin (1989) 87–9

observer, I suggest, is citizen and non-citizen bodies, though they might display be construed as good or a not so good citizen.

No subsequent sculptures look like the Riaces. Take my **last** assistant. the renowned 'Spear carrier' created by Polykleitos of Argos. When Pliny describes this work he uses the words 'viriliter puerum' ('a manly boy'), contrasting it with **another** of Polykleitos' statues, the *Diadoumenos*, which he describes as 'molliter iuvenem' ('soft youth').[62] The copies support this contrast between the 'hard' Doryphoros and the 'soft' Diadoumenos, but if Pliny's terms 'youth' and 'boy' lead one to expect something particularly childish about the Doryphoros the copies disappoint. The Doryphoros' virility conflicts with the youth that the absence of facial hair asserts among Greeks who did not shave. Can so manly a figure be a boy? Rather than offering a body type resonant of a particular way of being in the world, the Doryphoros offers a body type whose reference to the world is confused and unreadable. Yet this statue became already in antiquity the very embodiment of classical male beauty.[63]

The direction of my argument will have become clear. Not only do classical authors employ the term *polites* to cover all the residents of the polis, but when men are represented no attempt is made either to mark off the actual from the potential citizen by age, or to give the citizen a body distinct from the non citizen. Political status is never visually flagged, even on monuments which represented Athens to itself, as the Parthenon frieze does. There is no verbal or visual marking out of those who had political rights. Whatever modern scholars have heard behind *polites*, no reference could, without context, be assumed to pick out only either those who 'ruled and were ruled in turn' or those who had two parents who were both Athenian.

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[62] Pliny *Natural History* 34.55. There are sexual connotations here, with *puer* the term for a boy beloved and *mollis* used to indicate effeminacy.
[63] Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 5.12.21

Let me put this in positive form. Athenians found themselves needing in a range of different contexts to talk about those who belonged in the Athenian community. Exactly what that community comprised, and with whom a contrast was being made by referring to the community, varied from occasion to occasion. The Athenians had a term for one belonging to the community, *polites*, but used that term flexibly, defining the community by context, not by the term itself. If it was necessary to refer to the particular rules which determined who had political capacities in the community they had an alternative term they could use, *astos*. But the default term was *polites*, and the default emphasis was on being part of a community, not on having or not having a political role. So too classical sculptors, although demonstrating in works from shortly after the Persian wars that they could distinguish individuals in extremely subtle ways, and draw attention to the multinaturalism of the human world, chose rather to continue to stress, as their archaic forebears had done when they sculpted *kouroi*, what human figures have in common, and to do so by developing a convention for representation which stood free not just of petty jostlings for status in a particular culture but of the particular combinations of features offered by nature itself.

If Aristotle juggles narrow definitions of who is afforded political capacities in the polis against broader conceptions of what it is to be a citizen, which involve the quality of participation within the community, that may be because Athenians, although finding it necessary to define who could take part in politics, continued to think in much broader terms of participation in the community. Aristotle's legacy is the dichotomous model dominant and unresolved in contemporary talk of citizenship. When restricting who had political capacities was thought necessary at Athens the Athenians responded by developing terminology to refer to those possessing the political capacities (*astoi*) distinct from their regular way of referring to members of the community (*politai*). The British Citizenship Act of 1981 hi-jacked the term 'citizen' for a restricted use when it wanted to distinguish between British subjects who

had and those who did not have the right of residence in the UK. That it is now felt necessary to teach 'citizenship', that is teach what it is to be a good member of the community, suggests that modern Britain has been less successful than classical Athens in preventing the act of hi-jacking from impacting upon community.

Part of Athenian resistance to dividing society between those who had and those who did not have political capacities was constituted by the creation of the classical body, an ideal of what it was to be a man which resisted the claims of particularism and the possibilities for distinguishing male bodies, whether as to their nature or as to their culture. There was neither a distinct body type for the Athenian male over the age of eighteen nor distinct clothing for mature children of Athenian parents. The effects which Latour seeks when he calls for 'multinaturalism' were arguably achieved by an art that defies nature. The model of male beauty developed in what we call classical idealism charged an unnatural male body with positive force in representations of service to the community. The more closely the real citizen body was scrutinised for its age and its parentage, the more distanced the body of art became, and the more impossible pinning status distinctions made by language onto **real bodies**.