Competition between elites of antagonistic societal segments in divided societies often has an unsettling effect on stability. This project focuses on the internal relationships between political elites in Lebanon whose competition for over 30 years amid continuous external disruptions, contributed to political stability, normalised intergroup peace and made power-sharing arrangements resilient.

Since the Taif Agreement (1989), elites representing the major Lebanese religious communities (18 officially recognised sects) have developed, consolidated and reinforced patronage networks. This had a double effect on sectarian elites’ position in society: first, they emerged as gatekeepers for citizens’ access to most socio-economic opportunities, guaranteeing citizens’ ability to “get by” while the state remained persistently under resourced. Second, elites status became precariously dependent on the ability to deliver services and goods to their followers in return for confirmation of elites’ status.

Both these dynamics have encouraged normalisation of a transactional relationship between elites and members of their sects, while at the same time allowing inter-elite competition to become pragmatic, preventing threats which could disbalance the overall power dynamics. That both elite-followers and inter-elite relationships are following informal rules, and that this informality empowers sectarian elites has been recognised (Salloukh 2015), as are the dynamics through which elites serve to weaken state services while increasing their own patronage networks as substitute.

The project considers the reverse impact of patronage on Lebanese elites and on dynamics of inter-elite relationships that result from elites’ dependency on support of their communities/sects and, more importantly, on the survival of the state as the primary conductor of their activity. Appreciating the pressures that sectarian citizenship exercises over elites allows for a better understanding of the paradoxical “hollowing out” of the state by elites (Mouawad 2017, Makdisi and Marktanner 2009), at the same time as elites actions towards preventing state collapse.

The project begins with the assessment of literature on post-Taif inter-elite competition and cooperation in Lebanon, before moving on to analysis of media and documents to identify the main themes which elites have use to highlight their connection with voters, and to distinguish themselves from other elites justifying their limited cooperation across the sectarian divide. Specifically, the project will prioritise political elites across the four major Lebanese sects: Sunni Islam (S Hariri, N Mikati, T Salam), Shia Islam (N Berri, H Nasrallah), Druze (Walid Jumblatt and Talal Arslan) and Maronite Christian (G Bassil, M Aoun, S Gemayel, S Geagea, S Frangieh).

During the second stage of the projecte, these themes are dissected as they emerge during 2011-2022 period, allowing the research to comprehensively study inter-elite competition and cooperation around key moments of domestic inter-sectarian tensions: clashes in Sidon (2012), the bombing in Tripoli (August 2013), Bir Hassan bombing (November 2013), the two assassinations in December 2013, the Arsal clashes (2014), subsequent bombings in 2015 and finally, the 2019 protests.

The third stage focuses on the October 2019 protests. These are often identified by observers as exclusively domestic (Geha 2019; Assi 2020, Grimm 2025), and therefore qualitatively different to the inter-sectarian conflictual instances. However, this study argues that these protests are perceived and presented by elites as equivalent external threats to the existence of the state at large. As such, this particular observation and analysis allows the research to confirm whether motivations and responses to the domestic tensions of 2019 reflect responses to external challenges in the earlier phase. Specifically, anticipate elites’ use of similar rhetorical behaviour and strategies to treat threats as “external to Lebanon” and as ‘anti-Lebanese’ to justify their own role in the system and increasing state resilience as a consequence.

By conducting this analysis, the project will enhance existing understanding of elite-elite and elite-society relations in Lebanon and, more broadly, offer a deeper assessment of elites communications, identify pathways to harmonisation of messages between competing elites and showcase inter-elite cooperation to both assert dominance and increase state resilience. Furthermore, the research of inter-elite competition and cooperation, can equally be tested in other polities with structural similarities. e.g. Iraq, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, for its generalisability, and to enrich our understanding of other deeply divided societies.