- October 5, 2022
- 13 University Square/0G/010
- 16:00 - 17:30
Matt Jope, University of Edinburgh, 'Evidentialism and Non-Evidentialism for Rational Trust'
An important question for the epistemology of trust is whether trust is normatively constrained by evidence. Evidentialists hold that trust is rational only if supported by evidence. One benefit of evidentialism is that it helps to capture what looks like an intuitive connection between trust and action: we place trust in others and in doing so acquire reasons for action. However, one drawback of evidentialism is that it fails to explain what is distinctive about trust that sets it apart from other cognitive attitudes such as belief. Non-evidentialism on the other hand is better suited to explain what is distinctive of trust but it appears unable to account for the intuitive connection between trust and action. I argue that progress can be made by distinguishing between beliefs that are the output of trust and the trusting attitude itself. While the former may be supported by evidence, the latter need not be.
School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics
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